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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

MAY
JUNE | 1966

Communism and Catholicism

Report on Latin America

Peking and China's Past

Reforms in Bulgaria

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WHITHER RUSSIA?

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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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Whose Men in Havana?

By D. Bruce Jackson

Within the space of just over a year, Havana was the site of two conferences of major significance for the Latin American Communist movement. Both were probably financed almost entirely by the USSR, but while Moscow reacted to one with smug satisfaction, it was clearly annoyed and frustrated by the second. The first, a conference of some 22 Communist parties from Latin America, held in late November of 1964, marked a temporary end to recriminations between Castro and traditional Communist party leaders of the hemisphere. It also set the stage for a series of events in Cuba pleasing to Moscow, ranging from the departure of Che Guevara to the eventual open rift with Peking. The second was the Tricontinental Solidarity Conference of January 3-15, 1966, which not only failed to deal the Chinese the nasty blow Moscow had hoped for but strained Moscow's diplomatic ties with countries in the rest of the hemisphere. On top of this, the conference freed Castro, at least partially, from the restraints which the earlier gathering had placed on his maverick policies in regard to revolutionary upheavals in Latin America.

The First Havana Conference

The November 1964 Havana conference brought Castro face-to-face with Moscow-line Communist leaders from virtually all the Latin American countries. As long as they evinced a willingness to make at least some concessions to Cuban views, Castro could hardly refuse to act in concert with them. Concessions apparently were forthcoming, for in January a joint communique of the meeting was published, and signs of a Cuban rapprochement with both Moscow and the Latin American parties began to appear.[1]

The Soviet side had apparently conceded the necessity of supporting guerrilla warfare in

Mr. Jackson is an American student of Latin American affairs. This is his first contribution to Problems of Communism.

[1] TASS, January 18, 1965. Full text also appeared in *Pravda,* January 19, on which date it was also carried by *Prensa Latina.*

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several areas where local Communists had previously judged the popular mood to be unready for armed struggle. Earlier, only the Venezuelan Communist Party had supported Castro-style insurgency. The Havana communique, however, listed five other countries as areas where "support for freedom fighters" was called for: Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia, Paraguay, and Haiti. If elsewhere the traditional Communist parties might pursue their customary opportunism with renewed abandon, freed from the threat of Cuban-supported insurgencies on their left flank, in these six countries it seemed that Castro could exact a compensatory effort by local Communists more along Fidelista lines.

For a brief period, events seemed to bear out this description of the Moscow-Havana compromise. Guerrilla insurgency in Venezuela was stepped up in early 1965, the Colombian Communists began making new sounds of support for the guerrilla bands in the hills, and a new guerrilla organization, the FAR ("Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes"—Rebel Armed Forces) made its appearance in Guatemala with the blessings of the local Communist party. However, the continued appearance in such Soviet-line media as the *World Marxist Review* of articles strongly critical of "adventurists" or "ultra-revolutionary" activities by the Latin American left suggested that Moscow did not perceive the six-country formula as a permanent solution to the problem of Latin American revolution. It soon became evident, in fact, that Moscow viewed the Havana conference more as a tactical maneuver aimed at budging Castro off the fence in the Sino-Soviet struggle than as an outline for Latin American Communist strategy. Furthermore, while the conference may have resulted in generally increased Communist militancy of a sort pleasing to Castro, it also permitted an ideological retreat from certain Chinese and Cuban nostrums irritating to Moscow.

The Guevara myth of the ascent to power of the "Lider Maximo" had never been a comfortable addition to Latin American Communist doctrine. Even Maoist teachings called for a more extensive groundwork for the revolution than the myth attributed to Castro's band. But as long as Cuba remained the latest and best example of Communist success in Latin America, a certain amount of homage had to be paid to Castro's "strategy" of creating revolutionary situations where none yet existed by means of heroic armed struggle against the old order. Failure to render this homage had often provoked Castro to direct his support to other leftist groups more willing to take up arms, leaving the less militant Communists still to share the brunt of repressive measures taken by government forces against the insurgents.

Nevertheless, in addition to the aversion of Moscow-line Latin American Communists to violent revolutionary activity—an aversion which antedates Khrushchev's "peaceful road to socialism" formula—there was a growing conviction in Moscow by the time of the Havana Conference of 1964 that the Castro phenomenon was not likely to be successfully imitated by his gun-wielding followers elsewhere. The continent might be "ripe for revolution," but it was clearly not ripe for Communist revolution or anything easily identifiable as such. Armed struggle in Venezuela, although amply financed by both Moscow and Havana, was clearly making no significant headway, while in other countries attempts to launch revolutions from the hills in Castro's now tarnished image had failed dismally. Not only were new Castroist movements bearing the stigma of their idol's post-victory sell-out to Moscow, but the counter-insurgency techniques applied by the Latin American governments in 1964 were far superior to Batista's bumbling offensive against the Cuban revolutionaries.

As Moscow-oriented Communists surely realized, a major key to Castro's success in gaining power in Cuba had been his avoidance of identification with any foreign revolutionaries. How could he now expect revolutionaries in other countries to succeed in his name and under his slogans? The problem, as stated by a Guatemalan Communist in mid-1965, was "the tendency . . . after the victory of every revolution of world significance to universalize every detail of its experience as a general 'guide to action'." He concluded: ". . . paradoxically enough, after Cuba the revolution in Latin America is becoming more difficult." [2]

[2] José Manuel Fortuny, "Has the Revolution Become more Difficult in Latin America?" *World Marxist Review* (Prague), August 1965, p. 39. Fortuny is a Guatemalan Communist Party [PGT] central committee member in exile.

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Moscow apparently hoped that the step forward toward the Cuban position at the 1964 conference would clear the way for a tactical two steps backward to a position more suited to the realities of Communist potentials in the hemisphere. The move toward Castroism at the Havana conference was, in fact, superficial at best. For all its militant wording, the main stress of the Havana communique was on the right of each party individually to determine its own "correct line" and to implement it without competition from externally supported splinter groups. Hence, if a party in one of the six countries of "freedom fighters" later decided that changed circumstances required de-emphasizing violent tactics, Castro was still restrained from supporting other groups by the communique's injunction against "all factional activity."

More important, Castro's commitment to the Havana compromise split him away from the Chinese and the Chinese-line revolutionary elements in Latin America. Whether Castro fully realized this at the time remains unclear. Certainly he did everything possible to forestall a break with the Chinese, from delaying publication of the Havana communique until late January (a day after the Russians finally published it) to sending Che Guevara off to Peking at the end of January. Castro himself probably did not feel that his concessions at Havana had amounted to abject surrender to Moscow. He could not help but recognize the failure of Castroist bands in most of the hemisphere, and he probably accepted both the validity and sincerity of Moscow's arguments on the need for Communist unity. A growing Sino-Cuban rift nevertheless developed, manifested by increasingly frequent hinting at Cuban "revisionism" by ultra-left groups, many of which had previously looked to both Havana and Peking for revolutionary guidance and inspiration.[3] Despite his desire for Communist harmony, Castro felt compelled to make a speech on March 12, 1965, clearly informing the Chinese that their caustic hints about flaws in his revolutionary integrity were both unwarranted and highly unwelcome in Cuba.

As 1965 wore on, the regional pattern for armed versus peaceful Communist tactics suggested by the Havana communique bore less and less resemblance to what was happening. Of the six countries in which Communists had a presumed moral commitment to support Cuban-style insurgency, only one could claim a significant new development: Guatemala and the FAR. In Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti, the question of support for freedom fighters remained academic. In Colombia there were early indications of a turn towards armed struggle, but the Colombian contribution to the August *World Marxist Review* contained an emphatic statement that armed struggle was only one of many tactics to be applied in different situations in the country. Finally, in Venezuela an April Communist party plenum enunciated a two-pronged strategy of armed struggle and "democratic peace," which opened the door to renewed agitation by the more Moscow-oriented elements of the PCV leadership for a turn towards non-violent political struggle.

The Dominican Windfall

The unexpected course of events following the April 24 Dominican crisis gave added impetus to existing trends in Moscow-line Communist thinking. What had begun as a "bourgeois-reformist" coup [4] became—through Communist participation in the rebel movement, repressive actions of the military, and US troop landings—a "patriotic struggle against Yankee imperialist intervention" in which the Communists could claim to be the "most consistent" fighters for constitutionalism and national sovereignty.

This was made possible not through the abortive guerrilla tactics which in 1963 had led the Castroist 14th of June movement to ignominious defeat, but through cooperation with bourgeois elements in something resembling a united front. The submersion of Communists in this joint effort in turn allowed support for the rebels both within Latin America and within the US, preventing a total mopping-up of the Communist elements and eventually, according to Moscow, forcing an "imperialist"

[3] Leading the attack was the Belgian dissident Communist journal *La Voix du Peuple*. In its issue No. 27 of July 2, 1965, Castro is accused of " 'organized peaceful coexistence' in the revisionist mode."

[4] Moscow never seemed sanguine about Communist strength in the rebel movement; Peking was still less so, referring derisively to the pro-Bosch leadership of the coup as "putschist." NCNA, Peking, April 29, 1965.

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retreat in the form of the compromise Godoy government.[5] As one Soviet writer exclaimed in May: "If the Cuban revolution ushered in an age of people's democratic, socialist revolutions in the Western Hemisphere, the present developments in Dominica (sic) are the beginning of a new period, in which the conditions are being created for broad national anti-imperialist fronts to resist North American imperialism." [6]

In the Soviet Union, the Dominican crisis encouraged those who advocated the increased world-wide use of united—or popular—front tactics. Their voices, feeble at first, increased in strength by the summer and fall of 1965, when Moscow celebrated the 30th anniversary of the Seventh Comintern Congress (July 25-August 20, 1935). The Comintern Congress anniversary combined with the Dominican crisis and the escalation of fighting in Viet-Nam to provide Moscow with the pretext for the tactical switch. The decisions of the congress, which condemned "left sectarianism" within the Communist movement and authorized the formation of broad popular fronts to include all forces opposed to fascism, were ideally suited to a Russian counteroffensive aimed at isolating both the Chinese "Stalinists" and the US "imperialists." [7]

In the months that followed, three factors of the "united front" concept emerged: 1) in the socialist camp, unity of action (and hence no Chinese nonsense) against the enemy; 2) in the developed capitalist countries, "anti-monopolistic unity" of the Communists with Social Democrats; and 3) in the undeveloped world, "anti-imperialist national unity" involving Communists and national democratic parties.[8] For the Communist countries, this formula involved merely a restatement of the unity theme with which Moscow has long sought to discredit the "splittist" Chinese. In Europe it involved increased stress on tactical flexibility in forming alliances with other leftist parties (as in the Mitterand candidacy), and in the developing world it meant a further broadening of the 1960 prescription for the newly-emerging African states which had urged Communists to submerge or even dissolve themselves in "national democratic" movements.[9]

Latin America, which because of its developed class structure had not really been covered by the "national democracy" formula, clearly figured prominently in this new theoretical construct. After the Dominican crisis, the logic of the Seventh Congress was applicable in a unique sense to Latin America, where the spectre of "US imperialist intervention" could be conjured up as an "external enemy" of both a "socialist fatherland" (in this case Cuba) and the Boschista democratic left. Furthermore, the known aversion of Castro to "open airing of dirty linen" lent particular appropriateness to the tactics of denouncing pre-1935 sectarianism rather than Mao Tse-tung and of identifying current Soviet policies with the Seventh Congress rather than with Nikita Khrushchev.

The Doctrine, 1965

The dominant theme of Moscow-line writings on Latin America in 1965 was the creation of the "broadest possible front of democratic and anti-imperialist forces." Specifically named for inclusion in such fronts were the "left Christian Democrats," as well as such familiar Communist target groups as the Peronists in Argentina and the Trabalhists in Brazil. Beyond this the formula was vague, but how far it went was indicated by the Brazilian Communist Pedro Motta Lima, who asserted in the August 1965 *World Marxist Review* that the "broad united opposition front" must take in "wherever possible, those sections of the oligarchy which

[5] For Moscow's view of the Dominican settlement, see Vadim Listov, "Washington's Setback in Santo Domingo," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 37, September 15, 1965, pp. 13-14.

[6] V. Listov, "Big Stick Against a Small Nation," *New Times*, No. 20, May 17, 1965, p. 11.

[7] US House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, 84th Congress 2nd Session, *Strategy and Tactics of World Communism: the World Congresses of the Communist International*, p. 308 ff.

[8] This neat world-wide formula emerged most clearly in B. Ponomarev's speech to an October 21-23 Prague conference which appeared in *Kommunist*, No. 16, November 1965, pp. 14-31.

[9] For an extensive discussion of the convoluted "National Democracy and the Post-Colonial Period," see Kurt London (ed.) *New Nations in a Divided World*, Praeger, New York, 1963, pp. 56-74.

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are not directly connected with the ruling camarilla." [10]

Communist doctrine also made a significant turnabout on military matters. Commentaries began to identify "anti-imperialist" or "anti-oligarchic" undercurrents in the Latin American military and to attach great importance to the lower-class origins of many soldiers. "Patriotic" army officers and enlisted men were now considered both suitable and vital allies of the Communists. As an October Moscow broadcast explained, "In a number of Latin American countries, when the balance of strength between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces depended on the soldiers, the cohesion of officers with patriotic inclinations for the democratic movement decided the result of the struggle." [11]

The rationale for this broadened front drew heavily on the Dominican events. According to Motta Lima, the reasons why "the enemy did not venture to use his military superiority to impose his will on the Dominican people" were both the "protests and solidarity" of the world and the "especially noteworthy" fact that "restoration of democracy was the watchword of the April rebellion." [12] To use Marx's words, the fight for democracy is the "universal pretext," the *"point of departure* for the revolution, its most important initial objective capable of uniting and mobilizing a broad front of social and political forces."[13] In other words, democratic slogans, not socialist or the later Castroist ones, give cohesion and lasting power to a revolutionary movement, and it is alliance with non-Communists (including military elements) which gives the revolutionary movement the strength and international respectability necessary to slow the hand of US or OAS response.

These themes were developed repeatedly in various ways in the August 1965 *World Marxist Review*. "It would be a grave political mistake," wrote Costa Rican Communist Eduardo Mora Valverde, "to advance slogans which do not correspond to the realities of the present stage and hence are likely to alienate potential allies in the struggle against imperialism." [14] A Guatemalan Communist noted: ". . . the role which the party is called upon to play as the vanguard of the revolution is one thing in theory and quite another in practice. . ." [15]

Such comments, with their clear suggestion that Communists should not only play down the socialist content of their program at this stage but also be prepared to accept a secondary role behind non-Communists in Latin America revolutionary movements, run directly counter to Chinese doctrine. Peking's view on united front tactics, as expressed most recently in Lin Piao's V-E day speech, is that correct balancing of "alliance and struggle" allows concessions to potential allies only insofar as the dominant role of the Communist Party is not compromised and the way thus opened for a Chiang Kai-shek-style "betrayal." The goal of united front alliances, according to the Chinese, should be the simultaneous waging of numerous "people's wars" throughout the underdeveloped world to overextend and weaken the US, not merely collaboration for more limited common objectives.[16]

The Cubans share only half of the Chinese doctrine on united fronts, however, the half which emphasizes the need for armed struggle. The Communist "vanguard" was never at the reins in Castro's victory and was, if anything, carried along towards a Communist state at a rate exceeding its boldest expectations.[17] Moscow is quite aware of this fact and, in seeking to refashion an ideological compromise with Castro, evidently reasoned that the support of armed struggles demanded by the Cuban leadership had become increasingly open to redefinition as a result of developments within Cuba as well as in the hemisphere at large.

The place of armed struggle in the current doctrine is prominent—broader than the six original targets of the first Havana conference,

[10] Pedro Motta Lima, "The Revolutionary Process and Democracy in Latin America," *World Marxist Review*, August 1965, p. 48.
[11] Yuri Ponomarev commentary, Moscow Radio, October 2, 1965.
[12] Pedro Motta Lima, *op. cit.*
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] Eduardo Mora Valverde, "Economic Situation in Latin America and Development of the Revolution," *World Marxist Review*, August 1965, p. 36.
[15] J. M. Fortuny, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
[16] *NCNA*, Peking, September 2, 1965.
[17] See Theodore Draper's analysis in his *Castroism, Theory and Practice*, Praeger, New York, 1965, pp. 81-88.

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but also vaguer and not at all where either the Chinese or Che Guevara would have placed it. Armed struggle is considered virtually inevitable, but only because of the "violence of reaction and US imperialism," which in every country except Chile and perhaps one or two others closes the path to peaceful revolution. Parties must prepare for violence, master the techniques of armed struggle, and cultivate military allies, but violence is not to be a catalyst of revolution as in Guevara's theory. Rather it is a sequel to the acquisition of power by a "broad democratic front" of a national democratic character in which the Communists have a significant but probably not predominant role. The expected violent response of "US imperialism and local reaction" to this front would then usher in armed resistance of a popular sort, behind which the people would unite as they did in the struggle against Batista's repressions in 1958-59. If the Communists had learned their Dominican lessons well, they would survive the fray and thrive, emerging as leaders of this now "patriotic" battle for freedom and national dignity. Thus when the enemy finally retreated in the face of international indignation, the Communists would have ensured themselves a strategic position in some subsequent united front government, which under Soviet blandishments and Yanqui glares could with luck be coaxed down the rosy path to "scientific" socialism.

The obvious parallel between this strategy and certain facets of the Cuban path to communism is most noteworthy because Communists have waited until the Dominican crisis to draw it so clearly. As one Communist writer, José Manuel Fortuny, put it, ". . . it is necessary to give thought . . . to whether the North American imperialists are not assimilating the lessons of the Cuban revolution more rapidly than we are."[18] In other words, the US may have been more impressed by the possibilities of united front revolutionary reformist movements serving Communist goals than the Communists themselves, who in the Dominican Republic publicly admitted that they had underestimated the revolutionary potential of the bourgeois-led coup and were not prepared to take full advantage of it.[19] Fortuny continued:

Usually only one aspect of the Cuban revolution is stressed—its tactical path, the path of the heroes who with arms in hand took to the mountains. . . . But it is no less important to analyze the other lessons of Cuba.[20]

The "other lessons" involved primarily Cuba's largely peaceful transition from a national-democratic revolution into a socialist one, even with orthodox Communists playing something less than a "vanguard" role. A statement by the Soviet Academy of Sciences in the same issue of the August *World Marxist Review* expressed this lesson succinctly:

The evolution of the Cuban July 26th Movement has shown that revolutionary trends can in some cases assume the leadership of anti-imperialist and democratic struggles and go over to the position of the revolutionary proletariat as the movement progresses, by concluding a solid alliance (or by merging) with the Communist parties both before and after the socialist revolution.[21]

Twixt Theory and Reality

"Broad united fronts" are of course nothing very new—they were strongly endorsed in the Havana conference communique and have always ranked high on the list of priorities for Latin American Communists, who have participated in numerous coups and palace revolutions in cooperation with non-Communists, without notably advancing their cause. Nevertheless, the emergence of this doctrine, with its forthright rejection of Che Guevara's thesis on a "catalytic" insurrection, so soon after the Havana agreement between the Cubans and the Moscow-line Latin American Communists was remarkable. The new closeness of Castro to Moscow had apparently produced not a turn by traditional Communists toward the Castro-

[18] J. M. Fortuny, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

[19] See Dominican party organ *El Popular,* Santo Domingo, August 16, 1965.

[20] J. M. Fortuny, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[21] "Political Parties in Latin America," *World Marxist Review,* August 1965, p. 105.

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ist line of insurgency, but rather a reconfirmation and accentuation of their traditional line.

The departure of Che Guevara from the Cuban scene, which delighted Moscow, could only partly explain this phenomenon. The Soviets also must have expected united front tactics to be more productive of results satisfactory to Castro then they had been in the past. This Moscow could do only by assuming that the United States would be accused of pursuing a "big stick" policy which threatened not only the workers but broad sectors of the bourgeoisie, thus making united fronts both possible and useful. The Russians could also argue that Castro had a better chance of breaking out of his Latin American isolation by making common cause with non-Communists against "Yanqui imperiolismo" than by scaring the reformists with insurgency and Bolshevik or Castroist slogans.

There were problems, however, such as the Cuban leader's emotional need to reaffirm his revolutionary credentials when under attack from ultra-leftists for selling out to "Soviet revisionism"; this began to push Castro away from anything smacking of "softness" on revolution. Implementation of the united front doctrine, of course, also continued to pose many problems beyond that of possible Cuban opposition. The ability of Communists to form united fronts of consequence often depends on factors almost wholly outside their control—in particular the willingness of such revolutionary leftist groupings as the MIR's in Peru and Venezuela to go along with the "unity" argument and play down violence. As long as the latter continue

Communist Strategy in Latin America: Three Variants

HAVANA

The Revolution Triumphant

The duty of every revolutionary is to effect the revolution, and effect it in deed, not in word . . . . We believe that on this continent, in the case of all or almost all peoples, the battle will take on the most violent forms.

—Fidel Castro in closing address to Tri-continental Conference, Jan. 16, 1966.

Let *Borba* know that the broad front of the real progressive and revolutionary forces of Latin America is not reached by means of hesitation before imperialism or by agreements with the imperialist puppet governments, but rather, on the contrary, by means of revolution. . . .

—Editorial in Cuban Communist Party organ Granma, Feb. 13, 1966, attacking Yugoslav attitudes on the Tri-continental Conference.

PEKING

The Party Triumphant

History shows that within the united front the Communist Party must maintain its ideological, political, and organizational independence, adhere to the principle of independence and initiative, and insist on its leading role.

All revolutionary people will learn to wage people's war against US imperialism and its lackeys. They will take up arms, learn to fight battles and become skilled in waging people's war, though they have not done so before.

—Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," NCNA, Peking, Sept. 2, 1965.

MOSCOW

The People Triumphant

The failure of the plan of Colombian reaction to smash the revolutionary movement in the country is the result of the indefatigable work of the party aimed at organizing the unity of action of the working class, peasantry and middle strata of the town population, rallying all democratic and patriotic forces of the country and mastering all forms of the struggle against imperialism and its agents.

The Tenth Congress of the Colombian Communist Party is a new stage in the struggle of your party for the expansion and strengthening of its ranks, for the unification of all democratic forces of the country, for the happy future of the Colombian people, and for peace, democracy and socialism.

—Letter of the CPSU Central Committee to Colombian Communist Party, Pravda, Feb. 2, 1966.

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fighting in the hills, the Communist parties can expect to form united fronts with more moderate forces only at the expense of a split with important allies on the far left. Furthermore, the extent of Moscow's control over individual party policies is limited, based more on suggestion and persuasion than on any form of sanctions. Even under conditions relatively propitious for popular front tactics, local Communists might choose for their own reasons to support guerrilla warfare or urban terrorism, leaving Moscow with little choice but to go along.

Implementation and Debate

The revived united front doctrine made its most dramatic appearance in Chile, the one Latin American country which had experienced a relatively successful popular front in the 1930's. Chilean Communists returned from a trip to Moscow in the summer of 1965 obviously bearing Soviet blessings for their *via pacifica.* Although the Chilean Communist-Socialist coalition had not come to power in the 1964 elections, the Communist defeat had been far less ignominious than that in Venezuela, where the Communist demand for a boycott of the 1963 elections had been almost completely ignored by the voters. At any rate the Chileans received an endorsement—either on their own or Moscow's initiative—for attempts to form alliances with the Left Christian Democrats and for cooperation with the Frei government in support of "progressive" measures, which, Moscow apparently felt, would facilitate more fruitful state-to-state-relations. The "Convocation to the 13th National Congress," issued by the Chilean party while its leaders were in Moscow, stated the doctrine explicitly:

For the Communists, a regrouping, without exclusions from the base, of the democratic anti-imperialistic sectors constitutes an imperative. . . . The resistance to imperialism should acquire the character of a great popular movement, based on multiple joint actions, similar to that which developed against fascism.[22]

Several months later, on October 10, Soviet Presidium member A. P. Kirilenko headed a list of some 30-odd Communist delegations to the week-long 13th Congress of the Chilean Communist Party. The Latin American Communists, nearly all of whom were represented in Chile, could not have missed the implications behind Moscow's attention to this congress and to the line of broad, popular-front "anti-imperialist unity" which was ratified there. On October 21, still another meeting to discuss the present-day significance of the Seventh Comintern Congress convened in the Prague offices of the *World Marxist Review* to hear Soviet party theoretician Boris Ponomarev deliver the most extensive discourse to date on the subject.[23]

In other parts of the hemisphere where "ultra-revolutionary" groups were not a major worry of the Communist parties, the pattern was similar. In Mexico, where governmental opposition to US Dominican policy had clearly pleased Moscow, a June plenum of the Communist Party announced a program endorsing an alliance not only with other opposition forces, but also with "those supporting and even taking part in the government." [24]

In Brazil the stated Communist goal was simply to "regroup the democratic forces, . . . defeat the dictatorship, and . . . bring about a broadly representative anti-dictatorial government," [25] while combatting "adventurism and petty-bourgeois haste" and concluding agreements with assorted opposition leaders and parties.[26] In Argentina the Communists called for a "labor, democratic, and popular front" including everyone from Communists to "men of science and art, . . . tradesmen and progressive manufacturers" to fight for democracy, progress, and a government of the people.[27]

Application of the doctrine to those countries mentioned in the Havana communique for support of "freedom fighters" presented

[22] *El Siglo* (Santiago, Chile), July 11, 1965.

[23] For full report of proceedings of this meeting, see *World Marxist Review,* December 1965.

[24] *La Voz de Mexico* (Mexico City) June 20, 1965.

[25] Luis Carlos Prestes, interviewed in *L'Humanité,* (Paris), August 3, 1965.

[26] "Resolutions of the CC, Brazilian Communist Party," *Information Bulletin of the World Marxist Review* (Prague), August 26, 1965, pp. 39-52.

[27] Statement of the CC, Communist Party of Argentina, *Nuestra Palabra* (Buenos Aires), July 14, 1965.

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greater problems; nonetheless, there are indications that pro-Moscow strategists wished to apply the doctrine there as well. The *World Marxist Review*, while acknowledging that the situation in every country had its unique features and that they were not, of course, "prescribing what line to take," still emphasized that "big stick imperialism" was a factor common to all hemispheric countries.[28]

In countries where Communists and the democratic left were excluded with equal effectiveness from participation or influence in the government, Castro-style armed struggle was probably not judged by Moscow to be incompatible with building the necessary "broad alliances." In Guatemala, Moscow and Havana could happily agree on support for the FAR guerrillas. The democratic left in Venezuela, however, was far from being in the same isolated status as the Communists. By mid-September it was common knowledge that the more Moscow-oriented sectors of the PCV leadership were trying, albeit unsuccessfully, to arrange a temporary halt in the armed struggle in exchange for a return to legality. Successive editorials in the Venezuelan Communist weekly *Que* insisted that the people were tired of armed struggle and ready to be mobilized into a united front to bring about a truly "democratic" government. *Que* cited the Caamano regime as an example of such a popular front government and quoted Mao's writings to justify the "democratic peace" strategy to farther-left critics.[29]

Equally interesting is the case of Peru, where the conflicting pulls of a government willing to take an "independent" foreign policy and of armed insurgents fighting in the hills characterized the dilemma of many Latin American parties having virtually no strength of their own. The MIR guerrillas were gaining headlines and attracting enthusiastic verbal support from the Communist world for their heroism, yet by objective standards they were succeeding only in toughening the Belaunde regime's stand against communism inside and outside the country. After much equivocation, the Peruvian Communist Party finally came up with the remarkable, worst-of-both-worlds formula: "The Communist Party supports the guerrilla movement, although the Peruvian Communists do not consider that there is a revolutionary situation in the country."[30]

The Second Havana Conference

The Russians clearly expected the January 3-15, 1966, Tri-continental Solidarity Conference in Havana to leave their popular front doctrine for Latin America intact. Judging from the enthusiam for a tri-continental meeting which Moscow suddenly began to show at the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in Ghana in May 1965, there seems little doubt that the Soviets felt assured that Castro would invite only Moscow-line Communists from Latin America to such a conference. The Chinese, by their coldness to Castro's proposal for the conference, made it clear that they were equally certain of Soviet domination of the Latin American continent, that a repeat of the anti-Chinese performance produced at the 1964 conference could be expected, that the Cuban-Latin American Communist consensus would continue, and that the newly-formed tri-continental solidarity organization would produce majorities twice as heavily weighted towards the USSR as its narrower Afro-Asian predecessor had.

Moscow underestimated the wiliness of the Cuban "lider Maximo," however. Whether by plan or as a result of repeated Chinese goading, the Latin American delegations which the Cubans eventually invited to the conference were far from a homogeneous group. Mixed in with old-time Moscow-liners such as Uruguay's Rodney Arismendi were assorted Castroites, Trotskyites, and even representatives of such pro-Chinese groups as the Dominican Popular Movement.

Castro could not be accused by Moscow of being disloyal; he went out of his way to denounce Trotskyites and others (*e.g.*, the Chinese) who had criticized Cuban and Russian inaction during the Dominican crisis. But he also had caustic words for revolutionary groups

[28] J. M. Fortuny, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

[29] Carlos Valencia, "Criticism of the Tactic of Democratic Peace," *Que* (Caracas), August 31, 1965, pp. 8-9.

[30] Peruvian delegate Acosta at the October 21-23 Prague conference (see subsequent text) quoted in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), October 22, 1965.

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which spent their time theorizing instead of acting, and he made a major point of pushing for recognition of the Venezuelan FALN, rather than the Communist Party (PCV), as the *only* legitimate representative of the Venezuelan liberation movement. This again was not formally a "splittist" act, since there had never been any public break between the two groups. But it served clearly to place the PCV leadership in hot water should any formal split occur due to its efforts to turn to non-violent tactics.

The tensions which this Cuban attitude reintroduced into the Latin American Communist movement soon found outlet through the Yugoslavs, who were already annoyed at Castro for his failure to support their attendance at the conference, and who had for some time publicized their view that the FALN armed struggle was hurting the Communist cause. In an article in *Borba* on January 24, 1966, a Yugoslav correspondent, Z. Bozic, noted that Latin American Communists were far from unanimous in support of the ultra-revolutionary political line enunciated at the Tri-continental Conference.[31] In particular, he blamed the Cubans for giving the Venezuelan FALN such prominence at a time when the PCV had already decided to play down the unsuccessful armed struggle. The Cubans replied with a counterattack on the Yugoslavs in which these allegations were termed baseless "slanders" of the PCV and other Latin American Communist parties.[32]

The Russians were more discreet than the Yugoslavs, but the lack of enthusiasm in their media for the super-militant resolutions of the Tri-continental Conference was obvious. To be sure, the conference did not commit Moscow's followers in Latin America to any over-adventurous deeds—indeed, Moscow's message to the Colombian Communist Party's 10th Congress in early February 1966 mentioned nothing of the "armed struggle" which had been the predominant theme of the Havana meeting. The Tri-continental Conference did, however, weaken Castro's commitment to the Communist parties as the only revolutionaries to be supported in the hemisphere, and it placed new obstacles in the way of alliances between Communists and non-Communists against "US imperialism."

Outside the charged atmosphere of a "solidarity" conference, however, Castro's verbal aberrations from the Moscow line on Latin American revolution will probably prove difficult to sustain. The increasing ability of the American republics to deal with insurgent activities not supported by the democratic left will help Moscow's determination to place the strategic question of alliances above the tactical matter of when to use violence. The Dominican united front against US "intervention" remains a much more attractive model to Latin American Communists than the languishing Venezuelan guerrilla war.

[31] *Borba* (Belgrade), January 24, 1966, p. 2.

[32] Editorial in Cuban Party organ *Granma*, January 13, 1966.

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Peking's Remembrance of Things Past

By James P. Harrison

There has been considerable speculation recently about what might be termed China's paranoid style of international relations. The Chinese Communists themselves have provided abundant evidence supporting this analysis but naturally place particular emphasis on the historical basis of their mistrust towards many of the world's governments. It follows that an understanding of the actions and statements of the leaders in Peking, whether in relation to "American imperialism" and Viet-Nam, the Sino-Soviet dispute, or the future of Asia, must be based on some knowledge of the Chinese Communist concept of the past.

Unfortunately, the Chinese view of modern Asian history is as bitter as it is emphasized. It is marked by a characteristically nationalist resentment of China's past humiliations and further reinforced by Communist belief in the virtues and inevitable triumph of the exploited. As "nationalist Communists," the Peking leaders stress the class struggle not only in terms of class against class, but also in terms of oppressed *versus* oppressor nations.[1] Indeed, for the developing countries they attempt to equate the two. Hence, far from wishing to forget the suffering of a century of "internal disruption and foreign disaster," the Chinese Communist leaders stress the educational potential of this experience and clearly base their claim to leadership of the emerging nations on their own turbulent and exploited past. As Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi recently put it, "China, too, is an injured nation."

Injustices allegedly inflicted on China by foreign powers form a basic theme in the indoctrination of seven hundred million people, as articles in the daily press and reports of mass meetings readily attest. Typically, a leading Chinese Communist historian writes:

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[1] The theme of a form of class struggle between eastern and western nations is a logical extension of Lenin's theory of imperialism and has also been implied by non-Communist Chinese nationalists from Yen Fu, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and Sun Yat-sen on.

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We stress the study of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolutionary movements of the past century . . . during which the imperialist powers waged more than ten aggressive wars against China, more than twenty countries forced China to conclude unequal treaties, and eight or nine powers kept garrisons, concessions, settlements and spheres of influence in China . . . Studies of these events provide rich material for the patriotic education of our citizens.[2]

At present such statements are increasingly being tied in with the war in Viet-Nam, and the sobering fact is that the vast majority of Chinese probably accept them.

It is also important to realize that this emphasis on the historical underpinning of China's revolutionary ideology strongly affects Peking's animosity not only toward the United States and other non-Communist powers, but also towards the Soviet Union. Russia is now bracketed with the rest of the developed nations in Peking's view and hence should be excluded from leadership of the struggles of the developing countries. There is an obvious connection between this attitude and the current Sino-Soviet dispute, as can be seen from a brief survey of modern Russian-Chinese relations as viewed by the Chinese.

The Impact of History

First of all, Chinese Communist writers have on occasion raised the question of Tsarist Russia's encroachments on territories regarded as historically part of the Manchu Empire—notably, the region to the east of Manchuria (now part of the Soviet Maritime Province), Mongolia, and the northwestern border regions of Sinkiang.[3] Although it is acknowledged that these encroachments belonged to Russia's pre-Communist period, recent frictions in these areas will certainly continue and probably increase.[4] Probably at least as important for the present, moreover, are the Chinese Communist leaders' memories of past grievances against various policies and personalities of Moscow-directed international communism.

This is not to say that the Tsarist aggressions of the past and Stalin's often ill-conceived China policies necessarily preclude harmonious relations between the two major Communist powers: there was, after all, a period of relatively close relations during the early 1950's. Still less does it imply that the Communist regime is just another Chinese dynasty concerned only with traditional Chinese problems. It does mean, however, that when other aggravations intrude, as they have increasingly since 1956, the Chinese Communist leaders display a tendency to view the Soviet Union in the light of earlier Sino-Russian relations.

The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921 as a direct result of the upsurge of Chinese nationalism following World War I. The first Chinese Marxists were also nationalists, but the "un-Chineseness" of the ideology to which they turned testified to the revolutionary nature of their commitment. Throughout the history of the Chinese Communist movement, the emphasis given to the nationalist or the Communist side of the equation has varied, but a significant feature of the rise of Mao's generation to power has been the degree to which the Communist leadership has succeeded in uniting the two elements—in harmonizing a very untraditional revolutionary theory with Chinese nationalism. As Chinese Communist spokesmen proclaim, "The thought of Mao Tse-tung integrates the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution."[5]

Close Soviet ties with the Kuomintang in the early 1920's initially favored the efforts of the Chinese Communists to work within the framework of the nationalist movement. However, equivocal and increasingly chauvinistic Soviet policies, together with Kuomintang military successes, enabled Chiang Kai-shek drastically, if only temporarily, to reduce Communist influence in China after 1927. Chiang's charge that the Chinese Communists placed loyalty to Moscow ahead of patriotism appeared to be confirmed on numerous occasions, as for exam-

[2] Liu Ta-nien, "Historical Science in the New China," *Li-shih Yen-chiu* (Historical Research) 1962, no. 2.

[3] *E.g.*, see Liu Kuang-chai and Ch'en Pen-shan, "Criticize Lu Chin-ch'ih's Anti-Soviet Slanders," *Shih-hsueh Chi-k'an* (Historical Quarterly), No. 1, 1957.

[4] See Dennis J. Doolin, *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict,* Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1965.

[5] Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," *Peking Review,* Sept. 3, 1965, p. 22.

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ple when they supported the Soviet Union's drive into Manchuria in 1929. This action to prevent attempted Chinese Nationalist seizure of the Russian-held Chinese Eastern Railway [6] was all the more difficult for the Chinese Communists to defend because the Bolshevik regime had reneged on its promise, made in 1919, to return the railroad and other interests acquired in China by Tsarist Russia to Chinese sovereignty.[7] The Chinese Communists, in recent years, have contrasted their support of "proletarian internationalism" on this occasion with Soviet failure to back Peking unequivocally in the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The Chinese Communists' experience of being struck down by the Kuomintang after 1927 has undoubtedly influenced Peking's present policy of not placing too much faith in the "bourgeois nationalist" governments of the developing world. Indeed, as recent events in Indonesia, the Middle East, and elsewhere have again demonstrated, the equation of communism and nationalism is still a difficult one to achieve. Yet, since Lenin, communism has triumphed on its own only where it has succeeded in capturing the nationalist movement, as it did eventually in China, and in Yugoslavia, Cuba, and North Viet-Nam.

At the same time, Moscow's contributions to the setbacks suffered by Chinese communism in the late 1920's became an initial source of Chinese mistrust of Russian leadership of the world Communist movement. Although publicly the Chinese Communists continued to go along with Soviet-dictated policies until the latter 1950's, Moscow directives caused much dissatisfaction and dissension within the party. Thus, in 1930, when the same Chinese Communist leader who the year before had defended Stalin's aggressive action in Manchuria was called to Moscow to account for the latest failure of Comintern policies in China, he bluntly told his Russian mentors that the Comintern "did not understand conditions in China." He emphasized that "loyalty to the Communist International was one thing and loyalty to the Chinese revolution quite another," adding that some Chinese Communists "distrust the views of their comrades in Moscow as much as some comrades in Moscow distrust the worker comrades in China." [8]

Moscow's instigation of the replacement of this leader, Li Li-san, by the Russian-oriented "returned students" in 1930-31 marked one of the last direct Soviet interventions in the affairs of the Chinese party.[9] Nevertheless, in the years that followed, lingering Chinese Communist memories of Soviet policy mistakes in China played an important part in the rise to power of Mao Tse-tung. In fact, the first "thought reform" movement in the CCP in 1942 was directed as much against "Soviet-style dogmatism" as against other deviations.[10]

During the 1930's, Soviet policy became far more concerned with curbing the dual menace of Japanese and German expansion than with furthering the political ambitions of local Communist parties. Accordingly, in 1935, the Comintern decreed a new international line calling for Communist collaboration in united popular fronts against fascism. The Chinese Communists, hard-pressed by Chiang Kai-shek's repeated "annihilation campaigns," were also seeking a united front with the Kuomintang and "all patriots" against Japan. This was finally realized following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 and paved the way for rapid Chinese Communist expansion. During the hostilities, the Soviet Union extended considerable military and financial aid to Chiang Kai-shek, even after the latter partially renewed pressure against the Communists.

Postwar Sino-Soviet Relations

With the intensification of the Communist-Nationalist struggle for power after the war, Stalin apparently misjudged the situation in

[6] See O. Edmund Clubb, *Twentieth Century China,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1964, p. 162.

[7] The Karakhan Manifesto of 1919 promised to restore to China Russian treaty rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway and some Manchurian mining concessions. This pledge was not carried out, however, until 1952.

[8] *Pu-erh-sai-wei-k'o* (Bolshevik), May 10, 1931, p. 54.

[9] See Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-46,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1958. For the most comprehensive account of Moscow's role in the Chinese revolution, see Robert C. North, *Moscow and the Chinese Communists* (rev. ed.), Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1963.

[10] See Boyd Compton, *Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44,* Seattle, 1952, esp. pp. xvi and xxxiv.

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China again, reportedly advising the Chinese Communists, in spite of their vastly strengthened position, to settle for half a loaf—in the form of either a Nationalist-Communist coalition government or Communist rule over part of the country. According to Vladimir Dedijer, Tito's biographer, Stalin privately admitted in 1948 that he had erred in giving this advice since Mao defied it and went on to conquer the entire country.[11]

As for Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists in Manchuria, although significant, it was reduced to some extent by Soviet destruction, or removal as war reparations, of an estimated two billion dollars worth of Japanese economic facilities, as well as by other Soviet actions.[12] In short, there is considerable evidence indicating that Stalin would have preferred the establishment of a not-too-powerful Communist buffer state in North China, or even an amenable Nationalist-Communist coalition government, to the emergence of a strong and united Communist China. (No doubt many Soviet leaders would concur in this judgment today.) In any case, it seems evident in the light of the entire history of Soviet relations with the Chinese Communists that the latter triumphed as much in spite of Moscow as thanks to it.

[11] Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito*, New York, 1952, p. 322.

[12] For additional information and commentary on these events, see Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow*, New York, G. P. Putnam, 1963, p. 245 ff.

Upon assuming power in 1949, however, the Chinese Communists realized that, whatever their grievances on account of past Russian attitudes and actions, their needs and interests could only be served by cooperating with and seeking aid from the Soviet Union. They therefore cultivated close relations with Moscow. Nevertheless, even in the heyday of Sino-Soviet cooperation in the early 1950's, when wholesale "learning from the Soviet experience" was the order of the day in China, there were still occasional signs of something less than complete accord. In early 1950, Mao made his first trip outside China and spent two months in Moscow negotiating with Stalin before the Sino-Soviet defense pact was finally concluded. This protracted negotiation contrasts sharply with the customary brief visits of East European heads of state to Moscow for the same purpose and suggests that there may have been some hard bargaining between the two countries.

Moreover, considering Communist China's enormous needs and the fact that she fought the Korean war at least partly in behalf of the Soviet Union, Soviet aid to China has not been munificent. It totaled perhaps two or three billion dollars, now fully repaid, and the Chinese have complained that they were obliged to buy Russian goods at prices above the world market. The last direct Russian interests in China, in the form of joint stock companies in Manchuria and Sinkiang, were terminated by China in 1954, over Soviet protests.

Peking on the World Class Struggle

Let us look at the world situation today. The whole world is in the midst of great upheaval, great division, and great transformation under the impact of the deepening class struggle on an international scale. The revolutionary movement of the world people is developing by leaps and bounds, particularly the angry revolutionary flames of the peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America. . . .

At present, imperialism, modern revisionism, and all reactionaries are intensifying their collusion to make counterattacks on the world people's revolutionary movements. But they are in no way able to stem the tide of the revolutionary movement. . . .

The world today is as Chairman Mao's poem describes: "The four seas are seething, clouds lowering, and waters raging; the five continents are rocked by storm and thunder." A new, great anti-US revolutionary storm is sweeping all over the world. The people's revolution will certainly win, and the future of the world will definitely belong to the people.

—Peking Radio, Domestic Service in Mandarin, March 22, 1966.

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Since 1956, of course, the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations has become far more evident. Moscow and Peking have differed over an ever-lengthening series of issues—over destalinization and interbloc relations; over the crises in the Formosa straits, the Himalayas, the Near East, Berlin, Southeast Asia, and Cuba; over general Communist policies toward the non-Communist world; and over Sino-Soviet economic and military relations. Inasmuch as these differences spring from the vastly different economic and political needs of the two countries, they should hardly be surprising to Marxist economic determinists. At the same time, the fact that they are rooted in such basically different needs and historical experiences precludes any real solution.

There is also, of course, the question of ideology. In 1950, common doctrinal beliefs were an important basis of the Sino-Soviet alliance. However, as differing needs dictated differing interpretations of the common ideology, this basis was steadily undermined, and the Chinese Communists began to claim for a variety of reasons that Moscow had forfeited its right to lead the communion of true believers. Just as Chinese who compromised Confucianism were once excoriated as heretics and bandits in traditional China, so now, in Peking's view, must all "Marxist revisionists" be purged from Communist ranks everywhere.

The intensity of the polemics between Peking and Moscow is comprehensible only in the light of the great importance which the Chinese Communist leaders place on their own version of Communist ideology. They have devoted literally billions of pages to its propagation since 1949; it is both their religion and the means of maximizing state power. As in Stalin's Russia, there is an equation of the interests of the state with the fulfillment of the ideology. Of course, Maoism is a Chinese version of Communist ideology, which explains its peculiarly anti-Western overtones—this in spite of the fact that Marxism is preeminently a Western doctrine at variance in many respects with traditional Chinese thought. (The Marxist emphasis on "struggle," for example, is diametrically opposed to the Confucian ideal of harmonious compromise in human relations.) Perhaps this fact explains the intensity of the Chinese Communists' stress on ideological indoctrination.

In short, the Chinese view of Marxist ideology and of China's history form an important part of the background of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Knowledge of these Chinese beliefs is a prerequisite for understanding the current differences between the two major Communist powers.

China and the United States

Knowledge of Chinese attitudes regarding the past is equally essential to an understanding of present and future Chinese policies toward the United States and the rest of the world. For, as might be expected, Peking's sense of historical injustice is still directed far more against the United States and other "imperialist" powers than it is against the Soviet Union. Without going into the details of Chinese historiography on the subject of US "imperialism" in China, a brief summary of Chinese Communist representations of America's role will suffice to convey the depth of Chinese feelings on this score.

Voluminous writings by Chinese Communist propagandists and unceasing educational campaigns have painted a distorted picture of American transgressions against China.[13] The United States is associated with the misdeeds of the British, French, Japanese, and other "imperialist" powers from the Opium War of 1840 onward and is alleged to have committed over twenty "major aggressions" against China in its own right. It is claimed that in the 19th century the United States played a leading role, second only to that of Great Britain and Japan, in the economic invasion of China; and that America's celebrated "Open Door" policy, far from having been aimed at curbing the aggression of other powers in Asia, was instead motivated by US ambition to "share in the looting of China." The relatively minor participation of the United States in the suppression of the Taiping (1860) and Boxer (1900) uprisings and allegedly consistent American aid to "reactionary" Chinese regimes in more recent times, from Yuan Shih-kai to Chiang Kai-shek, are cited as proof of US hostility to the cause of popular revolution in China.

[13] See, *e.g.*, Liu Ta-nien, *Mei-Kuo Ch'in-hua Shih* (History of American Aggression against China), Peking, 1951, and *Kung-jen Jih-pao* (Workers' Daily, Tientsin,) Nov. 4, 1960.

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These distorted examples from earlier history are supplemented by a much greater volume of propaganda concerning America's alleged "crusade against communism" since World War II. Needless to say, it is the latter —especially, American support of militantly anti-Communist governments in Taiwan, South Korea, and South Viet-Nam—which has dominated Peking's anti-imperialist propaganda since 1949. A typical article in the central party newspaper set forth China's "blood debt" against the United States in these terms:

United States imperialism is the deadly enemy of the Chinese people. After the second world war, it attempted to turn China into its colony. Not long after the founding of New China, it again staged the aggressive war in Korea, set up military bases around China, and organized military cliques with their spearheads pointed against China, in an attempt to strangle New China in its cradle. United States imperialism fantastically attempted to bring us down by enforcing an economic embargo . . . and is still trying to prevent the restoration of the legal rights of China in the United Nations. . . . United States imperialism still occupies our sacred territory of Taiwan [and continues to carry out aggression in Southeast Asia . . .] Confronted with all these deeds of United States imperialism, the Chinese people can only carry out irreconcilable struggle against it.[14]

More recently, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi expanded on this recurring theme in much broader terms:

US imperialism is the enemy of the Chinese people; it is also the common enemy of the people of the whole world. It is subjecting nearly every country to its threat, control, interference, or aggression, with the aim of attaining world hegemony. For this purpose it has built up the biggest war machine in human history. It has more than 2,200 military bases and installations on foreign soil and has sent over one million aggressor troops abroad. In these circumstances, it is only natural for China, as a socialist country, to resolutely oppose the US imperialist policies of aggression and war and resolutely support all oppressed peoples and nations in their just struggles for freedom and independence. Otherwise she would be betraying her internationalist duty.[15]

From all this, it is evident that current Chinese international attitudes and behavior are not simply the product of the impetuous dynamism that characterizes the present early stage of the Chinese Communist revolution; nor are they due solely to Chinese chauvinism. These factors are clearly present, but in addition there is a messianic sense of the struggle of the "exploited" peoples of the world against the "exploiting" powers. Chinese nationalism reinforces Marxism-Leninism in what Peking regards as an international class war of the oppressed nations led by China against the oppressor nations—the "Imperialists" headed by the United States and the "Revisionists" headed by the Soviet Union.

That Peking's interpretation of contemporary history is wildly emotional and often grossly distorted is perhaps not so surprising as it is frightening. A central concept in Chinese philosophy, as in other philosophies, is that to every action there is a reaction. The West believes that it was the Communists who started the chain of actions and reactions of the cold war. The Communists maintain that it was the other way around, contending that the "capitalist" powers inevitably exploit, and that such exploitation begets resistance and class struggle.

In the welter of complex historical strands, it is futile to try to fix the blame for the present complete impasse in Sino-American relations. At the same time, it seems clear that an effort to resolve the deadlock is becoming increasingly urgent, and that one of the prerequisites is a better mutual understanding of recent Asian history. The United States can and should play a role in endeavoring to guide Chinese nationalism into more acceptable channels, but such an endeavor must proceed first of all from an understanding of the historical driving forces behind Chinese belligerence. As for the Chinese, a distorted and unrealistic view of the world brought them disaster in the last century; in the future it could bring disaster to the world.

[14] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 5, 1962.

[15] *Peking Review*, Jan. 7, 1966, p. 5.

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Economics and Politics: III

EDITORS' NOTE: The article below continues our current series of studies on new economic trends and reforms in the Communist world. Previous installments appeared in the January-February and March-April issues of this year. Studies on Hungary and Yugoslavia, promised for this number, have been delayed but will appear in future issues.

Reforms in Bulgaria

By J. F. Brown

On December 4, 1965, the Bulgarian Communist Party daily, *Rabotnichesko delo,* published the party Politburo's long-awaited "Theses" on economic reform. The program that was outlined indicated that Bulgaria was intent on a comprehensive overhaul of its entire system of economic planning and management. Though more cautious in important respects than the various reforms underway in Yugoslavia, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, the Bulgarian program was just as dramatic in its impact—especially in the light of certain national conditions and characteristics.

Indeed, it was rather surprising that Bulgaria should have embarked upon a serious economic reform at all. In the past the regime, led by Todor Zhivkov, had been perhaps the most timid and unimaginative, not to say dogmatic, in the whole of Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Bulgarian economy was still largely undeveloped; as a consequence, it had been able to maintain an impressive rate of growth and was still on the wave of an investment boom.[1] All these factors could have been expected to militate against a reform involving a large measure of decentralization.

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, conditions were different. Two of the pioneers of economic reform, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, had highly developed

Mr. Brown, former Research Fellow at the University of Michigan, now lives in Munich. His book The New Eastern Europe (*New York, Praeger*) *was published last year.*

[1] Calculations from the Bulgarian Statistical Yearbooks reveal that between 1952 and 1964 the average annual growth rate of the national income was 7.4 percent. The average annual growth rate of industry between 1948 and 1964 was 14.7 percent.

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and complex economies, which quite clearly had outgrown the "Stalinist" system of planning. To a lesser degree, Poland and Hungary were in a similar position. Yugoslavia—the real trail-blazer in economic reform—was, it is true, a relatively undeveloped country. But the Yugoslav reforms were the offshoot of an ideological deviation long considered anathema by the rest of Eastern Europe; moreover, from an economic point of view, the results of the Yugoslav experiments were not so strikingly successful as to invite imitation.

Bulgaria and Rumania alone, then, remained in a category that could be considered more "suited" (or less ill-suited) to the classical Communist system of planning and management, since their low-key economies had not yet suffered the acute growing pains of the more advanced countries. Rumania's prudently conservative leaders seemed content, for their part, to stick with the old system until such time as it should become a victim of the law of diminishing returns. Bulgaria's leaders, however, apparently decided that weaknesses in the national economy were already serious enough to warrant action. For while great quantitative progress had been achieved in heavy industrial production, the country's very success in this respect had led to failures in others. The performance in agriculture had been depressingly poor, causing an unhealthy imbalance in the national income. And in all sectors of the economy qualitative factors—the quality of goods, rentability, costing, accurate pricing, etc.—had been neglected. Inefficiency and cumbersome planning at every level were creating problems which largely offset the achievement of a high rate of growth, and the strain of maintaining this high rate was in turn aggravating the weaknesses and contradictions inherent in the economic system.[2]

The economic discussions conducted in the Soviet Union, sparked by Professor Yevsei Liberman's now famous article of September 1962,[3] convinced the Bulgarian leaders that economic reform was not only pressing but also permissible. (In a period of changing relations between the East European countries and Moscow, Bulgaria has remained a model satellite, and had the Soviet Union not made it clear that she too was contemplating economic reforms, it is very doubtful whether the Bulgarians would have taken up the issue.)

At the Eighth BCP Congress in November 1962, a resolution was passed accepting in principle the need to reform the planning and management system, to increase workers' participation in the drawing up and implementation of plans, and to augment material incentives throughout the economy.[4] The following May, a Central Committee plenum confirmed these decisions and announced some "groundwork" moves, including the merging of certain industrial enterprises and the reorganization of economic administration in the country's 27 okrugs, or districts.[5]

The decisions of this plenum attracted little attention at the time; they seemed to signify no breakthrough in official economic thinking. What did attract attention, however, was the initiation—also in May—of a series of discussions on economic reform in *Novo vreme,* the theoretical monthly of the Bulgarian Party Central Committee. The fact that *Novo vreme* was carrying the series was a sure sign that the party was preparing its own cadres for something new and big.

Over a period of months the discussions picked up in excitement, and by November they had become quite startling. In that month an article by Professor Angel Miloshevski proposed nothing less than the complete adoption of the Yugoslav workers' council system. Even more important was Professor Petko Kunin's article in the December issue. A rehabilitated follower of Traicho Kostov, Kunin was considered one of Bulgaria's outstanding economists. His comprehensive article amounted to a plea that all enterprises become financially self-supporting and autonomous vis-à-vis the state. He advocated a new system of planning and accounting that would allow for genuine competition between enterprises, for the "most rational and economic use" of fixed and working capital funds and of the labor force, and for profits and profit-sharing, to be used as "stimu-

[2] For a good discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Bulgarian economy, see John Kalo, "The Bulgarian Economy," *Survey* (London), No. 39, December 1961.
[3] *Pravda,* Sept. 9, 1962.
[4] *Rabotnichesko delo,* Nov. 16, 1962.
[5] *Ibid.,* May 19, 1963.

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lating devices." Profits, Kunin argued, should determine the remuneration of managers and should be the main source for increases in wage payments. To the more dogmatic of the party cadres, this must have sounded very much like creeping capitalism, but Kunin argued that his proposals were essentially socialist and that "the approach to communism, the transition to this high form of society, demands bold ideas, bold steps, well thought out, realistically and skillfully applied."

In January 1964 it was made known that experiments somewhat along the lines suggested by Professor Kunin were already being carried out at the "Liliana Dimitrova" textile plant in Sofia. The innovations involved "non-state financing" and a system of remuneration and premiums based on profit. The first results were said to be very encouraging.[6] By this time the regime had evidently made up its own mind on what the reform was to comprise. In the same first month of the new year, the party Politburo and the Council of Ministers announced what they called "basic principles" of the new system and decreed that these should be tried out experimentally in a number of enterprises, beginning on April 1, 1964.[7] During the rest of the year a total of 50 enterprises, mainly industrial, began working under the new system, or at least parts of it. Collective farms in four of Bulgaria's administrative districts also operated under new principles. In 1965 the experiments were widely extended. By the end of the year the new system was being used in enterprises employing some 33.5 percent of the total number of industrial workers in Bulgaria and contributing 44 percent of the total industrial production.[8]

Of no little irritation to students of the Bulgarian scene, in the two years which elapsed between official approval of the principles of reform (January 1964) and the publication of the reform "Theses" (December 1965), no official information was given out to describe the experiments being made, although the Bulgarian press regularly carried reports of progress. No one knew, therefore, exactly what the "new principles" were. The regime's reticence was of course understandable. This was a trial-and-error period, a time of empirical experiment, the first in Bulgaria for over a generation. Only after thorough experimentation could the regime feel confident enough to commit itself publicly to a coherent reform.

While outside observers faced an official blanket of silence, they could form some idea of the lines the reform was taking from various proposals, ideas and reports appearing in the press. The most stimulating article in this respect was a piece by Ivan Mironov in the May 1964 issue of *Ikonomicheska misal* dealing mainly with the issue of self-financing and autonomy for enterprises. Since the article appeared only one month after experiments at the factory level were supposed to begin, it could be assumed that the ideas contained in it were a fairly accurate reflection of what the regime had in mind in this area (an assumption finally proven correct when the "Theses" were published over 18 months later). Mironov advocated that wages and capital accumulation be tied to the profit level of individual enterprises. He also proposed that each enterprise be subject to a property tax and an interest rate on fixed and circulating capital, and that there be depreciation rates accurately reflecting wear-and-tear and obsolescence.

For the workers Mironov saw a considerably increased role, remarking: "When the accumulations of the enterprise and a considerable part of the wages depend on the size of the profit, the workers cannot be indifferent to the problems of management and the result of the work of the enterprise." The Politburo's "Theses" in December 1965 took some steps in this direction, establishing production committees designed to give the workers a greater say in planning, in income distribution, and even in "the selection of the management cadres." Of course, these provisions fell far short of Professor Miloshevski's proposals for the introduction of the Yugoslav workers' councils system. But if the regime leaders ever even toyed with such an idea—a rather doubtful assumption—they had thought better of it by the time they came to publish their official proposals.

If, on the workers' councils, the regime showed its conservatism, on another issue it moved, in the course of the almost two years of experimentation, to a more liberal position

[6] For details on this experiment, see *Vecherni novini* (Sofia), Jan. 10, 1964.
[7] *Rabotnichesko delo*, Jan. 25, 1964.
[8] *Ibid.*, Dec. 5, 1965.

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than it had apparently first envisaged. In an interview granted to a Yugoslav reporter in October 1964, Grisha Filipov, a vice-chairman of the Bulgarian State Planning Committee had spoken out adamantly against any form of free prices. The market, said Filopov, "can establish neither prices nor production, for this leads to disorganization. They will remain established strictly according to plan."[9] Yet the official Politburo "Theses" of last December allowed for both a variable and a free price category, similar to the Czechoslovak model.

It was probably hesitation over how "liberal" or "conservative" to be on such issues, as well as the desire to give the experiments a thorough trial, that caused the Bulgarians to delay the publication of their officially approved plan. An official announcement had been expected early in 1965. In July 1965 Premier Zhivkov told a group of Austrian journalists that the official "Theses" would be published in about a month, *i.e.*, in August.[10] There was, therefore, a definite delay for which differences of opinion on "how far to go" could well have been mainly responsible. Economists themselves seem to have been seriously divided on the question, and it is noteworthy that Professor Eugeni Mateev—a minister without portfolio in the cabinet, a first-rate economist, and the man who initiated the series of discussions in *Novo vreme* in May 1963—was described by Zhivkov as being "against the [new] system."[11] Mateev is no dogmatist, and it may be that he regards the application of a rather advanced system of reform to a relatively primitive economy as being dangerously premature. He may agree with the point Filipov, himself a trained economist, was trying to make: that a great degree of centralized control was still necessary.

If some trained economists considered the reform too liberal, it can well be imagined what many party apparatchiks thought of it. "Stalinist" opposition to reform of all kinds in Bulgaria had been very strong since 1956 and had been responsible for frustrating more than one promising development. It is understandable, then, that the fundamental changes involved in any radical economic reform would arouse the strongest apprehensions in the party.

Yet the leadership was able to play an important card: by conducting preliminary experiments, it could argue that the proof of the pudding was in the eating. It brought forward statistics—perhaps accurate, certainly politic—to show that in the first half of 1965 the growth of industrial production in those enterprises operating under the new system averaged 15.6 percent, as compared to only 11.5 percent for those still operating under the old system.[12]

With the publication of the "Theses" last December, everybody finally got a chance to see what the new system was all about. Its reformist character was based on the following general principles: considerable decentralization of economic decision-making, with major responsibility assigned to the so-called industrial association, or trust (see further); increased use of the profit motive; a system of wages tied to production results; "full use" of economic levers, including profit, prices, credit interest and taxes.

On decentralization, the Bulgarian "Theses" followed the pattern set by the East German, Czechoslovak, Polish and Soviet reforms. The economic associations, or trusts, are to be the new centers of power and will largely determine the degree of autonomy which individual enterprises will enjoy. Only in Yugoslavia, and possibly also in Hungary, will individual enterprises escape this control at the association level. In Bulgaria, as in all East European countries, the business of the associations and of the individual enterprises will be conducted on the basis of contracts. Priority in contracts is to be given to commodities listed in the centrally-fixed plan, and not all contracts will be officially approved. "Free contracting" will be allowed in the light of production possibilities and according to market needs. The degree of freedom which this new contracting system will allow will, of course, depend on the size of the priority list fixed by the central authorities. At least at first it will probably be large.

The decentralization reform reflects the government's obvious intention to shift part of the task of handling investments off its own shoulders and onto the enterprises. The re-

[9] Frane Barbieri, *Politika* (Belgrade), Oct. 15 and 18, 1964.
[10] *Neues Oesterreich* (Vienna), July 17, 1965.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] Radio Sofia, Dec. 4, 1965.

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sponsibilities thus transferred are to be financed by the enterprises out of their own funds and through repayable bank credits. Within the enterprises—and here again Bulgaria conforms to the general pattern—a number of special investment funds are to be created; these include a development and technical improvement fund (the amount to be determined as a percentage of capital funds), a new products fund, a social-cultural fund, and a wage reserve fund. The development and technical improvement fund will be used to finance capital investments and capital repairs. Resources from this fund can be used to finance the development of new products. Its amount will be a fixed percentage of total production costs. The percentage of the enterprises' contribution to the social-cultural fund will be fixed by the state.

The amount of the enterprise's contribution to the wage reserve fund will be a fixed percentage of the total wage fund. Under the new system, wages will be made up of two components: the guaranteed portion (easily the biggest), and the incentive portion, which will, of course, vary. Here the Bulgarian system is very much like the Czechoslovak—but unlike the Soviet, Polish and East German, where the state still centrally fixes the overall level of each enterprise's wage fund.

It is generally recognized that the kind of price formation policy followed is one of the most important indications of the degree of economic freedom in any economy. Measured by this yardstick, the Bulgarian reform is a relatively advanced one. Like the programs adopted in Czechoslovakia and proposed in Hungary, it will have a three-price system of categories—fixed, variable, and free. The prices of basic production goods and the most important consumer goods will be fixed by the state. On other goods there will be fixed maximum and minimum prices or in some cases a fixed maximum only. A last category of goods, composed mainly of seasonal and locally-produced items, will be priced freely. One may assume, though, that this last category will be small.

To sum up, it is fair to describe several features of the new Bulgarian system as "liberal" or "advanced." Other features—in particular the scheme for more participation by workers in decision-making—can be termed "liberal" by Bulgarian standards, though timid and orthodox compared to Yugoslavia's reforms.

Finally, the program has its conservative aspects. While the Bulgarian leaders have shown their determination to ensure a more flexible and responsible economic system, they have also taken precautions to see that the trend toward greater freedom will not get out of hand. Thus a large number of controls have been retained by the regime. As the "Theses" themselves say, the state will carry out "a uniform policy in the spheres of technical programming, capital investment, foreign trade, prices, remuneration of labor, and finance." Central planning continues to be the backbone of the whole system, and unlike the proposed Hungarian model, which foresees the complete abandonment of compulsory, centrally-directed indices, the Bulgarian program simply stipulates a reduction. The obligatory indices that will remain include: the volume of basic production in real terms; the limit on capital investment; the limit for basic raw materials; and foreign currency limits for imports and exports. If all these controls are brought fully into play, the centralizing features carried over from the old system might well negate the effectiveness of liberal innovations. Perhaps the Bulgarian leaders have acted wisely here by taking into account the still undeveloped state of their economy and keeping all these controls within reach; more probably they have acted out of the chronic timidity that has characterized them in the past. Whatever the reason, if controls are applied indiscriminately as soon as the slightest disequilibriums occur, then the new system will be virtually strangled at birth.

Time will tell. Experiments with the new system are continuing in 1966, and in 1967 full-scale implementation is to take place "along basic lines in the whole national economy," including agriculture and even local government. It will be about another two years, therefore, before the system can be appraised realistically. In the meantime one can only follow its fortune through press reports, comparing its progress with that of the Czechoslovak system, which it most closely resembles. That one of the most backward countries in Eastern Europe has adopted a system similar to that of one of the most advanced countries is an intriguing coincidence. It will be instructive to follow the extent to which each country allows itself, or is allowed, to benefit from the reform.

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Communism in Cyprus

By T. W. Adams and Alvin J. Cottrell

In August 1965 the strife-torn Republic of Cyprus was scheduled to hold its second island-wide elections, but because of the conflict and confusion raging across the island at the time, the elections were cancelled. Given the present political environment in Cyprus, there is some doubt that they will be held before August of this year, when President Makarios' extended term of office ends. Regardless of when they occur, however, two serious questions will arise: First, in what form and manner will the voting take place? And second, how much success will the island's Communist Party have at the polls?

Although there is considerable difference of opinion regarding the size and effectiveness of AKEL,[1] the Communist Party of Cyprus, it is generally conceded to be the only well-organized political force that could rival the dominant, though amorphous, grouping of church-backed right-wing factions known as the Patriotic Front—the "personal party" of Makarios. (It is perhaps worth noting that the only other legal Communist Party in the Middle East is in Israel; the Syrian Communist Party enjoys only "quasi-legal" status.) AKEL maintains a cohesive "grass roots" base and is cleverly managed by a shrewd and fervent long-time Marxist, Ezekias Papaioannou, trained in Moscow. As far as is known, AKEL is entirely Greek Cypriot in composition, the Greek Cypriot community accounting for about 80 percent of the 600,000 population of the island. At the present time, its strength is estimated to

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[1] AKEL is the acronym for Anorthotikow Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Progressive Party of the Working People).

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approach 10,000 active members. It derives its support from a leftist labor federation numbering about 40,000 members, and from a series of front organizations for farmers, women, and youth. Whether or not the party could control a third of the electorate in an election, as has been claimed by AKEL leaders, would depend on the issues involved. Nevertheless it is clear that, on a percentage-of-population basis, the Communist Party of Cyprus is numerically one of the strongest in the non-Communist world, second only to that of Italy.

The Rise of the Party

Communism first came to Cyprus after World War I. But AKEL's predecessor, the KKK (Kommonistikon Komma Kyprou,—the Communist Party of Cyprus), did not have enough appeal to combat the power of the Orthodox Church over the predominantly agrarian and religiously oriented society of that time. The party was officially banned by the British colonial government in 1933, after island-wide riots in which the KKK was involved. AKEL itself was formally founded in 1941 by a group of hard-core Communists. It grew out of a left-wing debating society which initially attracted many liberal intellectuals. Toward the end of World War II, the reorganized party gained considerable ground through its tactical support of *enosis* (union) with Greece and through the efforts of a number of Greek Cypriot high school teachers—this despite losing the support of the liberal intellectuals, who withdrew from the movement. With no effective opposition, AKEL had become the strongest political organization in Cyprus by 1946, when it won the local elections in five major cities.

The Church soon recognized AKEL's growing power and the danger it implied. After the present Archbishop's predecessor, Makarios II, was elected Archbishop in 1947, he encouraged the formation of another political party catering to the right-wing middle class. (From the beginning of the Ethnarchy idea under the Ottomans, the backing of the Church had usually been the key to success in Cypriot politics.) This new Church-backed party, the Nationalist Party, quite naturally made *enosis* its main political platform, but otherwise was a rather loosely organized moral front. In the municipal elections of 1949, the right-wing enosists captured 60 percent of the popular vote, winning back the capital, Nicosia, and 11 of 15 municipalities, while AKEL maintained its control of the large port cities of Limassol, Famagusta and Larnaca. By the time the so-called "Emergency Period" was proclaimed six years later, the charismatic Makarios III—later to become President of the Republic—was thought to have cut down AKEL's following from nearly 40 percent of the population to only half that figure.

During the Emergency Period (1955-59), while it was proscribed by the British for subversive activities, AKEL continued to conduct an active undercover campaign for unconditional self-determination for Cyprus. However, by this time the party had dropped its overt support for *enosis*, causing it to lose favor with the Greek Cypriot followers of General George Grivas (Dighenis) and his EOKA guerrilla organization, then engaged in struggle against the British.[2] Although Grivas made it clear that he would not accept AKEL's support even if offered, the party has never been able to live down the memory of its opposition to the EOKA campaign. In the words of Grivas:

In opposing us, the Cypriot Communists were simply taking orders from behind the Iron Curtain; this was clearly shown in the first month of our campaign, when in a broadcast from Moscow, the leader of the Greek Communist Party, Zachariades, denounced EOKA and treacherously revealed the identity of Dighenis, which he had learned from one of his Athenian spies.[3]

Party Secretary-General Papaioannou was arrested by the Colonial Government in 1955

[2] EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyrion Agoniston—National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) was a secret terrorist network formed by Grivas in 1953 with the stated purpose of fighting "for the liberation of Cyprus from the British yoke." The sanguinary conflict waged by EOKA lasted four years before an armistice was declared upon the promise of independence for Cyprus in 1959. The British were never able to subdue EOKA completely despite the use of an estimated 20,000 troops. Survivers of the EOKA underground emerged as heroes, and many now hold important posts in the government of Cyprus. Grivas, who has never softened his hatred for the Communists, is now in command of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, composed mainly of "volunteers" from the regular army of mainland Greece.

[3] C. Foley (ed.), *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, New York, Praeger, 1965, p. 35.

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but escaped the following year and paradoxically turned up in Britain in 1957. He returned to Nicosia a year later and took over the party before the ban was lifted on its activities in 1959, just before independence.

There is evidence that AKEL worked closely with Moscow in the period immediately before and following independence. Cypriot Communists made frequent trips to the USSR, Soviet propaganda was broadcast in Greek to Cyprus daily from Radio Budapest, and the Cypriot Communists began to identify themselves with the Castro revolution in Cuba. In October 1960 Papaioannou attended the 43rd anniversary of the Soviet Revolution in Moscow and stayed over for the Conference of 81 Communist parties the following month. An editorial in the Cypriot Communist organ *Haravghi* (Dawn) in December praised the Moscow conference declaration, hailing the CPSU as the "vanguard of the Communist movement." The declaration, said the paper, "constitutes a sermon and a motive of brotherly struggle for peace all over the world."[4]

Since independence, AKEL has denounced the London-Zurich agreements of 1959 (which produced the Republic of Cyprus) as a complete renunciation of the principles of self-determination. In particular, it complained that the British Sovereign Base Areas guaranteed by the agreements constituted neo-colonialism. AKEL's Central Committee defined its position as follows:

Under the regime imposed by the Zurich-London agreements, and since we are far from having gained true independence, the basic goal of the Cyprian people continues to be real independence for Cyprus, demilitarization of Cyprus, and democratization of the constitution.[5]

In domestic affairs, AKEL has tried over the past six years to give the party a "patriotic image" in order to allay the memory of its failure to support General Grivas against the British and its equivocal position on *enosis*. Party leaders have concentrated on improving internal efficiency and on extending their influence among workers and young people. AKEL's present economic platform is believed to follow the party's basic program, which was drafted in 1959 and revised in 1962, and which called for intensive agricultural development and extensive land reform through "confiscation and distribution of large private, church, and government lands among the impoverished peasants."[6]

Sources of Power

The principal source of AKEL's power is the Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labor (Pankypria Ergatiki Omopondia—PEO), whose leaders were reported to be in Moscow when the most recent crisis began in December 1963. The PEO is affiliated with the Communist-led World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), whose headquarters are in Prague. Its Secretary-General, Andreas Ziartides, is a devout Communist, a member of the WFTU Executive Committee, and a member of the Central Committee of AKEL. Ziartides says he is a "self-taught" Marxist.

With an estimated dues-paying membership (as of November 1963) of 37,400 workers, the PEO embraces about 60 percent of organized labor on the island. Its nearest rival, the right-wing Confederation of Cypriot Workers (Synomospondia Ergaton Kyprousek—SEK), has only about 17,830 members[7] and is less effectively run. It is probable that many workers belong to the PEO simply because it is the most effective labor union in Cyprus and has the ability to win superior benefits, rather than because of its Communist affiliations.

The PEO supports AKEL's main propaganda lines, such as the demand for a neutral and "completely independent" Cyprus, opposition to NATO, and the adoption of a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean. Before the outbreak of communal violence in December 1963, the PEO declared its support of Presi-

[4] *Haravghi* (Nicosia), Dec. 8, 1960.
[5] Quoted by AKEL Deputy Secretary-General Andreas Fantis in *Neos Dimokratis* (Nicosia), June 1960.
[6] The revised AKEL program was set forth at the party's Tenth Congress in March 1962, and was published by Printko, Ltd., Nicosia (Kaimakli), 1962.
[7] U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, *Directory of Labor Organizations* (Europe), Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, May 15, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 5.1 and 5.10.

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dent Makarios on the issue of an appeal to the United Nations to resist foreign intervention in Cypriot affairs. In mid-1965 it repeated its pledge of "unqualified support" for the President's bid to revise the London-Zurich agreements and the Constitution.

Breaking the Communists' grip on the labor movement has proved to be a difficult task. The PEO is firmly entrenched, having become well developed before Cyprus gained independence. Its leadership is vastly better trained and more effective than that of the non-Communist SEK. Furthermore, the wives and children of PEO members constitute the majority of the memberships of AKEL's women's group and youth movement.

Strategy and Tactics

AKEL's slogans have not changed over the past six years. The scene at the party's 11th Congress held at Nicosia in March 1966 was described in these terms:

The big hall in which the Congress is meeting is bedecked with slogans and posters calling upon the people of Cyprus to rally in a united anti-imperialist front to struggle for the complete national independence of Cyprus, for the ending of foreign military bases on the island, and for the vital and democratic rights of the people.[8]

Since the establishment of the Republic, the party's propaganda line has consistently credited "the existence of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp" with providing "all the possibilities for building a truly independent economic and political life in Cyprus, free of any economic and political bondage imposed on us by the imperialists-colonialists."[9] In terms of current Soviet theory and practice regarding the achievement of "national democracy" as the precursor of socialist "people's democracy", AKEL is still in the first stage of Communist revolutionary campaigning—that of "national democratic," anti-imperialist," and "national-liberation" struggle.

AKEL has used its political power to insist that Cyprus accept offers of barter agreements, economic aid, and technical assistance from the Communist-bloc countries. The island's Communist newspaper, *Haravghi,* has also supported the Soviet tactical line of attacking the presence of British bases and American communications facilities on the island, claiming that it is the West's intention to turn Cyprus into a nuclear base. At the same time, editorial statements in *Haravghi* depict the Soviet Union as the sole leader in the cause of world peace:

It is enough for the peoples to be mobilized in time and not to allow the warmongering imperialists to trap the popular masses in their nets. The general and complete destruction of all nuclear weapons of massive destruction, for which the people are fighting under the leadership of the Soviet Union, constitutes the only real guarantee for peace.[10]

It should be noted here that the Cypriot Communists have explicitly aligned themselves with the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet split. On September 29, 1963, following a plenary session, the party Central Committee issued a 5,000-word statement which included a passage denouncing the Chinese Communists and their "civil war methodology." The statement declared that AKEL's aim was to bring about a Communist Cyprus, but that the "proper" way to achieve this was through "absolutely democratic and peaceful methods."[11] Secretary-General Papaioannou reconfirmed the party's position this year in stating that "our party condemns all splitting activities and fully supports the striving of the CPSU and other fraternal parties for the firm unity of the international Communist and workers' movement."[12]

While AKEL publicly espouses the cause of "self-determination and demilitarization," it has not made its position unequivocally clear on *enosis,* and it is on this issue that the greatest strain has developed between the party and the Greek Cypriot community. (The party also differs with Moscow on this question.) AKEL

[8] *Pravda* (Moscow) March 3, 1966.
[9] Andreas Fantis, "The Rise of Socialism," *Neos Dimokratis,* April 1961.
[10] *Haravghi,* June 5, 1960.
[11] *Ibid.,* Sept. 29, 1963.
[12] Speech delivered by Secretary-General Papaioannou at the AKEL 11th Congress, March 3, 1966, carried by TASS International Service from Moscow, March 3, 1966.

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leaders realize that publicly they must pay lip service to *enosis* lest the party lose much of its popular support. Thus, PEO and AKEL leader Andreas Ziartides told one of the writers: "What we want is national liberation, and in Cyprus this means *enosis*—but we want genuine *enosis*, not the kind proposed by the imperialists as in the recommendations of Dean Acheson." [13] On the other hand, the AKEL leadership is clearly aware that, should *enosis* come about, the party would surely lose its legal status under a mainland Greek government. (Communism has been banned in Greece since 1949.) Apparently, however, AKEL feels safe in straddling the fence on this issue, optimistically sensing that the possibility of union with Greece is becoming more and more remote.

Meanwhile, the party has come out in favor of the government view that, so long as "genuine and untrammeled" *enosis* is not obtainable, the only right course is to proceed toward unrestricted independence through recommendations made in the March 1965 report of former United Nations mediator Galo Plaza of Ecuador, which ruled out both the Greek and the Turkish extreme positions and proposed continued independence with all inhabitants sharing equal rights. *The Cyprus Mail* was quick to point out, however, that "*Haravghi*, while siding with the rest of the newspapers in welcoming the policy of support for the Plaza report, toes the Communist line by demanding that the government go beyond that and call for the abolition of bases." [14]

AKEL and the Archbishop

If it is true that the Makarios government has purposely been seeking excuses to kill or bypass *enosis*, as has been alleged by the island's right-wing press, then AKEL's indifference to the issue conveniently and logically fits in with its present conditional support of the Archbishop. To most Greek Cypriots, however, self-determination, which the Communists preach with ostensible enthusiasm, and *enosis*, which they privately dislike, are one and the same thing. AKEL, of course, does not bother to explain its distinct conception of the two ideas.

Although AKEL opposed Makarios in the 1959 presidential elections, the party in 1960 concluded a mutually expedient truce with the forces of the Archbishop-President in return for five seats in parliament. Since then, its political strategy has been to avoid open conflict with the President. The party's official line toward him was officially stated soon after independence:

We support the Archbishop and President of the Republic of Cyprus on every particular issue against the colonialists and on behalf of the defense of the people's interest. We criticize him on every particular issue where his position clashes with the popular national interests.[15]

The Communists have supported the President on such major issues as constitutional revision and a non-aligned foreign policy. They also have encouraged his cordial relations with Tito and Nasser and have successfully urged him to support the Communist-dominated Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), whose 1963 Executive Committee meeting took place in Nicosia. It was at this meeting that Makarios reaffirmed his intention to reject all military alliances.

Meanwhile, however, AKEL is conducting an intense campaign for new election laws establishing proportional representation, asserting that they polled a much higher percentage of votes in the 1960 elections to the House of Representatives than is indicated by their present representation (they received only the five seats agreed upon before the single-list balloting took place). The party also continues to deplore expenditures for a national army but insists that once "genuine democratic parliamentary institutions are realized, they must be defended against foreign intervention." [16] Their

[13] Personal interview with Ziartides, August 1965. The Acheson Plan of September 1964 proposed a complicated territorial exchange and population resettlement as a preliminary condition for *enosis*.

[14] *The Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia), Aug. 29, 1965.

[15] *Haravghi*, June 5, 1960. Interestingly enough, the possession of five seats in the 50-member House does not, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, make AKEL a recognized political party in that body. Article 73, par. 12 of the Constitution reads: "Any political party which is represented at least by 12 percent of the total number of Representatives in the House of Representatives can form and shall be entitled to be recognized as a political party group."

[16] *The Program of AKEL*, 1962, *op. cit.*

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paradoxical position on this issue reflects their hostility to General Grivas, who has followed a policy of distributing Communist-indoctrinated youths among different units in the Greek Cypriot National Guard and keeping them under scrutiny by security elements.

On his side, Makarios has allowed AKEL to operate openly. While he has occasionally come out against the party in public pronouncements, he has to all appearances taken few effective steps to structure his own Patriotic Front as a political counterforce. He also has his own personal differences with the fiercely anti-Communist General Grivas—a fact which AKEL can only view with satisfaction.[17] The Archbishop evidently assumes that he can keep the Communists within his flock through the Church. It is also possible that he needs AKEL to play off against any opposition which might arise within his own political following. Moreover, the Communists are all Greeks, and in Makarios' eyes the enemy is still the Turk.

With AKEL's strength remaining intact, if not actually growing, the price the Archbishop may have to pay for Communist cooperation in any future election could be much higher than it was in 1960. If he should seek another pact with AKEL regarding the second national elections, it might suit the party's long-range plans to bide its time and continue building up its organization with a view to making a possible bid for power, or at least putting up a major contest in the 1970 elections.

AKEL and Moscow

Soviet interest in Cyprus lies essentially in exploiting the current crisis to embitter relations between Greece and Turkey and thus weaken the southern flank of the NATO alliance; in forcing British withdrawal from Cyprus and eliminating the island as a military base for any NATO nation; and in ultimately replacing the island's pro-Western orientation with a pro-Soviet one.

Evidence of this interest was the speedy dispatch to the fledgling republic in 1960 of Ambassador Pavel K. Yemoshin, a man skilled in dealing with NATO conflicts. (He had served in Iceland at the time of the fisheries dispute between Iceland and Great Britain.) Since that time, Moscow has used its Embassy along with AKEL to transmit its propaganda to Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, and Israel.

Soviet tactics in pursuing the objectives outlined above were illustrated in February 1964 by the reaction of former Premier Khrushchev to the NATO proposal to assemble an international peace-keeping force on Cyprus, after it had become clear that the British alone could not put an end to violence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. At that time the Soviet Premier addressed almost identical letters to the government heads of the United States, Great Britain, France, Greece, and Turkey, warning that such a move would be "the source of international complications fraught with grave consequences." He denounced the proposed dispatch of NATO troops to Cyprus as tantamount to "an actual occupation" designed to bring a "neutral state under the control of NATO."[18]

Although the USSR initially sent massive arms shipments to Makarios in support of Greek Cypriot aspirations, Moscow has found that not all elements in the complex Cyprus situation are subject to its control. The very intensity of the inter-communal bitterness and fighting on the island, along with new developments in Soviet relations with Ankara, caused Moscow to make certain tactical adjustments which have embarrassed AKEL and compromised the party's popularity among the Greek Cypriots.

Thus, for example, after AKEL had belatedly and reluctantly swung over to a position, however vague, in support of Greek Cypriot nationalist aims and *enosis,* Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declared in a radio interview in January 1965 that the "internal organization of the Cypriot state is a matter for the Cypriots themselves" to determine, and he went on to suggest that, among other alternatives, "they may choose the federal form."[19]

[17] *The New York Times* (March 27, 1966) reported from Nicosia that disagreement between President Makarios and General Grivas over control of the Greek Cypriot National Guard was rapidly nearing a climax. According to the dispatch, President Makarios seeks to curb Grivas' influence and authority.

[18] Text of letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Johnson, Feb. 7, 1964; *New York Times,* Feb. 8.

[19] *Izvestia* (Moscow), Jan. 21, 1965.

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This suggestion of a federation as a possible solution of the Cyprus problem was acutely distressing to AKEL. In order to satisfy the Greek Cypriots, the party had to say something critical of the Soviet suggestion, but at the same time it could not afford to alienate the Soviet leaders.

Accordingly, its response was a conscious attempt to meet both conflicting pressures on the party. On January 26—immediately after Secretary-General Papaioannou and two other AKEL officials returned from an "enlightenment mission" to the Soviet-bloc countries—the party's Central Committee met and issued a statement declaring that it rejected the federal system for Cyprus "for reasons of principle and because it is an erroneous and impractical idea [which would help] the divide-and-rule policies of the imperialists." The AKEL statement, however, was careful to welcome other parts of the Gromyko interview—such as his expression of Soviet opposition to foreign intervention and his call for the removal of foreign bases and the maintenance of the island's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity—as a "most positive and immense contribution." In conclusion, the statement insisted—somewhat optimistically—that "the Soviet Union continues to stand by Cyprus and will defend the Cyprus case along with Greece in the United Nations." [20]

A short while later, on February 7, 1965, Secretary-General Papaioannou again referred to the Gromyko interview in noticeably cautious terms. Addressing an extraordinary party meeting, he stated that "our Party disagrees with Mr. Gromyko's reference to federation," but he noted that the Soviet Foreign Minister had also said that "it was up to the people of Cyprus to decide this question." Papaioannou went on to reject charges of a Soviet "betrayal" of Cyprus and asserted that the Russians were and always had been friendly to the Greek Cypriot cause.[21]

Timid and circumspect as were these expressions of opposition to Gromyko's suggestion of federation for Cyprus, they represented highly unusual behavior on the part of AKEL. So consistent had the party been in its loyalty to Soviet leadership, however, that Moscow evidently felt that it need not take the reactions of the AKEL leadership too seriously. This inference seems to be supported by the fact that the Soviet position regarding Cyprus subsequently moved in a direction still more favorable to the Turks. For example, Moscow has, since August 1965, officially adopted the now controversial term, "two communities," in referring to a possible settlement of the ethnic problem of Cyprus.

Soviet Diplomatic Maneuvers

The rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Turkey, confirmed last August by the first state visit to Moscow of a Turkish leader in 30 years, has placed AKEL in a situation similar to that of the Greek Communist Party during the Greek civil war, when it had to adapt itself to a painful Soviet decision on the delicate issue of Macedonian independence. In the Cyprus situation, while recent Soviet policy may be said to have helped avert a Turkish invasion of the island, it certainly has not satisfied anyone involved, and it has made the Greek Cypriot community aware of Soviet duplicity. As former AKEL Secretary-General Ploutis Servas caustically remarked, "When it comes to making Russian policy on Cyprus, AKEL is not part of Moscow's planning process." [22]

Moscow's friendly gestures towards Turkey in January and August of 1965 were obviously designed to capitalize on whatever ill feelings the American "honest broker" policy for Cyprus had caused in Ankara. The policy-makers in Moscow apparently saw more value in developing cordial relations with Turkey and urging Turkish moderation than they did in trying to appease the Cypriot Communists leaders; yet, the Soviet line on Cyprus was still cautious. In the UN Security Council debate on Cyprus in August of last year, for example, the Soviet delegate avoided mention of either *enosis* or "federation" and instead directed the bulk of his remarks to the need for withdrawing all foreign troops and bases from the island. Apparently, the Soviets have come to realize, as has the United States, that it is most difficult to please both sides simultaneously in the Cyprus issue.

[20] *The Cyprus Mail,* Jan. 27, 1965.
[21] *Nei Keri* (Nicosia), Feb. 8, 1965.
[22] Personal interview with Servas, Nicosia, Aug. 1965.

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Whatever the misgivings of the AKEL leaders over the Soviet-Turkish rapprochement, they did not voice them until later in the year—specifically on December 18, 1965. A day earlier, the UN General Assembly's Political and Security Committee had debated a pro-Greek Cypriot resolution calling on all member-nations to "respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and to refrain from any foreign intervention or interference." On the final vote in the Committee, the Soviet Union and the other Communist countries (with the exception of Cuba and Yugoslavia) abstained, even though the Political Committee had before it a Soviet-sponsored draft resolution condemning any interference in the internal affairs of other states. This Communist action triggered an immediate and unprecedentedly sharp reaction from the AKEL leadership. The following statement appeared on the front page of *Haravghi* the morning after the vote:

The Politburo of the Central Committee of AKEL observes regretfully that during yesterday's vote in the Political Committee of the United Nations, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries (excluding Yugoslavia and Cuba, which voted for the pro-Cypriot resolution) abstained with respect to the resolution of 32 non-committed countries.

This position of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries is wholly disappointing to the Politburo of the Central Committee of AKEL and to the Cypriot people, is in opposition to their previous announcements concerning the unfettered and complete independence of Cyprus . . ., and calls forth justifiable uneasiness among the Cypriot people.

The Politburo of the Central Committee of AKEL maintains its belief that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, which in the past gave significant and fruitful spiritual and material aid to the struggle of Cyprus, a fact which is esteemed by the Cypriot people, will finally vote for the resolution of the 32 non-committed countries in the General Assembly of the United Nations, thereby furnishing the additional strength to secure the necessary two-thirds majority for a pro-Cyprus resolution.[23]

Despite this plea, however, the Soviet bloc again abstained the next day when the resolution was put to a vote in the General Assembly. It cannot be said with certainty what the Soviets hoped to gain by this maneuver, but it was one that provided no satisfaction to the Turks, the Greeks, or the Communist Party of Cyprus. All that AKEL could do was try to forget the matter and hope that the USSR would see fit to modify its position in the future along lines more palatable to the Greek Cypriots.

Presumably with that end in mind, AKEL Secretary-General Papaioannou and his deputy, Andreas Fantis, flew to Moscow in January 1966 for talks with CPSU Central Committee members Suslov and Ponomarev. After lengthy discussions, a joint communique was issued affirming *inter alia* the Soviet belief "that the Cyprus problem can be solved through peaceful means, and that this necessitates the safeguarding of the rights and interests of the two ethnic communities."[24] This part of the communique was apparently calculated to please the Turks rather than the Greek Cypriots, but the AKEL leaders did not leave Moscow entirely empty-handed: they could at least find some satisfaction in the communique's further statement that the Soviet Union "supports the abrogation of the restrictive ties imposed on the Cypriot people under the Zurich and London agreements." Still, they must surely have gone home with the feeling that the USSR was not firmly behind Archbishop Makarios' position on the future of Cyprus. In fact, Makarios himself, in a subsequent interview with a Greek correspondent, indicated that he shared this impression:

With regard to the Soviet Union, I believe that it does not favor a solution leading to union with Greece.[25]

The Outlook

How long AKEL will be able to shoulder this burden of Soviet neutrality between the Greeks and Turks is indeed a crucial question. With Moscow in no apparent rush to sacrifice

[23] *Haravghi,* Dec. 18, 1965.

[24] *Pravda,* Jan. 25, 1966.

[25] *Kathimerini* (Athens) March 9, 1966.

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its relations with Turkey to the desires of the Greek Cypriots, and with the possibility of *enosis* presenting more of a menace than a blessing to the party, AKEL must work hard to maintain its influence in the domestic affairs of the island. For the time being, the Communists under Papaioannou's leadership are still the "loyal opposition of His Beatitude." [26] If present economic conditions in Cyprus continue to improve, the party may be unable to exploit the issues of unemployment and unequal distribution of personal income as successfully as it has in the past. At the same time, the Communists' program of land reform seems unlikely to bring any remarkable results since the Orthodox Church is the largest landholder on Cyprus. Unless AKEL chooses to meet Makarios head-on in the next elections, therefore, it appears probable that domestic issues such as land reform will play a less important role in the party's tactics in the immediate future.

Nevertheless, should new national elections take place before or soon after President Makarios' extended term officially ends in August, of this year,* a crucial period in Cypriot internal politics can be expected. In July 1965, the Greek Cypriot-controlled House of Representatives passed a law providing that all Cypriots—Greeks and Turks and minorities—vote for candidates on a single electoral list, rather than on separate lists for the Greek and Turkish communities as the Republic's constitution originally specified. The possible effect of this might be to enable AKEL, by appealing to Greek Cypriot nationalism, to make significant gains in its share of seats in the House of Representatives. With its strong labor and front-group support, the party also could have a good chance of winning local control of the five major urban areas if municipal as well as national elections were to be held in the near future.

If, on the other hand, the party should fail to gain its objectives through democratic means, or be outlawed as a result of pressure from the Grivas faction, it still will have the option of going underground and attempting to launch a coup d'etat at some opportune moment in the future. The party possesses three vital prerequisites for such an eventual course; *i.e.*, a tightly-knit conspiratorial organization, the support of a considerable segment of the population, and aid from the Soviet bloc.

Events to date would seem to indicate that most Greek Cypriots do not regard communism as a major threat. It was the Turks who initially drew attention to the Communist danger in Cyprus, and since AKEL is composed mainly of Greek Cypriots, even the mainland Greeks have hitherto tended to belittle the threat. Now, however, Athens, too, is becoming worried about the growth of Cypriot communism. One reason for this is that, although the Communist Party of Greece (Kommonistikon Komma Ellas—KKE) is outlawed, the present crypto-Communist Union of the Democratic Left, (Enosis Dimokratis Aristeras—EDA) might find it possible to exploit AKEL's success in an attempt to regain the respectability and support which the Communists lost in Greece following the 1947-49 civil war. There is no doubt that AKEL has mutually useful ties with both the illegal KKE and the EDA.

It is obvious, however, that the momentum of the Cypriot Communists' cause has suffered from the change in the Soviet position on Cyprus. AKEL clearly compromised itself by faithfully echoing the Soviet line in the past, and it cannot now afford to deny history or admit that it made a mistake. Although a crisis of confidence has developed in AKEL's relations with Moscow, it is unlikely that the Cypriot party could risk an open break with the CPSU—or, indeed, that it wants to do so. The Soviets continue to maintain a large embassy in Nicosia; AKEL leaders continue to make frequent trips to the Soviet Union; and thus far, the Chinese Communists have apparently not been able to exploit the differences between AKEL and Moscow to their own advantage.

Under the circumstances, the future course of Cypriot communism is not clearly discernible. The party leaders have shown themselves to be patient men, and they have lived through adversities and reverses more serious than the crisis they now face. They certainly can ill afford to allow the diplomatic tactics of the Soviet Union to defeat them now when they have so much at stake.

[26] Papaioannou was reelected Secretary-General of AKEL at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee, held in conjunction with the 11th Party Congress, March 1966.

* Postscript: In view of continued political unrest on Cyprus, President Makarios announced on April 2, 1966, that the present parliament and his own presidency would be extended for another year, *i.e.*, until August 1967. *Washington Post,* April 3, 1966.

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The Catholic-Communist "Dialogue"

By Kevin Devlin

EDITORS' NOTE: The article below is the first of a regular series of commentaries by Mr. Devlin on developments in international communism, to appear in every other issue of this journal. Comments and suggestions for topics to be treated in the future will be welcomed.

"Is this a Communist congress or an ecumenical council?"

There was some excuse for the cynicism of the bourgeois journalist who put this query after hearing Secretary-General Luigi Longo's opening report to the Eleventh Congress of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) on January 25, 1966. In his four-and-a-half-hour speech, Longo had dwelt—at iconoclastic length—on the similarity of many Marxist and Christian "values" and had called on Communists to undertake a "dialogue" not only with individual believers but with Catholic organizations and with the Church itself. The delegates had heard him voice fulsome praise of Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI ("outrageous in its low Machiavellianism," commented *Corriere della Sera* sourly, and anxiously[1]); they had listened as he repeatedly quoted papal encyclicals and Vatican Council documents, adding:

In these and other recent Church documents we find motives, changes and objectives which have guided us in our struggle. Today, the possibilities of an encounter between Catholics and Communists have become greater, and there is a more widespread awareness that this is the road which must be followed if one wishes to change the present course of international politics.[2]

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[1] Panfilo Gentile, "L'Appello ai Cattolici," *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), Jan. 27, 1966.
[2] *L'Unità* (Rome), Jan. 26, 1966.

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Longo's hope, in short, was that Catholics would join in building the society of tomorrow. It would be a "socialist" society, of course; but the Catholic collaborators, he promised, would help to determine its features. Meanwhile, there were certain firm guarantees to be given. The Russian Mikhail Suslov was among the foreign party emissaries who impassively listened to Longo's criticism of outmoded "conservative ideological positions [which] identified the religious 'ideology' as the opium of the people" and to his further declaration that "just as we are against a theocratic state, so we are against state atheism. This means that we are against the state's conferring any privileges whatever on an ideology, philosophy, religious faith, or cultural and artistic school of thought, to the detriment of others."

The element of political opportunism in these statements, delivered from the rostrum of a Communist party congress, was clear enough—particularly when Longo took it upon himself to defend the Pope and the Council against "the criticisms and scarcely veiled attacks" of the Christian Democratic right wing, or when he urged that Italy adopt "a neutrality parallel to the neutrality of the Church, which has abandoned the politics of blocs."

Nevertheless, political opportunism is only part of the story. The emphasis which the Eleventh Congress of the PCI placed on an approach to Catholics draws much of its significance from the fact that it is not an isolated phenomenon. It must, rather, be seen against the background of a wider pattern of change in the relationship between communism and organized religion, particularly in Western Europe, in recent years. This in turn has been the result of a continuing process of ferment and transformation both in the Christian churches (as expressed in ecumenism and the conscious adaptation to secular realities) and in the Communist movement (revisionist polycentrism and the consequent erosion of ideology).

Probings by the Church

On the Catholic side, this radical rethinking of received teachings and revision of traditional attitudes has been associated above all with John XXIII, the elderly "caretaker Pope" who jolted his Church by calling for an *aggiornamento*, a coming-to-terms with the modern world and with the non-Catholic religious, political and intellectual forces at work in it. The change in attitudes towards what his predecessors had consistently anathematized as "atheistic communism" was memorably expressed, less than two months before Pope John's death, in his encyclical *Pacem in Terris* (April 1963).[3] Instead of sweeping condemnation, there was a tranquil warning against confusing "false philosophical teachings" with the "historical movements [inspired by these teachings] that have economic, social, cultural or political ends." Not only were such movements (Marxism was obviously meant, but not named) subject to development and change, but "insofar as they conform to the dictates of right reason and are interpreters of the lawful aspirations of the human person, [they] contain elements that are positive and deserving of approval." This was startling enough; but Pope John went further in suggesting that "a drawing together or a meeting for the attainment of some practical end, which was formerly deemed inopportune or unproductive, might now or in the future be considered opportune and useful." Prudence would guide Catholics in deciding "the ways and degrees in which work in common [with Communists] might be possible for the achievement of economic, social and political ends which are honorable and useful."

The line thus traced out by Pope John was continued under his successor, Paul VI, and, as it were, institutionalized—not without strong conservative opposition[4]—in the debates and documents of the Vatican Council, particularly those on the Church in the modern world and on religious liberty, and in the establishment in April 1965 of a permanent secretariat for relations with non-believers (primarily Marxists).

La Main Tendue

Actually these altered Catholic attitudes and the Communist response to them were not quite as novel as they appeared to most. It was the late French Communist leader, Maurice Thorez, who had first used the now familiar phrase, "the outstretched hand" (*la main tendue*), in his appeal to Catholic workers for political cooperation in April 1936. Thorez's appeal was made within the

[3] For abridged texts of this and other papal encyclicals mentioned later, see A. Fremantle, ed., *The Social Teachings of the Church*, New York, 1963. For full texts of all but *Pacem in Terris*, see F. J. Powers, ed., *Papal Pronouncements on the Political Order*, Westminster, Md., 1952.

[4] Some 450 prelates, out of nearly 2,200 voting on this question, campaigned unsuccessfully to have an explicit condemnation of communism included in the text on the Church in the modern world. They were hardly mollified by the insertion in the final version of a phrase quietly reconfirming previous papal criticisms of atheistic doctrines (*"sicut antea reprobatur"*). This nod to the past was more than balanced by the open invitation to atheists to engage in "prudent dialogue" for the betterment of the world.

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opportunistic framework of the popular-front policy imposed by the Seventh Comintern Congress late in 1935, and the reaction from organized Catholicism was predictably negative: the only significant response seems to have come from a small group of "Revolutionary Christians," whose monthly organ, *Terre Nouvelle* (New Earth), bore as its eloquent emblem the hammer-and-sickle imposed upon a cross.

There was, however, a response from some Christian intellectuals, notably in a book entitled *Communism and Christianity,*[5] a collection of essays by the Catholics François Mauriac, Père Ducattillon (O.P.), Alexandre Marc, and Daniel-Rops; the Orthodox Nicolas Berdiaev; and the Calvinist Denis de Rougemont. In the main, the essayists maintained a dispassionate emphasis on discussion rather than polemic.[6] This was, in effect, an invitation to a "dialogue," but it was not taken up by Communist intellectuals.

Apart from any reaction to Communist moves, a small but important segment of French Catholic intellectuals was working during the prewar years towards a revision of traditional socio-political attitudes. The leaders here were Emmanuel Mounier and the group gathered around his periodical, *Esprit;* their "personalism" included a radical critique of bourgeois capitalism but still kept them far from the authoritarian and materialistic Marxist positions.[7] Later, the thought of Jacques Maritain moved in a similar direction, with greater emphasis on representative democracy.[8] Moreover, these thinkers could claim support from the official social teachings of the Church: for example, Pope Pius XI, who harshly condemned "atheistic communism" in the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* (1937), had earlier criticized the injustices of the capitalist order in *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931).[9]

Between the mid-1930's and the mid-1950's, then, France was the scene of the most notable preparations on the Catholic side for a future "dialogue."[10] During the same period, the major developments on the Communist side took place in Italy.

The Italian CP

Even before the war, the clandestine, persecuted Italian Communist Party was aware of the need to come to some kind of terms with Catholicism in the homeland of the Church. Thus, in September 1936 and again in April 1938, the PCI Central Committee issued appeals urging Italian Catholics to join in the struggle against the Fascist regime, which had also crushed Don Luigi Sturzo's Christian Democratic movement, and emphasizing the Communists' "absolute respect for religious opinions" (Sept. 1936 text).[11]

When Togliatti returned to Italy from Moscow in 1944, he reaffirmed and strengthened this approach, committing his revivified party (in his important policy report delivered in April 1944 at Naples) to a constitutional regime that would guarantee "freedom of thought and speech; freedom of the press, association and assembly; freedom of religion and worship." At the Fifth PCI Congress in late December 1945, he extended the list to "freedom of religious propaganda and organization." The new party statutes broke daringly with

[5] English edition, with translator's preface by J. F. Scanlan, London, 1938.

[6] The tone may be suggested by a few brief quotations: "Communism has too often been refuted by controversialists who did not know what it meant" (Ducattillon, *op. cit.,* p. 88); "In a period of acute social struggle, such as we are witnessing today, the system which corresponds best to Christian personalism is 'personalist socialism'" (Berdiaev, p. 226); and "In adopting a position *vis-à-vis* communism two attitudes are forbidden to a Christian at the outset, on the one hand the attitude of systematic hatred and suspicion, on the other that of a willingness to defend an intolerable condition of affairs [in non-Communist society]" (Daniel-Rops, p. 260).

[7] See E. Mounier, *De la propriété capitaliste à la propriété humaine,* Paris, 1936. Cf. also the manifesto of Mounier's group in *Esprit* (Paris), Oct. 1935.

[8] It is interesting to note that President Eduardo Frei of Chile has acknowledged his Christian Democrat regime's debt to the social and political thought of Maritain. See E. Frei and I. Bustos, *Maritain entre nosotros,* Santiago, 1964 (cited by E. Halperin, *The Christian Democratic Alternative in Chile,* Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1964).

[9] In fact, Pius XI hit both targets in one sentence of *Quadragesimo Anno:* "It remains for us, then, to call up for judgment the economic order as it actually exists and socialism, its bitterest accuser; and to pronounce upon them both a frank and just sentence." The Communist charge that organized religion had, in practice, made itself the ally of the capitalist establishment contained much truth—but it was far from the whole truth.

[10] A major postwar development in France was the Church's attempt to reassert its presence among the "post-Christian" masses through the *"Mission de France"* and the priest-worker experiment. This project was halted by Vatican decree in 1954 but again authorized on an experimental basis in October 1965.

[11] Both these documents were reproduced in *Rinascita,* Feb. 19, 1966. Although the Spanish Civil War had brought Catholic-Communist antagonism to a peak, there was apparently some tentative response to the April 1938 "Open Letter to Italian Catholics." In his preface to the republished documents, Franco Ferri reveals that in August 1938 talks took place at a Swiss convent between "Monsignor Rampolla, Secretary of the Congregation of Seminaries, and the Communists Donini and Sereni . . . in the course of which there was discussion of political alternatives and of the basis of the real guarantees contemplated by the Communists for the Church, not only in Italy." Ferro adds that there were "many [other] top-level contacts."

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all Communist precedent by offering membership to "all citizens who—without regard to race, religious faith, and philosophical convictions—accept the political program of the party." In the Constituent Assembly of 1946-47, it was the decisive Communist vote (in contrast to Socialist, Republican and Liberal opposition) which assured the incorporation in the Constitution of the Lateran Treaty, giving the Church a privileged position in Italian life.

But the Communists' "outstretched hand" was rejected—as it was bound to be in view of the advent of the Cold War and the persecution of religion by the new Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. An anti-Communist campaign by Catholic leaders, clerical and lay, helped to defeat the Communist-Socialist coalition in the 1948 elections and was climaxed in July 1949 by Pius XII's decree excommunicating Communists and their supporters.[12] Shortly afterwards the left-wing Christian Democrats led by Giuseppe Dossetti were heavily defeated at the party's congress. During the 1950's Dossetti's follower, Giorgio La Pira, the "holy mayor" of Florence, was among the few lonely voices calling for Catholic-Communist collaboration.

By the early 1960's, however, attitudes in both camps had changed considerably. In Florence, Bologna and other centers, groups of "advanced" Catholics were reconsidering Marxism in personal meetings and through small-circulation magazines like *Testimonianze* (Florence). On the Italian Communist side, the hand was repeatedly stretched out—in the theses of the Ninth PCI Congress in January 1960 ("action for an understanding with the Catholic world is conceived as one aspect of the Italian way to socialism"); in the theses of the Tenth Congress in December 1962 ("the aspiration toward a socialist society . . . can find a stimulus in the religious conscience"); and in articles and statements such as Togliatti's speech of March 1963 in which he rejected "the ingenuous and mistaken idea" that religious beliefs would fade away under socialism.

Togliatti's remark presaged another turning point: the emergence of Western Communist criticism of established Communist theory and practice regarding religion. This appeared first in reaction to Leonid Ilichev's report to the CPSU Central Committee in November 1963, in which he denounced religion in traditional fashion as "diametrically opposed" to communism and called for an intensification of atheistic campaigns to "conquer" it finally. Italian Communist criticism of this "fundamentalist" line was belated and at first restrained. Initially expressed in an article by Professor Lucio Lombardo-Radice (*Rinascita,* July 4, 1964), it found fuller expression some months later in the most interesting book that the "dialogue" has yet produced: *Il dialogo alla prova* (The Dialogue Put to the Test), made up of essays by five Catholics and five Communists.[13]

Difficulties and Dilemmas

The initiative for this joint work came not from the Communists but from the "Lapirian" Catholics, who drew a rebuke from *L'Osservatore Romano* for their pains. The actual effect of the "dialogue" was to emphasize the "ideological" gap between the two sides—and the limitations of any possible discourse. Thus, the Catholic participants generally stressed that there was no question of *political* collaboration on the level of organizations; their concern was rather to explore doctrinal implications in a Johannine spirit of goodwill. For the Communists, on the other hand, political collaboration was frankly the goal, however obscured by talk of "common human values." They were at pains to clear themselves of the charge of opportunism and *strumentalismo* (using others for their own ends). They also insisted that what mattered was the reality of communism in Italy, not elsewhere; they deplored the Soviet "call for a struggle against religious survivals" (Delogu) and admitted that in the name of "vulgar materialism" believers were wrongly subjected to legal and civil discrimination in the USSR (Lombardo-Radice).[14] Both sides generally agreed that there could be no ideological compromise; only the Catholic Zolo saw "the possibility of a doctrinal integration of some aspects of Marxist humanism with aspects of the Christian conception of man."

In fact, the Italian Communists were in a dilemma, torn between the legacy of the past and the demands of the future. Their problem was formulated with unusual clarity by Togliatti in his Yalta Memorandum of August 1964:

[12] Despite the *aggiornamento* under Pope John, this decree is still binding on Catholics, as the conservative Cardinal Ottaviani tartly recalled in August 1965 (interview in *Studi Sociali,* Rome). However, it has obviously been ignored by large numbers of Italian Catholic voters—which may have had something to do with Pope John's shift in emphasis.

[13] Florence, 1964. The contributors are alternately Catholic and Communists beginning with the Catholic Mario Gozzini, followed by L. Lombardo-Radice, N. Fabro, L. Gruppi, R. Orfei, A. Cecchi, G.-P. Meucci, I. Delogu, D. Zolo, and S. Di Marco.

[14] Even when some public Soviet attitudes toward religion were modified, Italian comrades continued to criticize them as inadequate. *E.g.,* see L. Gruppi's discussion of M. Mchedlov's *Kommunist* article of October 1964 in the March 1965 issue of *Il Contemporaneo* (supplement to *Rinascita*)—a special issue devoted to the "dialogue."

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The old atheistic propaganda is of no use. The very problem of religious conscience, its content and its roots among the masses, the way of overcoming it, must be presented in a different manner from that adopted in the past if we wish to reach the Catholic masses and be understood by them. Otherwise our outstretched hand to the Catholics would be regarded as pure expediency and almost as hypocrisy.[15]

The outstretched hand *was* indeed generally regarded as "pure expediency"—and not without reason. Communist attempts to publicize the "message" of *Il dialogo alla prova* through articles and local meetings with Catholic participation were weakened by obvious political moves, such as Pietro Ingrao's call in January 1965 for a Communist understanding not only with the Catholic masses but also with Catholic organizations and the whole "Catholic world" (it was assumed that his aim was to exploit deepening division in the Christian Democratic Party). This maneuver promptly backfired: a week after Ingrao's call, the Christian Democratic factions united to issue a National Council resolution denouncing communism, and within the next few months, the major Catholic professional and labor organizations followed suit, warning members against taking part in any dialogue.[16]

But in spite of repeated warnings by *L'Osservatore Romano* and the Italian Jesuit organ *La Civiltà Cattolica*,[17] the discussion nevertheless continued—if only with scattered groups of Catholics and their little magazines. On the Communist side, this led inevitably to a further development of revisionist positions, usefully recapitulated in Luigi Fabbri's recent book, *I communisti e la religione*.[18]

Renewed Initiative

Across the Alps in France, meanwhile, the dialogue was developing along different lines. First, it had less direct relevance to national politics, the Catholic MRP party having become a minor factor.

[15] English text in *The New York Times*, Sept. 5, 1964.

[16] Norman Kogan, "Italian Communism, the Working Class and Organized Catholicism," prepared for delivery at the 1965 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1965.

[17] In this matter there is a notable difference between the position of *Civiltà Cattolica* and that of the French Jesuit organ, *Études*. See, for example, G. Jarlot, S. J., "Le neo-marxisme Italien," *Études*, January 1966.

[18] Rome, 1965. Fabbri deals with the resistance of "doctrinaire" Italian Communists to these revisionist tendencies and also devotes an interesting chapter to relevant ideological developments in Poland and France.

Communism and Religion: The Selective Approach

The various historic-social vicissitudes through which each group of people or civilizations passed determined the crystallization of beliefs, the creation of determined precepts or religious norms. In almost all the globe and throughout almost all epochs, religion has held back historic-social development. But in determined historic phases and utilized by the ascending classes, it played a positive role, it was utilized as a revolutionary banner. Engels indicates it in speaking of the war of the peasants in Germany, and Lenin himself does in a letter to Gorki. "There was a time" he said, "when in spite of the origin and real significance of the idea of God, the struggle of democracy and the proletariat was brought about under the form of a struggle of one religious idea against the other." Lenin adds that "this time passed long ago."*

This is true. But in the ideas of goodness, equality, fraternity among human beings, which the Christian religion also speaks of and which are reflected in the honest religious and sincere conscience of any believers, there are elements capable of contributing to an emancipating struggle. These elements do not have their origin in religion as such, but they have been taken from non-religious, objective forms of relations between men as members of society. Perhaps these elements, instead of being a restraint to such a struggle, might constitute a stimulus? Our response is positive. . . . Religion is an encouraging idea where the religious movement supports the social transformations and socialism.

* Letter to Gorki, December 1913.

—From "On the Unity of Catholics and Communists," by Santiago Alvarez, in *España Republicana* (Republican Spain), monthly organ of the Spanish CP, No. 594, Aug. 1, 1965, Havana, Cuba.

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Secondly, on the Catholic side there was a considerably higher proportion of clerical participants, especially Jesuits and Dominicans. Thirdly, the French Communist Party did not commit itself organizationally to the debate to anywhere near the extent that the PCI did: the burden of Communist discussion was carried, rather, by a small number of individuals, notably Roger Garaudy, Gilbert Mury, André Moine and Michel Verret.

If the French Communist commitment to the debate has been less impressive than that of the Italian comrades, it has been met by a more receptive attitude on the part of some French Catholics. For several years now, Catholic spokesmen, clerical and lay, have participated in the Communist-organized "Semaines de la pensée marxiste."[19] In March 1965 the compliment was returned when two Communists, G. Mury and J. Bruhat, attended the "Semaine des intellectuels Catholiques."[20]

The leading Communist spokesman has been Roger Garaudy, director of the party's Marxist research center (and editor of its theoretical organ, *Cahiers du Communisme,* until "relieved" of his duties in October 1964 together with a third of the staff). His revisionist ideas on religion, developed over the past few years, are most fully expressed in his recent book, *De l'anathème au dialogue.*[21]

Like the Italians, Garaudy criticizes the Soviet-East European model. In fact, he was the first prominent Western Communist to do so: in February 1964, five months before the Italian Lombardo-Radice spoke out, he told a Catholic-Communist seminar in Lyons that "we cannot as Marxists adopt the present position of our Soviet comrades on the religious problem, as given by Ilichev. It is not a question of tactics, but of principle." Garaudy makes no doctrinal concessions; on the contrary, he stands by Marxist materialism, holding to the chiliastic belief that religion will eventually die under true and complete communism. But it will die of natural causes, he maintains, and there should be no attempt to kill it. This strain of eclectic revisionism was summed up in an article which Garaudy contributed to the left-wing Catholic weekly, *Témoignage chrétien,* in March 1965:

The concept of Christian love . . . is the highest image that man can conceive of himself and of the meaning of his life; and that is why Marxism would be impoverished if Saint Augustine, Saint Joan of the Cross, or Teresa of Avila became alien to it.

On this ground surely there can be a meeting of Marxists determined to understand, to integrate and to realize the human 'substance' of Christianity; and of Christians who understand the purifying virtue of Marxism as against all the disincarnated spiritual systems, and who are determined not to desert man's struggle.[22]

In Italy and France the "dialogue," such as it is, takes place in the open. In Spain, however, the complex confrontation between religion and Marxism proceeds in clandestinity, or in exile; it is conditioned by the bitter memories of civil war, and it is extremely difficult to trace its course. The leaders of the Spanish Communist Party have repeatedly made it clear that they now place their hopes in an alliance of anti-Franco forces in which Catholic organizations would have to play an important part. The grounds for these hopes were expounded—and exaggerated—in an article ("Towards an Alliance of Communists and Catholics") which Santiago Alvarez of the party Central Committee contributed to the June 1965 issue of *World Marxist Review.*

Alvarez's main point is that "the Catholics are our main allies today in the struggle against Franco," and he claims that "this process of rapprochement has quickened in recent months." To back this claim, he cites examples of priests supporting workers' protests in the Asturias and Catalonia; anti-Franco movements among Catholic students; a few left-wing Catholic publications like *Cuadernos para el Dialogo;* the formation in January 1965 of the Christian Democratic Union with a program of economic and social reform; and the positions taken by individual lay and clerical spokesmen—particularly that expressed by Msgr. Guerra Campos, secretary of the Spanish hierarchy (whose majority views he did not represent), in his ad-

[19] The "Week of Marxist Thought" held at Nantes in the spring of 1965 was devoted to Marxist-Christian relations. See the proceedings in *La Nouvelle critique* (Paris), May 1965, especially the contributions of Michel Verret and the Dominican Père Duquoc.

[20] See G. Mury, "Le dialogue se poursuit," *France Nouvelle* (Paris), March 31-April 6, 1965.

[21] Paris, 1965. See the sympathetic review by the Dominican priest Père Gardey, in *Le Monde* (Paris), Dec. 10, 1965. From the Catholic viewpoint, *De l'anathème au dialogue* represents a considerable advance from the rather condescending attitudes expressed in Garaudy's earlier work, *Qu'est-ce que la morale marxiste?* (Paris, 1963). Cf. also A. Moine, *Communistes et chrétiens* (Paris, 1965) and M. Verret, *Les marxistes et la religion* (Italian edition, *L'ateismo moderno,* 1963).

[22] Garaudy's article was reprinted in the dissident revisionist Communist organ, *Unir pour le socialisme* (May 1965), but not in the official party press. It also provoked disagreement on the Catholic side. On March 30 the council of French bishops censured *Témoignages chrétiens* for having published it (even though Garaudy was answered by a theologian in the same issue). In general, however, the French bishops have been much more permissive than the Italian hierarchy and have dissociated themselves from the positions of the "intégristes" on the Catholic right wing.

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dress urging on the Ecumenical Council the need for a dialogue with Marxists.[23]

In appealing to these potential allies, says Alvarez, the Spanish Communists are ready to offer many guarantees and promises—including not only freedom of religion but "aid to Catholicism by the [socialist] state." But the contrast between these magnanimous promises and the weakness of Spanish communism (perhaps 5,000 harried party members) is striking. The available evidence suggests that the opposition to the Franco regime comes today mainly from non-Communist forces, with left-wing Catholics playing a major role. Party Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo's recent claim that "workers' commissions" consisting of Catholics, Communists, and other leftist elements have been formed "in all the principal centers of the country"[24] has the ring of propaganda; and the dream of Catholic-Communist collaboration in building a socialist Spain seems far from realization.

Less significant developments in other countries can be noted only briefly. In Belgium, for example, an enthusiastic Communist reviewer (L. Goty, in *Le Drapeau Rouge,* Jan. 16, 1966) reports that Garaudy's *De l'anathème au dialogue* "is selling like hot cakes, and supply cannot keep up with demand." But the Belgian Communists have made little contribution to any dialogue. Much the same is true of Austria. In Holland, the most "advanced" Catholic community in Europe finds no partner for discussion in an ideologically sclerotic Communist party. In West Germany, Catholic intellectuals have made a notable contribution to the reassessment of Marxism, but no response comes from the clandestine Communists. North America has produced little beyond an "outstretched-hand" pamphlet by Gus Hall of the CPUSA (the decision of the new Communist Party in Quebec to welcome Catholic believers into its ranks will make little impact on French Canadian conservatism).

There is no lack of significance in the interaction of religion and communism in Latin America although only in Chile does one find anything like a sustained "dialogue" in the European sense. However, the Latin American situation—marked by the growing reaction of some Catholics to social injustice, by the Church's links with the "establishment" in many countries, and by the inflexibility of most of the local Communist parties—is too complex to be discussed in this brief survey.

The Problems Ahead

The importance of the Catholic-Communist dialogue, especially in Western Europe, is clear; but so are its limitations. These arise above all from the fact that communism—like Catholicism—makes absolute claims affecting every sphere of life: as Reinhold Niebuhr has said, Marxism is "an irreligion transmuted into a new political religion."[25] Consequently, neither side can compromise on the essentials of doctrine—and the doctrines are essentially incompatible. Moreover, the Communists are, naturally, interested primarily in political collaboration, whereas wary Catholics generally insist that any political cooperation be limited to what a French theologian has called "specific objectives, recognized as acceptable to Catholics, important to the common good, in circumstances where there is no danger that such cooperation will end by going beyond the limits agreed upon"[26]—which leaves little scope for opportunism, even if one discounts the weight of the past.

These limitations emerged clearly in the most impressive personal confrontation that has yet taken place—the Salzburg conference of May 1965, which brought together some 250 scholars from both camps to discuss "Christianity and Marxism Today." The initiative came from the largely Catholic St. Paul's Society (Paulus-Gesellschaft) based in Munich. The discussion between theologians like Rahner and Reding and ideologists like Garaudy and Gruppi proceeded in an atmosphere of anxious goodwill; but it moved on the level of ideas, not on that of practical politics. The conceptual and semantic gap remained, and there were no concessions on the incompatible essentials. The participants, however, did resolve (by 200 votes to 20, with 30 abstentions) that "the dialogue is possible and fruitful, and . . . must be continued and widened. They hope for greater reciprocal information and mutual knowledge, in the awareness that both the Christian world and the Communist world are going through a phase of evolution."[27]

[23] Bishop Guerra Campos' address was reproduced in the October 1965 issue of the Spanish CP's monthly organ, *España Republicana,* published in Havana. It was followed by a long commentary in which the Communist Manuel Azcarate criticized the Church's "reactionary" past but welcomed Catholic collaboration in building a multiparty socialist society in which Marxism-Leninism would prevail "not by means of external pressures but by its innate merits."

[24] Interview in *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 1, 1966.

[25] Introduction to *Marx and Engels on Religion,* New York, 1964.

[26] Yves Calvez, "Chrétiens et communistes," *Revue de l'action populaire* (Paris), November 1965.

[27] For non-Communist accounts of the Salzburg conference see *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), May 4, 1965; *Die Presse* (Vienna), May 5; and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* May 5. For Communist coverage, see *L' Unità,* May 6; *Zeitung vum Letzeburger Vollek* (Luxembourg), May 7; and *Volksstimme* (Vienna), May 9.

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But perhaps the most significant thing about the Salzburg encounter is that the burden of Communist argument was borne mainly by the Italians and French. The East German, Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian regimes refused exit permits to the Marxist scholars invited from those countries; [28] consequently, only one Bulgarian and two Yugoslavs represented East European Communist views.

Early in March of this year, a spokesman for the Paulus-Gesellschaft announced that a second such conference would be held at the end of April, this time on the subject of "Christian Humanity and Marxist Humanism." He also announced that the Polish philosopher Adam Schaff, who was not allowed to attend the first conference, was among those who had already accepted invitations.

The greatest obstacle to the dialogue is the gap between promise and performance—between what Communists say in the West and what they do in the East.[29] This fact can only strengthen the trend towards revisionist reassessment of Communist theory and practice in the West, and hence towards the organizational fragmentation of the Communist world. Moreover, the "dialogue" adds a little more fuel to the flames of the wider ideological struggle, since the pro-Chinese parties and fractions will generally make no concessions to religion.[30]

All in all, the political profit which those Communist parties involved can win from the dialogue seems to be marginal. Time may tell what price they have to pay in the revision of theory and practice.

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[28] The East German Robert Havemann, the Pole Adam Schaff and the Hungarian Georgy Lukacs were among those prevented from attending. The Hungarian regime allowed three Catholics to attend the conference.

[29] The official attitudes of the Communist regimes towards religion vary quite widely, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia now being the most liberal (Poland is a special case). In general, however, administrative and legal pressures against the churches continue. Consult *Religion in Communist-dominated Areas,* the useful biweekly bulletin issued by the International Affairs Commission of the National Council of Churches, New York. The Vatican's Secretariat for Non-believers takes cautious note of the apparent evolution in Italian, French, and Yugoslav Marxist positions on religion, and of the contrast with East European and Soviet practice, in its first report (*Corriere della Sera,* Oct. 24, 1965).

[30] For one of many examples, see the denunciation in the Albanian organ *Rruga e Partise* (Party Life), June 1964, of the "Holy Alliance of imperialists, reformists, modern revisionists and the Vatican against Marxism-Leninism and Socialism."

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Changes in Russia: The Need for Perspectives

By Frederick C. Barghoorn

EDITORS' NOTE: Professor Barghoorn's commentary is another contribution to our continuing discussion of the evolution and future prospects of the Soviet political system. Previous materials in this discussion include our symposium on "Progress and Ideology in the USSR" (issue of November-December 1965); Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski's essay, "The Soviet Political System—Transformation or Degeneration?" (January-February 1966); and Michel Tatu's essay-review, "The Beginning of the End?" (March-April 1966). Future issues will carry additional comments by American and foreign scholars—hopefully including Soviet and East European spokesmen, who have been asked to participate.

This symposium confronts the difficult but rewarding task of evaluating several thoughtful studies pertaining in one degree or another to the Soviet future.

Before commenting in detail on the fundamental issues posed by the studies in question, especially Professor Brzezinski's ingenious and original analysis, I should identify my point of view. Since political systems are the product of men's experience, they can change when there are changes in the environment by which they have been shaped. When political structures and the belief systems which legitimate them cease to be "functional," tensions develop between them and their internal and external environments. Institutions and practices which become obsolete must be either modified or replaced by new ones more appropriate to the tasks which confront them. Of course, political behavior is influenced not only by the experience of the living but also to some degree by living memories of the experiences of earlier generations. Hence, practices which have outlived much of their earlier relevance may, because of historical inertia, persist for a very long time indeed.[1] The concept of the political system as a set of interdependent processes and structures, adapting to but also influencing its domestic and foreign environments, is of course no magic

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[1] A tentative application of these concepts to the USSR was made by this author in "Soviet Russia: Orthodoxy and Adaptiveness," (see Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 450-511). A book by this writer on Soviet politics, applying the "political culture" and "political system" concepts to the Soviet Union, to be entitled *Politics in the USSR,* is scheduled for publication by Little, Brown & Co., in May 1966.

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key to political analysis. Its usefulness in the study of any system depends upon scrupulous regard to the unique history and characteristics of the particular system examined.

I shall comment briefly on the essays in the "Progress and Ideology" issue of *Problems of Communism*. These competent surveys of post-Stalin developments in several fields of social and natural sciences suggest, in my opinion, that the Soviet "creative intelligentsia" is an increasingly autonomous and politically influential sub-community of the overall political community. However, Soviet intellectuals are still constrained to seek limited objectives, pursued largely by such indirect means as behind-the-scenes pleading with party overseers, who are sometimes inclined for various reasons to support particular aspirations of the intelligentsia. The limited but real progress toward intellectual freedom made by the groups whose problems and prospects are examined in these essays tends to confirm Robert C. Tucker's view that the contemporary Soviet political system, having at least partly shaken off the heritage of the unique pressures of Stalin's personal rule, "should be pronounced, at least provisionally, post-totalitarian."[2] Still, the continued, if diminishing, frustration by the party and state of unfettered intellectual inquiry and artistic expression—especially Moscow's obstructiveness toward the practical application of innovative thinking—indicates how vigilantly the party still shepherds "its" intellectuals. The satisfaction of Soviet liberal intellectuals—and their well-wishers abroad—with post-Stalin gains must be tempered by realization that these gains are still not protected by firm legal guarantees or even by explicit revisions of obsolete and stifling ideological dogmas. Some of the partial reforms granted by the Soviet Establishment were after all, reluctant, possibly temporary concessions, impelled by domestic economic difficulties and by such expediential foreign policy calculations as the desire to achieve respectability in the eyes of leftist French and Italian intellectuals.[3]

I share so fully Michel Tatu's skepticism, expressed in his review of M. Garder's *L'Agonie du régime en Russie soviétique*, about Garder's prediction of the collapse of Soviet communism by 1970 that I can deal very briefly with his article also. Garder's book is the latest of a long line of apocalyptic predictions of the collapse of communism. Such prophecies ignore the fact that great revolutions are most infrequent, and that successful political systems are tenacious and adaptive. Vigorous elites, such as the Soviet party and police cadres, also are ruthless in acting to suppress threats to their power. Perhaps the most sensible aspect of Garder's analysis is his insistence that the disappearance of the Soviet regime would still leave Russia a very great power. Even this assumption is perhaps somewhat debatable, for the collapse of Soviet authority might be accompanied by the breaking away from Russia of some of the non-Russian nationalities. Tatu's observations—especially his succinct discussion of a possible military takeover in Russia, and his opinions on the political implications of economic reform—are very perceptive, but since they closely resemble those of Professor Brzezinski, I shall confine myself to registering general approval without elaborating. Tatu is, however, less convinced than Brzezinski that the Kremlin stands at a crossroad of historical destiny.

Brzezinski's brilliant article may well signal a new stage in Western analysis of Soviet politics. It deserves most careful scrutiny. Brzezinski combines systematic analysis of the development and present state of the Soviet policy, with provocative forecasts of its various possible futures. Forecasting the political future is hazardous, and many scholars regard it as an idle exercise. However, the hypothetical futures forecasted by Brzezinski have considerable value in helping to orient us toward various contingencies. Moreover, they may spur us to a sharp look at the warp of the past in search of intimations of the woof of the future. Brzezinski avoids overcommitment to a particular hypothesis by making his predictions contingent upon a variety of possible conditions. However, I think that his use of the "ideal type" mode of analysis, which for clarity and effectiveness selects aspects of a problem considered particularly significant, leads to some oversimplication. I share what I regard as his underlying assumption that a political system designed for the conduct and consolidation of a revolution is not necessarily suited to the needs of a relatively modernized society. The latter may be most simply characterized as a society whose members would like fewer jails and jailers, more comforts and conveniences, less propaganda and more uncensored information.

Brzezinski frames his analysis largely in terms of the concepts of political "degeneration," or decay, and "institutionalization," a proper level and quality of which he regards as essential to the constructive guidance and control of the emerging demands of productive social groups for access to the making of national policy. I agree with Brzezinski that important adjustments, and perhaps fundamental reforms, are necessary if the Soviet

[2] Robert C. Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.), Vol. XVII, No. 4, pp. 555-83, esp. p. 571.

[3] On the latter point, see Priscilla Johnson, *Khrushchev and the Arts*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1965, pp. 44-45, 62-64.

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Union is to preserve stability and achieve continued dynamic growth in popular welfare. I believe also that without such reforms the USSR will eventually lose ground in international competition.

However, it seems to me that Brzezinski exaggerates the clear and present danger of "degeneration" in the Soviet political system. Incidentally, or perhaps not so incidentally, it is very difficult to gather from Brzezinski's article any very precise indication of just when political decay began to set in and how far it has proceeded or will, within any specific period of time, develop. Possibly Brzezinski will wish in the future to further refine his predictive techniques.

Secondly, Brzezinski's somewhat schematic use of the concept of institutionalization leads him to exaggerate the imminence of decay, and to underestimate the difficulties of institutionalizing the fundamental reforms which he regards as anti-decay prophylactics. The reforms which he suggests are so fundamental as to amount, in effect, to the adoption by Soviet Communists of some sort of limited parliamentary or constitutional regime. Certainly this would be highly desirable, but how likely is it to occur in the foreseeable future?

The Russian political tradition is woefully defective in the prerequisites for gradualism. Russia's tragic history hindered the acquisition of a mature, balanced political character. Both the Tsarist and the Soviet political cultures have exalted the virtues of a stern social discipline and of unquestioned acceptance of the ruler's commands by his subjects. Most citizens, in my opinion, are still so awed by authority and so unsophisticated politically as to be easily manipulated or at best cowed by a display of determination from on high. In the Soviet era especially, citizens have been heavily indoctrinated in an anti-liberal spirit not calculated to foster sympathy for a wide sharing of authority and responsibility among even highly placed elite groups, and still less receptive to notions of governmental responsiveness to the wishes of the "masses." The elite elements are probably united both against internal subversion of their privileges, and against "imperialist" threats from abroad. If the present Soviet political system disintegrates within the next few years, it will probably be replaced at least for some time by a nationalistic oligarchy, representing a coalition of forces, dominated by moderate, production-oriented party leaders, scientists, industrialists and military figures. However, I think that the more desirable outcome envisaged by Brzezinski as one of his hypothetical variants, namely, gradual constitutional development, might eventuate after a long period of international tranquility and increasingly rewarding Soviet contact with the West.

In my opinion, fundamental change—or collapse—can only occur when at least the following conditions exist. First, the leadership must be badly split, or paralyzed by indecision. Second, there must be widespread loss of respect and support for the political authorities. Finally, it must become possible for some sort of organized political opposition with a clear conception of an alternative to the present system to organize, covertly or overtly, for effective political action. It seems reasonable to assume that some years will pass before these conditions are fulfilled.

Moreover, it will probably be possible to make partial reforms, short of those suggested by Professor Brzezinski, which will enable the present Soviet political system to continue to function fairly effectively for at least another ten or fifteen years. I am not persuaded that it would be impossible to retain the present centralized system of policy formation for some time, while granting increasing autonomy to the economic bureaucracy, to the scientific community, etc. Also, it seems to me that within the party itself, improved training and a more efficient method of recruitment of party executives, especially those assigned to coordinating the efforts of and maintaining liaison with the leaders of the various professional communities, could go far toward gaining increased support by the latter for the political authorities. To the extent that the party can recruit top executives capable of perceiving early enough the need for adjustments and taking initiatives to make them before pressures become explosive, it may be able to survive, and even to flourish. The burden of proof is upon anyone who takes the view that the Soviet political elite has lost or will soon lose the touch that has enabled it to perform its functions thus far with a relatively high degree of effectiveness. It is not irrelevant to note that the post-Khrushchev leadership, despite its perhaps excessive caution, has taken important steps toward improving the relationship between the political system and the Soviet national economy. If the reforms instituted at the September 1965 plenum prove successful, the economy, and indirectly the political system, will be considerably strengthened—even though the uneasy compromise effected at the plenum between centralized organization and managerial autonomy is likely to fail.

In foreign affairs, at least, the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership has displayed considerable skill in steering a course between the other two giants of the international arena, Communist China and the United States. Kosygin, in particular, seems a more skillful diplomat than any of us would have predicted before his mediation between India and Pakistan.

Despite my reservations, I agree with Brzezinski that existing Soviet political structures and the ideology which serves as a major source of their legitimacy are increasingly irrelevant to a more and more diversified society. Whether or not the specific institutional changes he regards as necessary for the effective process-

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ing of social demands by the polity are necessary or feasible remains largely unpredictable. There are so many unknowns and unknowables! For example, how sure can we be that a dynamic leader may not arise in the coming years—or months—to replace the colorless Brezhnev-Kosygin team and once again get Soviet society moving?

We must beware of confusing the desirable with the real. Fundamental social and political changes usually occur slowly, unevenly, and in a zig-zag fashion. Some parts of the system may change more rapidly, or more slowly, than others, although it is doubtless true that profound changes, for example, in the recruitment of leaders, eventually affect the functioning of all the structures of a system.

Institutional changes are usually preceded by broad changes in attitudes and ways of thinking. The erosion of ideological dogma among intellectuals is undoubtedly helping to undermine the psychological foundations of rule by a party which still makes a demigod of a man who died almost fifty years ago. There has recently been an encouraging revival of rational and empirical thinking in many fields. Its exponents, however, still constitute a small if growing minority, and they function in a considerable degree of isolation from one another. Still, empiricism, in science and social science, in economic administration and even in such fields as law is increasingly challenging traditional Communist orthodoxy.[4] Related to these positive developments is the tendency for liberal, nonconformist Soviet writers to ally themselves with, and in a sense to act as spokesmen for Soviet natural scientists—a trend symbolized by the fact that physicists are among the best patrons of avant-garde writing and "abstract" art.

However, the dominant political culture in which the rational, liberal factions of the Soviet intellectual community must cautiously maneuver is still characterized by a great deal of arbitrary administrative behavior, cloaked in secrecy and justified with sacrosanct dogma and official lies. I was vividly reminded of the seamy side of the political culture when on October 31, 1963, I was abducted on a Moscow street and detained in total isolation for nearly three weeks on a fabricated charge of military espionage.

The growing demand of various segments of the Soviet intellectual community for greater autonomy has forced the Kremlin to recognize grudgingly the need to relax controls over the trained and talented professionals upon whose willing and efficient performance national power depends. Concessions have even been made to that most troublesome group, the creative writers, at least to those not openly in opposition to official doctrine and policy.[5] Party spokesmen still warn that "groupism" (*gruppovshchina*) is incompatible with the proper behavior of Communist intellectuals, thus acknowledging the existence of group consciousness among professionals. However, Soviet social scientists, and even *Pravda* editorial writers, instruct researchers and youth leaders to take account in their work of the diversity of interests of Soviety society.[6]

There has been a great deal of behind-the-scenes bargaining between the Kremlin and the Soviet intelligentsia since the death of Stalin. One of its products has been the creation for the first time in the history of the USSR of the rudiments of a free, critical public opinion. Although still shackled, the Soviet intellectual community today is at least free to defend its views and interests against the cruder forms of arbitrary political interference, provided its members do not openly flout doctrines and symbols still regarded by the party leadership as above criticism. A poor sort of freedom? Yes, but almost unimaginable when measured by the Stalinist yardstick.

The possibility that the progress which has been achieved since the death of Stalin—toward personal security, the rule of law, limited intellectual freedom, and partial access to the exciting "bourgeois" world—might still be swept away by a relapse into Stalin-like terror seems remote even if it cannot be completely excluded. In terms of a rational Kremlin approach to the Soviet national interest, the price of such a relapse would be prohibitively high. Its consequences could be dire for the lives and fortunes of many party and government leaders. It would cripple an increasingly sophisticated economy, and it could undermine support for Kremlin policies among important segments of Soviet society and among Western intellectuals, including many Communists.

The foregoing considerations seem to me to support the view that the Soviet political system will continue to adapt more or less successfully and positively to pressures arising in the intrasocietal and extra-societal environments. It seems likely that the CPSU will be with us for a while before it accepts Professor Brzezinski's blithe recommendation that it wither away.[7]

[4] In the field of law, see for example the remarkable article in *Izvestia* of Nov. 24, 1965, by the jurist V. Kudriavtsev, chiding the advocates of a "get-tough" policy toward criminals and urging empirical analysis as the only useful tool in analyzing the causes of crime.

[5] The ground rules were provisionally set forth in A. Rumiantsev's article, "The Party and the Intelligentsia," *Pravda,* Feb. 21, 1965.

[6] See, for example, the article on "concrete" research by the prominent economist, V. Shubkin, in *Kommunist,* No. 3, 1965, and a *Pravda* editorial of June 16, 1965.

[7] Perhaps it is needless to point out that party spokesmen still deny the possibility that the party can disappear before the achievement of communism on a worldwide scale. See, for example, E. Bugaev, B. Leibzon, *Besedy ob ustave KPSS,* Moscow, 1964, p. 61.

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The Purges Revisited

BORIS I. NICOLAEVSKY: *Power and the Soviet Elite: "The Letter of an Old Bolshevik" and Other Essays.* Janet D. Zagoria, Ed. New York, Praeger, 1965.
ROBERT C. TUCKER AND STEPHEN F. COHEN, EDS.: *The Great Purge Trial.* New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1965.

Reviewed by Thomas W. Wolfe

AS THE SOVIET POET Yevgeni Yevtushenko put it not long ago, the Soviet Union has traveled an "uneven road," a road strewn with millions of lives, including ". . . one million in a war against the people." This war against the people—the Stalinist purges of the middle 1930's, in particular—is the central subject of the two volumes under review. Revisiting the world of the purges after three decades, each of these books recaptures, in its own distinctive way, the bitter and degrading experience to which Stalin subjected not only the Soviet people but also his own party comrades in his ruthless drive for absolute power. While with one notable exception the materials brought together in these books had been available elsewhere, both volumes are accompanied by distinguished introductory essays which in each case provide fresh insight into the Soviet political process.

George F. Kennan, introducing the collection of articles by the late Boris Nicolaevsky,* notes that a conspiratorial code of behavior devised for men bent on the revolutionary overthrow of Tsarist Russia was ill-suited to the task of regulating relationships among these men after they became responsible for governing the country. Moreover, an appropriate code of mutual relations within the ruling elite has not been, nor can it be, devised until institutions that embrace and protect the entire society become binding upon both rulers and ruled. "Over the long run," Kennan writes, "men in power can expect no greater protection from injustice and cruelty at the hands of their peers than they are themselves willing to extend to the humblest of their subjects." If, as Leonard Schapiro maintains, change in the Soviet system must come essentially from above rather than from below, then it would seem more crucial than ever that political life within the ruling elite be somehow brought under a less sinister code than that which has hitherto prevailed.

Perhaps no one has conveyed better the jungle-like quality of political life within the upper echelons of the Soviet leadership during the Stalin era and its aftermath than Boris Nicolaevsky, who has been described by Louis Fischer as "the master Kremlinologist," and whose credentials as an interpreter of the Soviet political scene were assuredly unique. Him-

* See obituary on p. 45—*Ed.*

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self a major figure in the Russian revolutionary movement in Tsarist times and, as a Menshevik, banished from the Soviet Union after the Bolsheviks seized power, Nicolaevsky had devoted 44 years of exile to dissecting and documenting the internal rivalries of the rulers of Russia.

The 17 selections from Nicolaevsky's writings deal with both the Great Purge of the 1930's and the maneuvering within the ruling elite at the time of Stalin's death and during the subsequent struggle for succession. Historically, the most significant essay is the "Letter of an Old Bolshevik," a slightly-disguised rendering of Nikolai Bukharin's views, based on talks held between Nicolaevsky and Bukharin in Paris two years before the latter became a victim at the third and last of the great Moscow Trials in 1938. This document, which has done much to illuminate the internal party opposition to Stalin in the 1930's, has long been regarded as one of the most important source materials on the background and motives of the purges. Its value is now further enhanced by Nicolaevsky's first public explanation of the circumstances under which Bukharin, already haunted by a presentiment of his eventual liquidation, came to confide in him during an official visit to Paris in 1936. Nicolaevsky's account is given in an interview with Janet Zagoria and Seweryn Bialer which represents a notable addition to this volume of essays.

IN RECENT YEARS it has become increasingly difficult to find copies of the English transcript (published in the USSR) of the third and most famous of the Moscow purge trials—the one in which Bukharin was the principal figure along with Alexei Rykov and 19 other defendants. With republication of the trial transcript (which runs almost 700 pages, slightly abridged) under the title *The Great Purge Trial,* this problem no longer exists. Edited and annotated by Robert C. Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen, this volume is valuable not only for making available one of the more important "self-revealing" documents in Soviet history, but also for the brilliant introductory essay by Professor Tucker. Utilizing the disclosures on the purges which have appeared in the Soviet Union since Khrushchev's celebrated report on Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Tucker has gone far beyond the usual requirements for an introduction, not only taking a fresh look at the purges, but also offering a critical reappraisal of the ideas and assumptions underlying the extensive Western literature on the subject, most of which was published during the Stalin era.

One of the more interesting questions raised by Tucker is that of Bukharin's role in the 1938 trial. Was Bukharin, by confessing his "guilt," attempting to tell the country (and the international Communist movement) never to doubt the correctness of the "party line," and thus, at the same time, to perform his "last service" to the party? This notion, with its implicit vindication of Stalin and of the purges—presumably for the purpose of imposing internal discipline on the eve of the great conflict with Nazi Germany—has been given wide credence in one form or another in the West. Tucker takes exception to this view, arguing that for Bukharin "a last service to the party and the Revolution could consist only of a last denunciation of Stalin for betraying and ruining both."

In Tucker's view, the 1938 trial was a gripping duel between Andrei Vyshinski (the prosecutor and mouthpiece of Stalin) and Bukharin (the ostensible defendant, but in effect Stalin's accuser). Bukharin had promised to confess, but by doing so he turned the historical tables on Stalin. Thus the man whom the world regarded as the quintessence of an Old Bolshevik was in effect permitting Stalin "to convict himself symbolically of destroying Bolshevism" by committing judicial murder against the person of Bukharin. The world, says Tucker, should have been able to read Bukharin's Aesopian last message, but unfortunately it did not. Today's reader can judge for himself, against the background of Tucker's exegesis, whether this message does indeed emerge from the record of the trial.

Another provocative question raised by Tucker concerns the part played by the personality of the dictator in a totalitarian system such as the Soviet. According to Tucker, all the available evidence points to Stalin as the instigator and guiding spirit of the terror of the 1930's; there is no evidence, he points out, that the purges were in any way masterminded by a zealous secret police acting independently or in excess of Stalin's own wishes. All of which leads the author to conclude that insufficient attention has been given to the factor of per-

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sonal motivation not only in the purges of the 1930's, but in the fashioning of the Soviet political system *in toto*. Not the needs of the Soviet system, he argues, but the satisfaction of Stalin's own needs, "both political and psychological," underlay the events of the 1930's and the politics of Stalinist totalitarianism.

This is an interesting and significant argument. It amounts to saying that motives and behavior peculiar to Stalin, and not shared by the ruling elite in general, are to be blamed for the holocaust that was visited upon Soviet society. One can accept this thesis up to a point, but at some juncture it becomes necessary to ask how the nature of the system itself bears upon the failure of its leaders. It may be true that other leaders—Kirov, for example, or Bukharin—were appalled by Stalin's paranoid

Boris Nicolaevsky: 1887-1966

Boris Ivanovich Nicolaevsky was one of the last of a rare breed of men. Influential as his writings have been, they hardly convey the full range of his insights, convictions, and erudition, nor his personal impact on two generations of scholars and statesmen dealing with Soviet affairs.

In 1904, at the age of seventeen, Boris Nicolaevsky was arrested under the Tsarist regime; there were to be eight more arrests in the subsequent years. Breaking with his family tradition (for eight generations his forebears had been Orthodox priests), he became a dedicated revolutionary in search of social justice and equal opportunity for a free individual in a free society. In exile and in prison, he was a voracious reader and a skilled debater. Self-taught, he was aided by a phenomenal memory and an instinct for ferreting out the hidden links of motivation—be they personal or political.

During the Russian Revolution, Nicolaevsky—a lifelong Social Democrat—became a member of the Menshevik Central Committee. His activities finally landed him in Butyrki Prison, whence he was released in 1922 and permitted to leave Russia, never to return. This was the beginning of his most productive period—as a historian of the revolutionary movement, as an analyst of developments in the USSR, and as an indefatigable collector of archival materials. In Berlin, after 1933 in Paris, and from 1940 on in New York, he represented, directed, or assisted a variety of research institutes, archives, and academic institutions. He helped innumerable scholars and journalists, while amassing an incredible collection of documents, publications, memoirs, and notes on interviews. Only he could find them, decipher them, and make sense of them; but what treasures they held!

Nicholaevsky's knowledge was encyclopedic, but only a small fraction of it found its way into print. His favorite plans for research remained unfulfilled; his editing of documentary collections on the Bolshevik and Menshevik movements were never completed. But his study of *Aseff, The Spy* (Doubleday, 1934) has remained a landmark. So, too, has his biography of Marx (*Karl Marx: Man and Fighter,* co-authored with Otto Manchen-Helfen, Lippincott, 1936), and the work which he wrote with my late father, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia* (Yale University Press, 1947). Hundreds of articles (many originally published in the Russian émigré journal, *Sotsialisticheski vestnik*) illustrate his insatiable curiosity, his originality of mind, and his wide range of competence—from historiography to forced labor camps, from Kremlionology to Marxist theory. Largely at the insistence of younger scholars whom he had generously helped with advice and materials from his files, he agreed to the publication of *Power and the Soviet Elite* (reviewed in this issue). Famed statesmen and unknown defectors, lifelong asociates and beginning college students all found in him a unique fund of information and an ability to cut through sham to the essence of things which—until his death on February 21—never ceased to concern him. As Louis Fischer wrote, in reviewing Nicolaevsky's last book in *The New York Times Book Review,* "We have all sat at his feet."

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suspicion of his colleagues and his campaign of physical liquidation against them. It may also be true that if Kirov had not been murdered, probably at Stalin's instigation, a somewhat different road might have been taken in the prewar period. Stalin, to be sure, was bitterly denounced by his successors, but they, in turn, were denounced by Khrushchev, who finally found himself ousted and denigrated by *his* successors. Clearly, the inability of the Soviet system to produce a ruling elite that does not regularly devour its own testifies to a malaise that runs deeper than the personality problems of some of its leaders.

Art and Craft

PRISCILLA JOHNSON AND LEO LABEDZ, EDS.: *Khrushchev and the Arts. The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964.* Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1965.
PETER VIERECK ET AL.: *Creativity in the Soviet Union.* Special Issue of *Tri-Quarterly* (Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.), Spring 1965.
ALEXANDER STEININGER: *Literatur und Politik in der Sowjetunion nach Stalins Tod.* (Publication of the Osteuropa Institute, Munich.) Wiesbaden, Otto Harrasowitz, 1965.

Reviewed by Victor S. Frank

TWO YEARS AGO I contributed an article to a special issue of the London quarterly, *Survey,* dealing with the state of Soviet studies in the West.[1] I wrote, *inter alia,* that as long as genuine research and true scholarship in the USSR, the natural fountainhead of Russian studies, were vitiated by the control and guidance of a political organization, the Communist Party, and as long as Russian scholars themselves were forbidden or unable to interpret evidence about their native history and civilization in a genuinely scholarly way, that task must be taken over by scholars outside the Soviet Union. The work of Western scholars, I pointed out, was helping to fill the gap opened in the history of Russian civilization by the continuing existence of a regime which in fact denied that there could be any objective truth apart from "class truth."

For this statement I was taken severely to task by a Soviet publicist, Mr. Yu. I. Igretski. Quoting long passages from my article, he called my contention that the CPSU exercised a baleful influence on Soviet scholarship "a lie," ironically represented my thesis as an appeal to Western scholars to rescue Soviet historiography from Soviet historians, and said that I was "so blinded by class hatred" as to ignore the fact that I was challenging Soviet scholars from "an untenable position," since Western scholarship was itself infested by class interests and dominated by politics.[2]

A recently published American work, however, fully bears out the thesis that there are

[1] *Survey* (London) No. 50, 1964.

[2] Yu. I. Igretski, "Samonaliz burzhuaznykh sovetovedov. Zhurnal 'Survey' ob izuchenii SSR v zapadnoi istoriografii" (Self-Analysis of Bourgeois Sovietologists: The Journal *Survey* on Soviet Studies in Western Historiography), *Istoriia SSSR* (Moscow), No. 5, 1965.

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fields in Russian studies in which Western scholars are bound to be immeasurably more informative and more objective than their Soviet colleagues. Miss Priscilla Johnson's brilliant 90-page introduction (based on a shorter version that appeared in the May-June 1963 issue of this journal) to a selection of documents jointly edited by herself and Mr. Leo Labedz, dealing with the complex relationship between the arts and politics in the Soviet Union in the years 1962-64, could not conceivably have been written in the Soviet Union—and this for two reasons. First of all, the subject matter is politically so explosive that no Soviet scholar in his right senses would dare touch it; and secondly, even in the improbable case that a study of this sort were undertaken in the Soviet Union, the accessible source material would be much more meager than it is in the West. Strange as it may seem, Western experts *do* know more about contemporary developments in the Soviet Union—if only because the gathering of information is not, in their case, connected with any security hazards.

Miss Johnson's introduction relates one incident which illustrates this simple truth. Addressing a Central Committee plenum in June of 1963, Mr. Khrushchev tackled the delicate question of whether or not he had known of Stalin's crimes and, if he had, whether he had done anything about it. He assured his listeners that he had often spoken up to Stalin. Khrushchev's son-in-law, Mr. Adzhubei, then the editor-in-chief of *Izvestia,* was more explicit in his plea on Khrushchev's behalf. Let the doubters, he declared, look up a resolution passed on March 17, 1937, by the Moscow party *aktiv* headed by Khrushchev—a resolution which, he said, had condemned the cult of the individual.

So much for Mr. Adzhubei's claim. Now the conditioned reflex of any historian in such a situation would be to look up the reference. This is what Miss Johnson did. "The truth is not," she says (p. 56), "as Adzhubei suggested, that Khrushchev at the height of the purges took his life in his hands to oppose the Stalin cult. The Moscow party organization did adopt a resolution condemning the cult, and Khrushchev did speak in favor. Far from being aimed *against* Stalin, however, the resolution was passed *at his instigation* to support the expulsion from the party of Bukharin and Rykov." And Miss Johnson adds: "Adzhubei evidently put forward his claim free of worry that ordinary Soviet readers would be able to check newspapers of the purge periods in their libraries."

This is what I mean, Mr. Igretski.

No doubt, the files of the KGB and the Ideological Commission of the Central Committee contain fuller information on the clash between creative artists and the cultural bureaucrats

Reviewers in this Issue

THOMAS W. WOLFE—Senior Staff Member of the RAND Corporation (Washington, DC); specialist in problems of Soviet military doctrine and history, and author of *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964).

VICTOR S. FRANK—Russian-born writer and broadcaster, currently heading the London Bureau of Radio Liberty.

GEORGE E. TAYLOR—Professor of Far Eastern History and Politics at the University of Washington, Seattle, and Director of its Far Eastern and Russian Institute.

THOMAS B. LARSON—Lecturer at the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University, Washington, DC.

KARL-EUGEN WÄDEKIN—Co-editor of *Osteuropa,* published in Stuttgart, and contributor to *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich).

LEON HERMAN—American specialist on Soviet economic affairs and contributor to this as well as other journals.

JAMES D. SEYMOUR—Currently with the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York, and contributor to various scholarly journals.

JAMES R. TOWNSEND—Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, specializing in Communist China.

THOMAS WEISS—Pseudonym of a student of Soviet literature who recently defected from East Germany.

HUGO DEWAR—British analyst of Soviet affairs and author of a comprehensive study of purges in Communist countries, *The Modern Inquisition* (London, Allan Wingate, 1953).

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than Miss Johnson was able to assemble; but, by their very nature, these bodies are not likely to publicize their knowledge. As far as individuals directly involved in the conflict are concerned, each one may know more about his own part in it than Miss Johnson does, but it is highly unlikely that any one of them is capable of providing a wider and more detailed overall view than she does.

WHAT IS IT about the conflict between artists and bureaucrats in the Soviet Union that fascinates so many students of Soviet affairs? The main thing, I think, is the lucidly moral nature of the struggle. There are, of course, complexities in the triangular tug-of-war between the "liberal" and the "dogmatist" writers and the party bureaucrats, and a bewildering variety of individual cases have arisen. Nevertheless, the basic confrontation is clear. On the one side, there is the "Establishment" trying to bolster up, with all the brute force and cunning at its disposal, the fraudulent make-believe world which it has created; on the other side, there is a small but steadily growing group of articulate people (writers *must* be articulate—that is their trade) who have the courage to lay bare the fraudulence, who yearn to speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Literature is the only field of activity in the USSR where the hidden tensions and conflicts, latent in the society as a whole, come to the surface and become crystallized. This is why poetry readings in the Soviet Union attract such crowds, why poets are fêted and talked about as avidly as football stars and pop-singers are in the West.

The period selected by Miss Johnson for her study is particularly interesting. During the winter of 1962-63, the leaders of the CPSU launched an enormous public campaign to bring writers and artists more closely to heel. Ultimately the campaign misfired, partly because the repressive measures taken or threatened by the party had the reverse effect of creating publicity for the victims, and partly because, on the whole, the party's bite has by now become far weaker than its bark. Miss Johnson provides an admirable study of the ups and downs of this campaign.

I have only two reservations about her work. It seems to me, first, that she tends to underestimate one perennial feature of Russian life—one which helped to make life bearable in Tsarist Russia, and which has enabled many people to keep their sanity in Soviet conditions as well. I have in mind the ultimately humane element of muddle, corruption and inefficiency. Many sudden changes in official attitudes which Miss Johnson is inclined to interpret as devious Machiavellian moves are more easily understood as symptoms of a lack of coordination between various government agencies, or of confusion in the minds of the principals. Many Western experts on Soviet affairs still tend to think in rigid terms of the Stalin era, and a measure of "destalinization" is overdue here, too.

My second objection is this. Reading Miss Johnson's account of the relentless struggle between the party bureaucrats and the "liberal" writers, one is tempted to ask: how do these writers find the time to perform their proper job? What with meetings, conferences, elections, trips abroad, and other hectic marginal activities, how do they manage to procure for themselves that leisure and peace which are essential conditions of creative work? And a sneaking suspicion forms in the mind of the reader: do not the undoubtedly laudable and often heroic civil preoccupations of the writers reduce the area of true creativity? Are not most of the "liberal heroes" publicists rather than writers and poets? It is not accidental that the name of the one really great poet in modern Russia, the late Anna Akhmatova, does not occur in Miss Johnson's index of names. Yet Akhmatova's poetry, her preoccupation with "last things"—love, grief, old age, purity, inspiration, death—is far more subversive in the deeper, metaphysical sense than any of Yevtushenko's, Slutski's or even Voznesenski's rhymed broadsheets.

Do we not run the risk of overemphasizing the political and civic overtones of the works of modern Russian poets and writers and, by the same token, forgetting what real poetry and literature are all about? Akhmatova sees her muse as a slender sunburnt girl: is this girl likely to attend the mass meetings at the Sports Palace or the writers' conferences, however noble the sentiments expressed on these public occasions?

CREATIVITY in the Soviet Union is the title of a special issue of the *Tri-Quarterly,* a journal published at Northwestern University, Evans-

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ton, Illinois. The main feature is Mr. Peter Viereck's long essay, "The Mob within the Heart: A New Russian Revolution," which covers much the same ground as Miss Johnson's introduction to *Khrushchev and the Arts*. But whereas Miss Johnson is a scholar, Mr. Viereck is a poet. His strength lies not so much in an analytical dissection of events as in an intuitive attempt to comprehend "the new Russian revolution," which he very appositely calls a "conspiracy of feelings" (taken from Yuri Olesha's famous story, *Envy*, 1927).

There are some brilliant asides in this essay. "We ourselves are part of the test tube which we are trying to see from the outside," Mr. Viereck says, for instance, explaining why he has no complete answers to questions on the prospects of this "conspiracy of feelings" (p. 12). In another context, he says—and since he is a poet, he knows what he is talking about: "The muse senses that most modern rulers don't really exist. They are the bloodless packaging job . . . of some metallic communication technique, the invention of either the Madison Avenue or the Agitprop type of Organization Man" (p. 17). And, in the same context: "Whether under so-called socialism or so-called capitalism, youth tends to secede from society." The essay is emotionally loaded and structurally untidy. Yet it ends with a surprisingly sober, commonsense prediction (p. 43): "Result: not a ghost of a chance of the Communist one-party dictatorship in Russia being overthrown from below. Intellectual revolt, yes. Revolt of the heart, yes. Political freedom? Hardly."

There are other excellent features in this issue. Particularly impressive are Mr. George L. Kline's poetic translations. His version of Joseph Brodski's long one-breath poem, *Elegy for John Donne,* is a marvel of accuracy, poetic beauty and empathy.

HERR ALEXANDER STEININGER'S doctoral thesis on literature and politics in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death is a striking testimony to the persistence of traditional German academic attitudes, complete with their strong and weak points. On the positive side, there is a great array of facts, well marshalled, well selected, and well substantiated, which makes it likely that the book will prove an important reference work for any student of modern Russian literature. Particularly useful is the chronological bibliography of articles which have appeared in Soviet periodicals. Hand in hand with this learning, however, Herr Steininger is apt to produce such breathtakingly naive remarks as: "The first basic condition [for objective research] is a precise knowledge of all relevant facts and literature" (p. 9). But don't let me be churlish. For all its naivety, Herr Steininger's book is a welcome contribution to our knowledge of the intricate relationship between literature and politics, between art and craft in the Soviet world.

I began the review polemically; let me end it on a conciliatory note. Mr. Igretski, the Soviet publicist who attacked me in the pages of *Istoriia SSSR*, wrote that "bourgeois ideologists" demand that the USSR grant complete freedom to "bourgeois propaganda" in its own home. Certainly they do. But Western scholars have gone beyond "demanding" these privileges; they are already enjoying them to a degree. Contacts between the Communist and non-Communist parts of the world are so numerous by now that Miss Johnson's book, for instance, is likely to be read by a good many Soviet people, even if most of them are bound to be Mr. Igretski's colleagues. In such a case, her book will itself become a political factor by widening Russian knowledge of one particular episode in modern history. The hermetic isolation of the Stalin days is over and done with. Whether we and Mr. Igretski want it or not, we live in the same world, or as Mr. Viereck puts it, "We ourselves are part of the test tube. . . ."

In this sense all three books, different though they are, not only widen *our* perspective, but may, in an imperceptible way, change the picture inside the Soviet Union. And we may hope that publicists like Mr. Igretski will continue to play a positive part in this process of interpenetration of the two worlds by quoting relevant passages from Western books in their polemical reviews.

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A Curtain of Distortion

FELIX GREENE: *A Curtain of Ignorance.*
New York, Doubleday, 1964.

Reviewed by George E. Taylor

THE THESIS of this book is that the American people today are more misinformed about China than the people of any other Western nation. According to Mr. Greene, the information exists but is being either distorted or deliberately withheld from the American public by news correspondents, editorial writers, and government officials. The author thinks that this cumulative misinformation has led most Americans to the conclusion "that China's backwardness, her shortage of food, and what is thought of as the prevailing misery of her people, are due to the Communists; that during the civil war in China evil men threw out the good men; and that though the good men were defeated and are now in exile, it is America's moral obligation to support them against the ruthless and aggressive tyrants who have reduced the Chinese masses to unspeakable indignities and suffering" (p. xiii). This, Mr. Greene maintains, is also the picture that governs US national policy, which is therefore based on an unrealistic conception of the condition of China today.

What is the reason for this state of affairs? The author's argument is that emotion gets in the way of objective reporting. He suggests that the exaggerated American hostility to China today has resulted directly from the excessive hopes which the United States pinned on China in the past; and he further claims that an American's views of Communist China have, since 1949, come to be taken as a test of his loyalty. This latter is a peculiar charge in view of the number of Americans who have called for a review of US policy towards China—for example, in the Conlon report,[1] the resolutions of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce regarding trade with Communist China,[2] and the recent hearings of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, headed by Senator Fulbright.

PART ONE of Mr. Greene's book deals with the background of the American mythology about China. In his view, it seems, Americans have never actually had a correct view of China. During the 19th century, they allegedly looked down upon the Chinese as inferior, crafty, dangerous, and inscrutable. (No doubt some did, but the generalization is far too sweeping.) After the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, the triumphant Western powers patronized the defeated

[1] *United States Foreign Policy (Asia)*, studies prepared at the request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, by Conlon Associates Ltd. No. 5, Nov. 1, 1959. Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1959.

[2] *Report of the Committee to Explore Trade with the People's Republic of China,* prepared for the San Francisco Area World Trade Association of the Greater San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, 1964.

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Chinese, and a sympathetic image grew up which carried over for almost half a century. This, runs Mr. Greene's argument, was based upon self-delusion: Americans looked upon themselves as animated by a feeling of kindly benevolence toward a backward people but actually were motivated by crass materialism. (The truth is that many Americans were sincerely pro-Chinese, motivated by genuine sympathy for Chinese culture and the Chinese people.) Then came Chiang Kai-shek, and the Americans—says Mr. Greene—fell into another delusion: hero worship of the Generalissimo and his wife. Chiang, who in the author's words had risen to power by making "his deal with the big Chinese and Western commercial interests," who had "turned on his Communist allies" and taken "savage reprisals" against them, became for Americans the embodiment of all that was "heroic, selfless, fearless" (p. 14).

But then came World War II, during which thousands of Americans came into personal contact with China, and, instead of finding a heroic ally, found themselves—to quote Mr. Greene—"involved with greedy civil and military officials, brutalized policemen, and cynical bureaucrats living off a pauperized population" (p. 17). Some Americans even wrote about these facts, but according to the author the truth never reached the public until the war was almost over. Mr. Greene also tells us—not surprisingly—that it was the Communist armies which took the initiative against the Japanese invaders, while Chiang Kai-shek was more concerned with protecting himself against the Communists. This is actually nothing but a Communist-inspired myth which even Mao has corrected.[3]

The author acknowledges that, for a short period after the war, the curtain was lifted and Americans were told about the horrible realities of Chiang's China. But even this, he says, did not keep President Kennedy from identifying Chiang with freedom and humanity as against the ruthless dictatorship of the present Communist regime (p. 30). It would appear that no one—except, of course, Mr. Greene—recalls the conditions in China under Chiang Kai-shek; yet all he seems to recall is the misery and chaos brought about by eight long years of war with Japan. He does *not* recall the tremendous progress made between 1928 and 1937—the military and political unification of the country, the establishment of a national currency, the building up of a modern army, the expansion and improvement of education, and the rapid growth of commerce. These achievements of the Nationalist regime deserve to be mentioned no less than its shortcomings.

The author spends thirty pages on the so-called "China lobby," described as a partnership between agents of the Chiang government and Americans who favored full United States support of Chiang. Mr. Greene admits that the US government, as late as May 1950, was ready to accept the admission of Communist China to the United Nations and even to recognize the new regime. This is quite true. Then came the Korean War, Chinese Communist intervention, and the American people's shock at finding themselves at war with China. Was it the casualties, the brainwashing of captured Americans, the acrimonious negotiations, and the frustrations of a war not fought to a decisive conclusion that turned American opinion against Communist China? No, we are told, it was the China lobby. This is patently ridiculous and grossly exaggerates the influence of the lobby on American policy.

TURNING TO internal conditions in Communist China, Mr. Greene claims that starvation has ceased and heaps scorn on the American press for its reports in 1960-61 of food shortages, mass discontent and apathy, and mounting deaths. He should therefore learn a great deal from reading the captured Chinese military documents which have been available for quite some time to those who can read Chinese and are currently being published in English translation.[4] These documents are secret orders issued to high-ranking Chinese army commanders in 1961 explaining how to handle existing discontent in the ranks caused by malnutrition and by reports of famine deaths in the home villages of the peasant soldiers. While Mr. Greene was

[3] *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,* London, Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd., 1954. Vol. III, p. 184 ff.

[4] "Work Bulletins" of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Issues 1, 6, etc. Released by the US Government in 1963. To be published in English translation by the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, in March 1966 under the title, *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army,* edited by J. Chester Cheng.

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actually in China, whole districts in the west and southwest were completely out of control, and estimates of the death toll from starvation run as high as 10 million people.

At this stage in his argument, the author embarks upon a discussion of alternative paths of national economic development. The British and American path, he holds, is no longer acceptable: "The inequitable class exploitation that enabled Britain to industrialize and advance would not be tolerated today by any country in the world" (p. 114). The only way for a backward country to advance, in Mr. Greene's view, is to do what the Russians did—submit to a system of austerity, economic discipline, and forced marches to higher production goals—and we should not criticize the high cost in lives and human suffering that goes with the Communist style of industrialization. This is the old argument that you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs. But the point is what kind of omelet you are trying to make. Is the objective a higher standard of living for the people or a power economy for the elite? Mr. Greene apparently has no qualms at all on this score. Unless we do better than we are doing now, he predicts, the Soviet standard of living will be the highest in the world within the lifetime of our children. This would seem a rather rash forecast considering that at the present moment it does not yet match that of Japan.

In his discussion of development, Mr. Greene has a lot to say about India and much of it is disparaging. If India is lagging, however, it is not in an attempt to build a military-totalitarian society as the Chinese are trying to do; instead, she is engaged in a much more ambitious and commendable effort to construct a parliamentary democracy. The author would have us believe that the historical role of communism is to provide the most effective way for backward countries to become industrialized, and if this means the establishment of a self-perpetuating party and a bureaucratic state, we have only to wait for the healing influence of time to turn it into a democracy. The fact that there is no empirical evidence to back up this claim, and the fact that this amounts to condoning the suffering of millions of people does not seem to bother our author in the least.

Mr. Greene is particularly anxious to defend the communes against descriptions that have pictured them as slave camps, but the weight of evidence is against him. The trick, of course, is to compare what the Communist Chinese say about the communes with either the chaos of the early post-war period, to which the Chinese Communists contributed, or with earlier periods in Chinese history, but never with the enormous progress of the years from 1928 to 1937.

IN PART THREE of the book, the author advances the view that Americans wrongly look upon China as the most belligerent, expansionist nation in the world today. One can agree that some sections of the press have exaggerated the Napoleonic designs of Communist China, without, however, accepting Mr. Greene's contention that the Peking regime has no desire for expansion. It is impossible to repeat the whole tortuous argument here; nor is it necessary, because the facts are only too obvious.

It was to be expected that Mr. Greene would spend some time lauding the benefits to be derived from trading with Communist China and making fun of statements that China has very little cash with which to buy from the Western world. Much is made of China's ability to pay cash for wheat. There is, however, no mystery about this: the cash she pays for wheat amounts almost exactly to the profits that Communist China gets from trading with Hong Kong. If the United States were to trade with China and even to become her leading trade partner, the volume of exchange would probably still amount to less than one percent of US trade.

It is strange to have an Englishman writing a book on American policy and meaning Americans when he says "we." It is even stranger to have him claim that the United States of America is ignorant about China when it publishes more news, more translations of Chinese Communist materials, more scholarly books and articles on that country than all of Western Europe. And an American, Edgar Snow, has written the most authoritative book on Communist China of any journalist who has been there. Mr. Greene apparently does not read the available material. No one would deny that there is need for greater and more reliable information about China. But if there is "a curtain of ignorance," it exists largely because China's Communist rulers prefer it that way, hoping to keep the rest of the world in the dark about real conditions in their country.

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Reviews in Brief

Stalin Reconsidered

FRANCIS B. RANDALL: *Stalin's Russia.* New York, The Free Press, 1965.

THIS BOOK is a collection of topical essays, rather than a systematic history of the Stalin era or a biography of its chief protagonist. Though much of the treatment is a routine saunter over well-marked fields, Randall writes with a certain verve; he is whimsical, and sometimes plays the role of an *auteur provocateur.* Thus, he argues that "the cause of human freedom rides with Stalin," because if Stalin was merely a creature of circumstance "it is a defeat for us all," while if Stalin was really a tyrant he demonstrated what another man could do in a better cause.

In his first chapter, Randall asks a question which also struck this reviewer as he finished reading the book: Is there justification for another one-volume survey of the Soviet Union under Stalin? Presumably *Stalin's Russia* is aimed at beginning students rather than scholars, because it skims quickly over a wide range of topics and is based largely on secondary American sources (plus Stalin's better-known writings), making little use of materials published in the USSR since 1956. Even as an introduction, however, the book cannot be recommended wholeheartedly. There are too many errors of fact, dubious interpretations, and misplaced emphases.

The book is one of a series devoted to "historical reconsiderations." Randall's reinterpretation stresses two somewhat contradictory themes—Stalin's latitude in making decisions and the overwhelming influence of ideology in shaping these decisions. Minimizing the impact of impersonal forces as well as of individuals on Stalin's policies, Randall emphasizes the options open to an all-powerful dictator in charting his course. Few would deny Stalin's decisive power in the USSR, but surely it is an oversimplification to say that "most of what happened there happened because he wanted it to happen." Stalin "wanted" speedy collectivization, but did he want the agricultural difficulties—to put it mildly—that accompanied collectivization and lowered agricultural production for a decade? Stalin "wanted"—in some sense—a pact with Hitler, but did he want the ordeal by fire, the misery and destruction to which the pact was the immediate prelude?

A similar objection can be made to the author's treatment of the role of ideology. According to Prof. Randall, Stalin "acted chiefly in accordance with his ideology." The author is no doubt right in rejecting the notion of a dualistic Stalin whose doctrines were unrelated to his decisions. Unfortunately, however, it means little to portray the Soviet leader as acting under the influence of ideology when this ideology is defined as Marxism-Leninism plus "all the new doctrines that he worked out and new sentiments that he adopted" in the course of his rule.

Thomas B. Larson

Planning the Economy

JANE DEGRAS, ED.: *Soviet Planning.* (Essays in honor of Naum Jasny.) New York, F. A. Praeger, 1965.

ON THE OCCASION of the 80th birthday of Dr. Naum Jasny, a group of his professional colleagues have pooled their talents to produce a unique but fitting literary monument to the work and personal achievements of that eminent and prolific scholar of the Soviet economy. The book contains a nicely varied assortment of ten essays on the general subject of Soviet economic planning, each of these essays reflecting the particular current research interest of the individual author.

One group of essays sheds new and valuable light on some neglected areas of Soviet economic history. In one of these papers, for example, Mr. J. Miller, now an editor of *Soviet Studies,* recounts his own unique personal experience

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as a staff member (and graduate student) at the Economic Research Institute of the Soviet Gosplan during the grim years 1936-37, when this institution, along with the rest of the USSR, was passing through the Stalinist ordeal of mass political purges and trials. One byproduct of this wave of hysteria, he recalls, was a "colossal amortization" of books: whenever a man was arrested, any brochure or book he had ever published was promptly removed from the libraries and bookstores.

Professor Holland Hunter, of Haverford College, is the author of another retrospective essay embodying the results of his recent research into Soviet planning performance during the 1930's in two key industries: electric power and steel. Hunter reviews the record of the planning mechanism within a "contemporaneous setting" and on a year-by-year basis in an effort to evaluate the decisions reflected in each annual plan objectively and "without the unfair use of hindsight brought to bear from our present vantage point." His inquiry reveals a steady improvement in the technique of plan fulfillment in these two basic industries as compared with the performance of industries producing several less "essential" commodities, "with shortfalls systematically sloughed off onto consumer-welfare items."

The same group of historical essays also includes an analysis by Luba Richter of the grandiose Soviet experiment in "urbanization of the countryside" which was undertaken by Khrushchev during the 1950's. Drawing upon Russian fiction to reinforce her analysis, the author succeeds in conveying to the reader the magnitude of the economic and psychological barriers encountered by the leadership in the course of its attempt to implement this drive. She also brings out the remarkable persistence of the leadership's intent to remold the village environment in such a way as to make it more amenable to the purposes and manipulative techniques of the urban political elite.

Two essays, one by Peter Wiles and another by Colin Clark, are devoted to statistical examinations of the recent growth performance of the Soviet economy in a comparative setting. There are also papers by George Garvy on "The Role of the State Bank in Soviet Planning"; by Werner Klatt (a consultant to the United Nations) on "Soviet Development Aid"; and by Michael C. Kaser on social welfare criteria in relation to the Soviet planned economy. J. H. Richter provides a brief survey of Dr. Jasny's professional career.

Alec Nove, of the University of Glasgow, makes a dual contribution. In a graceful introduction to the collection, he presents an evaluation of the prodigious output of Dr. Jasny in the light of more recent research on the Soviet economy by younger academic specialists, pointing out that in a number of instances the statistical indices arrived at by these younger specialists, "calculated by highly sophisticated methods, proved very close to Jasny's rough estimates." Besides this tribute to Jasny, Professor Nove contributes a brief but thoughtful essay entitled "Toward a Theory of Planning," in which he critically examines the official Soviet concept of "planned proportional development." Dr. Nove concludes that his own research to date "has not uncovered any Soviet theory of planning in the sense of a body of doctrine which could be said. . . .to underlie decision-making by planners." He does, however, view the increasing popularity of mathematical economics in the USSR as a sign pointing toward the emergence of some kind of "theory of planning practice" promising at least to provide Soviet planners with a sort of operating manual for their day-to-day activities, although the basic goals of economic planning will doubtless continue to be defined by the political leadership. Readers and friends of Naum Jasny alike will not fail to take note of the fact that the volume under review was made possible by the faithful labors of Miss Jane Degras, who served in the capacity of both discerning planner and skillful editor of this impressive enterprise.

ABRAM BERGSON: *The Economics of Soviet Planning*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964.

The appearance of a new study on the Soviet economy by a scholar of the stature of Professor Bergson would be an important event under any circumstances, but the occasion is all the more noteworthy because in this latest work Prof. Bergson points a much broader picture of Soviet economic performance than he has ever before attempted, covering in fact the whole range of activities falling within the competence of the Soviet planning authorities. Not only that, but the new study combines the findings of the author's own research with a broad sampling of the judgments of other scholars currently working in the field. In Prof. Bergson's own words, he has attempted to present a comprehensive "summary survey" which will "contribute to understanding of a society and a way of economic life" that have emerged in the USSR after nearly four decades of economic planning.

Most readers familiar with Dr. Bergson's previous writings on Soviet national income will be grateful for the opportunity to become acquainted for the first time with his views on such other key aspects of the Soviet planned economy as the structure of consumption, managerial motivation, choice of technology, labor utilization, incentives in collectivized agriculture, and capital formation. In his evaluation of Soviet economic policy and practice, the author combines due recognition of Soviet achievements in the area of capital formation with a rigorous application of Western principles of economic efficiency. On the latter basis, he comes to the conclusion that Soviet practices in resource allocation have tended to violate the main dictates of effi-

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ciency rules (*i.e.*, performance oriented toward an economic optimum) and have therefore often been economically irrational.

Professor Bergson is also disposed to evaluate Soviet policies in terms of consumers' welfare. With regard to the treatment of consumer needs, he finds that the authoritarian Soviet system of planning, which has been marked by frequent changes in assigned "plans" designed to achieve a properly "balanced" output of final goods according to the planners' preference, has all too often resulted in the diversion of a portion of the resources required for the production of household consumption goods to more "essential" uses. As a consequence of this official bias against the consumer—to quote the author's judicious academic prose—"the mix sought must be realized to a less extent in targets for supplies for household consumption than in those for supplies for final uses generally" (p. 282).

In the final chapter of his study, the author undertakes an overall evaluation of the "economic merit" of the Soviet economic system. In his view, such an assessment of any system, whether socialist or capitalist, must turn on the issues of efficiency and equity of income distribution. Unfortunately, he observes, the Soviet government has been "notably secretive" on the subject of income distribution. He regards this fact itself as suggestive, but acknowledges it is a formidable obstacle to factual appraisal.

The author consequently centers his attention on economic efficiency as the main criterion for judging the merit of the Soviet economic system. He traces and evaluates a number of sources of inefficiency in the economy: the official value theory, price-formation practices, overcentralized decision-making, collectivized agriculture, autarky, and the criteria of performance employed by the central authorities for rewarding enterprise managers. He then proceeds to weigh these practices against the known sources of inefficiency in a market economy like that of the United States. On the basis of a substantial body of quantitative evidence, Dr. Bergson comes up with the calculation that the amount of net national product obtained in the USSR per unit of labor and reproducible capital in recent years has been equal, at best, to only 54.9 percent of that obtained in the United States. "If socialism were an especially productive system," he observes in conclusion, "one might think that by now this fact would have been manifest."

Leon Herman

Agriculture under Khrushchev

NAUM JASNY: *Khrushchev's Crop Policy*, with foreword by Alec Nove. Glasgow, George Outram & Co., Ltd., 1965.

WHATEVER MAY HAVE been the reason for the belated publication of Naum Jasny's newest study of Soviet agricultural policies, it certainly is a pity since the study, at the time it was actually written (1963), was much more of a pioneering work than it now appears to be. This book is by no means easy reading and no doubt will appeal mainly to those who have a deep and specialized interest in Soviet agriculture and its problems. Nevertheless, Mr. Jasny writes with unsurpassed authority in this field, and his latest work, notwithstanding the tardiness of its appearance, offers painstakingly detailed analyses which are still of value today.

At times Mr. Jasny might seem to have arrived at too negative an assessment of Soviet agricultural development under Khrushchev. However, the events of the last two years, as well as the admissions that have been made in Moscow since Khrushchev's ouster, have confirmed the author's estimates to an astounding degree.

There are, to be sure, various points which are disputable. In particular, this reviewer doubts that the low yield of hay per hectare and the existence before 1959 of vast expanses of untilled land in the regions north of the "black earth" zone can be blamed entirely on "backwardness and disorganization" (p. 39). The shortage of farm labor, brought about by the pronounced drift of population from the countryside to the cities, and the lack of adequate farm machinery presumably were major factors responsible for what appears to have been a strangely irrational distribution of fallow lands (p. 41). Again, the high costs of Soviet livestock production are perhaps due not only to the composition of the feed, as Jasny suggests (p. 61), but also, in equal measure, to the fact that in wide areas of the USSR livestock suffer each winter from a shortage of feed, preventing any gain in weight or any milk output for months on end. Furthermore, Jasny's comments about corn planting in the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (p. 141) are based on a misconception: the figures he cites for 1928, 1932 and 1937 do not refer to the present-day Moldavian Republic but only to that part of it which constituted the former Moldavian Autonomous Republic east of the Dniester River, before the inclusion of Bessarabia.

It would be petty, however, to place undue emphasis on such minor flaws of detail, for these do not impair the essential value of the book. A more important and basic criticism that might be made of Jasny's treatment is that his repeated insistence on the high cost of Khrushchev's agrarian experiments misses the crucial point—*i.e.*, that the primary goals of Soviet agricultural policy are to establish the "socialist" system and at the same time produce specified quantities. On this vital point, however, the reviewer would like to express his full endorsement of Jasny's arguments on the following grounds:

Even in a totalitarian system which treats farm workers as helots,

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production costs can be ignored only so long as there is no need for a rapid augmentation of yields and a sufficient supply of cheap labor exists. (And even in such conditions, it is doubtful that costs can be successfully disregarded.) Since 1950 at the very latest, the supply of farm labor in the Soviet Union has become progressively more scarce (relatively speaking), and at the same time it has become more and more imperative to increase output. Consequently, the only way is to rationalize and mechanize, making costs a decisive factor. Even the mobilization of such marginal labor reserves as may still be available—such as minors, old people, and the handicapped—entails costs since the only effective means of achieving this is better wages.

The shortages of machinery (capital investment) and of labor have made the cost factor in Soviet agriculture especially vital—much more so, in fact, than anyone anticipated ten or twenty years ago. Herein lies the justification of Jasny's comparisons of Western and Soviet farm methods, yields, prices and costs. Experts are increasingly recognizing that such comparisons are not only of value but virtually indispensable for evaluating present and future Soviet agricultural policies. Mr. Jasny has thus made a contribution that extends beyond the Khrushchev era and will prove its full worth only in the years to come.

Karl-Eugen Wädekin

Peking's First Steps

A. DOAK BARNETT: *Communist China: The Early Years, 1949-55.* New York, Praeger, 1964.

PROFESSOR BARNETT has collected in this volume twenty reports on Communist China which he wrote during 1949-55. For most of that period, he was a close witness of the Chinese political scene. He was in China during the fateful year of takeover (1949), remaining in areas under Communist control for six months; subsequently, he spent several years in Hong Kong engaged in a continuing study of developments on the mainland. Hong Kong was then, to a much greater extent than now, the key observation point for those denied access to the Chinese mainland. Barnett used his vantage point superbly, drawing on the documents, refugees and other sources available in Hong Kong for first-rate reporting about the revolution unfolding in China.

All of the reports, which are presented here with minimal editing, are available elsewhere, in a few cases as published articles but in most cases as reports distributed by the American Universities Field Staff. Moreover, other writers have covered most of the subject matter in a variety of forms and publications. Even so, to have reports of such high quality collected in a single volume is both convenient and useful. The sum product is an excellent descriptive account of the Chinese Communists' course during the critical years of political consolidation and economic reconstruction.

If there is one great drawback to the book, it is the absence of integrative analysis. In a brief two-page "epilogue," Barnett states that the early years "clearly revealed many of the most basic Chinese Communist policies of totalitarian control, social revolution, and economic development" and at the same time "highlighted some of the fundamental, intractable problems confronting the regime." Yet he offers no further elaboration on what these policies and problems were, or how they continued to affect the later course of Chinese development.

Of course, it was not the author's intention, either in the original reports or in the current reoffering, to provide this sort of analysis. His goal was simply to make available important data and information about the formative years of the Chinese People's Republic. In terms of this limited purpose, the volume is highly useful—the more so because the chapter arrangement and index make the location of specific information relatively easy. It is to be hoped that the author will someday undertake the job of correlating the developments of this period with both earlier and later trends.

J. R. Townsend

Politics and Science

MIKHAIL A. KLOCHKO: *Soviet Scientist in Red China.* Translated by Andrew MacAndrew. New York, F. A. Praeger, 1964.

BECAUSE FEW Americans have visited mainland China since the Communist takeover in 1949, any eyewitness account is usually received with considerable curiosity in this country. One of the more interesting and objective of these accounts is that by Mikhail Klochko, a Russian who defected to the West in 1961.

A chemist and recipient of the Stalin prize, Professor Klochko was sent to China twice as a scientific advisor. He spent a total of thirteen months there in 1958 and 1960—dates that were especially significant. In 1958 all appeared to be well with Sino-Soviet relations; there were few signs that the two states were on anything but intimate terms, or that the alliance was not seen by the parties as mutually satisfactory. While it is apparent from Klochko's account that the Russian community in Peking was somewhat isolated from Chinese society, relations on the professional level appear to have been warm and constructive.

The author's 1960 tour began much as the first had, except that

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most of his time was to be spent outside of Peking (primarily in Kunming). But as the months wore on, he began to notice some strange behavior on the part of both Chinese and Soviet officialdom. Eventually (in August 1960) all Soviet advisors were withdrawn. Klochko, who was suddenly obliged to terminate his work and leave Russia, makes some interesting charges concerning why and how this remarkable exodus came about. Briefly, he maintains that the initiative lay primarily on the Soviet side, and that there was no substantial provocation on the part of the Chinese.

While Klochko avoids technical discussion, he has much to say about how the Chinese are trying to develop science. Facilities, he says, are generally good—often better than those in the Soviet Union. What is lacking is trained manpower, and it appeared to him that not enough is being done to correct this imbalance. Not only are there too few scientists, but those who are available are required to spend a large portion of their time attending political meetings, while work in the laboratories remains at a standstill. Interference in scientific work by dogmatic party bureaucrats also draws the writer's fire. They are, he says, too impatient, and too distrustful of scientists.

Although Klochko had little background on China before his first assignment there, he made a point of learning as much as he could about his host country. He even learned some Chinese—though not enough, one would think, to justify his offering the judgment that the language is too imprecise for science. This assertion, offered in his conclusion, is not well grounded. According to many experts, the difficulty with the Chinese tongue often lies not with the language itself but with the way it is spoken. Mandarin, when properly pronounced, is not so ambiguous as the author would have us believe.[1]

On the whole, however, this well-written book provides a unique perspective on present-day China and on the problems she is encountering, domestically and internationally, in her efforts to become a modern nation.

James D. Seymour

[1] On this subject, see "Characters Often Mispronounced by Scientists and Technicians," by "XYZ" (pseudonym). *Kuang-ming jih-pao,* Oct. 18, 1961. Translated in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service Report No. 11720.

Comintern: Unity of Opposites

THEO PIRKER: *Komintern und Faschismus 1920-1940, Dokumente zur Geschichte und Theorie des Faschismus.* Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1965.

THIS BOOK is the tenth volume of a series published by the Munich Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Institute for Contemporary History), which specializes in historical research on the Nazi era in Germany. The study is a welcome addition to Pirker's other documentary volumes (not connected with the series)—one on the Moscow purge trials (*Die Moskauer Schauprozesse 1936-38,* Munich, 1963) and another on the Comintern (*Utopie und Mythos der Weltrevolution,* Munich, 1964).

In the present volume Pirker publishes selected articles from the Comintern paper *Inprekorr,* later renamed *Rundschau* (Review). The paper was established by the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 as a triweekly publication produced in German, French and English; it continued to appear until the early weeks of 1940, when—mainly because of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939—its existence became undesirable to Stalin. Pirker points out in his introduction that owing to the lack of documents from the Comintern archives—which are not open, nor very likely to be in the foreseeable future—*Inprekorr's* articles are the best available source on the day-to-day policy of the Comintern and on its evaluation of the emerging Fascist movement in Germany. Fascism and communism —"these two poles-apart but still structurally so similar political extremist movements," as Pirker puts it—cannot be understood in isolation from each other. Fascism in Germany, for example, emerged in great part as a reaction to the Bolshevik Revolution, as a copy of the Bolshevik political mind, and as a national reaction to the international aspirations of the Comintern in the early 1920's.

Pirker's main interest is focused on the Comintern's evaluation of fascism in Germany and Italy. He holds that articles in *Inprekorr* indicate a misjudgment and misunderstanding of the nature of the Fascist movement by the Comintern. The reasons for this were at least twofold. First, Marxist ideology, which envisaged the movement of history only in class relationships, proved to be an ineffective analytical tool when confronted with the Fascist movement, which was not a class phenomenon. The deterioration of Marxist political thinking during the Stalin era did not help much, of course, to remedy this situation. The second reason, according to Pirker, was the traditional Bolshevik hatred of parliamentary democracy. If the Nazis wished to destroy the Weimar Republic and its political institutions, the Bolsheviks could only consider it a welcome contribution to the coming socialist revolution. For these and other reasons, the Comintern was not able to make a workable evaluation of fascism and continued to consider the Social Democrats in Germany as the main enemy of communism. Not until 1935 did the Comintern switch to a sharply anti-fascist policy and launch the slogan of the Popular Front, which meant a willingness to cooperate with anybody (even the Social Democrats) who was ready to fight fascism. This policy continued until 1939, when Fascist

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Germany suddenly became the friendly ally of the Soviet Union.

Pirker's volume of documents, with its excellent introduction, should certainly be viewed by students of international communism as a valuable contribution to the history of the international Communist movement.

Thomas Weiss

The Katyn Massacre

THADDEUS WITTLIN: *Time Stopped at 6:30.* New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965.

MR. WITTLIN'S book deals with the 1940 Katyn forest massacre of Polish officers who had been taken prisoner by Red Army forces after the Soviet attack on Poland in September 1939.

The statement in the publisher's blurb that the book "proves beyond all doubt the Russians were responsible" for this appalling atrocity (4,253 bodies were taken from the mass graves) is unnecessary, since convincing proof to this effect was put forward back in 1952 by a Select Committee of the US House of Representatives. The Committee concluded specifically that "the Soviet NKVD was responsible" (*Interim Report,* July 2, 1952, US House of Representatives, No. 2430, p. 37), thereby upholding the findings of a Nazi investigation that had been conducted through the International Red Cross in 1943. The nine volumes of evidence gathered by the Committee attests to the thoroughness and completeness of the probe conducted by US authorities. An attempt to refute this mass of evidence was made by the Soviet authorities, who inspired yet another inquiry in Poland in 1952 (see *Zbiór Dokumentów,* No. 5, Warsaw, 1952, Polish and French text), the result of which, of course, was a foregone conclusion.

Particularly impressive was the manner and content of the evidence given before the US Select Committee by an American infantry officer named Van Vliet, quoted extensively by Mr. Wittlin (pp. 288-304). Lt. Col. Van Vliet, a prisoner of war in German hands, had been taken to Katyn during the 1943 investigation. He stated that at that time he had very much wanted to believe the massacre was "entirely German propaganda and a German plot" (*Final Report,* Union Cal. 792, Report No. 2505, p. 5, US Government Printing Office, Dec. 22, 1952). However, the evidence of his own eyes had been too strong for him, although he refused to commit himself while still in Nazi hands. Only after his release as a prisoner of war did he make a report to the War Department stating the conclusion to which, with the utmost reluctance, he had come.

On the basis of the Committee hearings and also of information given to him by surviving prisoners of war, Mr. Wittlin gives a semi-documentary, semi-fictional account of life in the Ostashkov, Kozelsk, and Starobelsk camps, where the doomed officers were imprisoned. In this section of the book a great number of Polish officers and intellectuals are introduced. The story of what happened to these men, and of the subsequent investigation into their deaths, is then told—sometimes in the form of an imaginative reconstruction of the scene, sometimes by direct quotation of the evidence presented at the Select Committee hearings. All those introduced to us in the camps make their final appearance as corpses disinterred from the mass graves of Katyn forest.

Mr. Wittlin has painstakingly sifted the vast amount of evidence amassed and has made use of what is essential to his purpose with considerable ingenuity. His purpose, quite evidently, and laudably, has been to give his subject appeal for the widest possible audience. He has tried to do this by placing emphasis on the fictional "wrapping," by constantly shifting the scenes, and by introducing extensive "color" material—his own personal experience, for example—which has little or no direct bearing on the main theme. The documentary aspect consequently suffers, and the book as a whole lacks the logical structure that the subject demands. Despite these shortcomings, *Time Stopped at 6:30* is a highly readable account of one of the most inhuman chapters of the Stalin era.

Hugo Dewar

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NOTES & VIEWS

"Economic Reforms in East Germany": A Comment

The article by Dorothy Miller and Harry G. Trend in the March-April issue of this journal undertook to do three things: first, to describe the substance of the economic reforms adopted since 1964 in East Germany; second, to analyze the developments which preceded them and made them necessary; and third, to evaluate their impact on the future course of the East German economy.

The first of these tasks occupies the middle section of the article and takes up only a quarter of its total length. While this section falls short of giving a really comprehensive picture of what is in fact a complex undertaking, it does sketch out appropriately the major features of the East German reforms. In particular, the authors are to be commended insofar as they avoid imputing to the reforms any tendency to move away from the system of central planing "towards capitalistic methods," as for example when they point out that "the East Germans still rely heavily on the application of strict direct controls . . . (and) appear likely to continue keeping firm central control of the price mechanism for a long time to come".[1] Unfortunately, however, there are other references which give a contrary impression that the reforms might actually be intended as a stepping-stone back to "capitalism." Thus, for instance, the authors appear to overemphasize the cost-reduction aspect of the reforms, almost identifying the entire program with the "awakening of cost-consciousness"—presumably in the Western sense.[2]

Turning to the other two parts of the article, I unhappily find myself obliged to disagree with the authors on almost all points. The few exceptions can be mentioned quickly: The overtaxation of existing resources as a result of the planners' "desire to push growth rates at all costs" is correctly cited as a most important factor in the decline of the East German economy. It is also true that "proximity to the German Federal Republic" has pushed the East German masters into overextended attempts to catch up with their political rival. The existence of "highly developed labor discipline" and a generally favorable climate for "implementation of the current reforms" is properly ac-

[1] This is commendable because the opposite interpretation has become fashionable in the West. The present writer treated this question in "Is Russian Planning Becoming More Capitalistic?" in *Challenge*, published by New York University, for June 1965. The interpretation advanced in this article was entirely corroborated by a detailed analysis written by Professor Yevsei Liberman, *Pravda*, Nov. 21, 1965.

[2] As pointed out in the article cited above, cost reduction, as a necessary element in attaining "profitability," was incorporated very early into central Soviet planning in the form of the so-called "Khozraschet" principle. Recent reforms in the Soviet Union and East European countries do not alter the place of cost reduction in theory but rather aim at improving cost accounting as a means of controlling and approximating balanced relationships between the various stages of production and between individual enterprises. The great difference between this function, which remains strictly circumscribed by primary planning goals, and the overriding "cost consciousness" typical of private enterprise must not be overlooked.

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knowledged, thus dissenting from the frequent propagandistic claim that East German workers have become resentful under oppressive rule. Finally, some of the basic shortcomings of the old system of overcentralization of economic decision-making—such as the tendency of managers to "establish the lowest possible (plan) quota in order to assure the largest overfulfillment"—are also adequately recognized.

On the other hand, the development that preceded and necessitated the reform is pictured in a way that is demonstrably not in line with the basic facts, while it ignores the real causes. (In fairness to the authors, however, it should be said that their views probably reflect to a large extent the conclusions of a great many other Western analysts.) My disagreement with them is based on the results of my own independent study of East German economic affairs, largely carried out "on the spot" during the last four years.[3]

Describing the economic factors which characterized all the Soviet-bloc economies in the late 1950's and early 1960's, and which in their view "awakened the current 'cost consciousness' and desire for reform," the authors state that "declining growth rates occurred in Eastern Europe soon after the Communist regimes had harnessed their unused resources," and that "in time, fewer and fewer uncommitted resources could be found to sustain growth rates" (at the high level attained immediately after the war). To the extent that this picture is valid at all, however, it merely describes an almost truistic economic phenomenon common to all cases of recovery from disastrously depressed levels of activity and therefore is irrelevant as a special characteristic of the performance of the Eastern economies. But it so happens that East Germany represents perhaps the most prominent—and therefore highly unusual—modification of this rule. Here is what the statistical record shows: The rule reigned supreme in the first postwar year, when industrial production (which had dwindled to 35 percent of prewar levels) almost doubled. This was followed, however, by almost three years of near-stagnation, and then came a new two-year jump with an average growth rate of 14 percent. The following seven years showed an average growth rate of 7 percent, with a low of 4 percent in 1956 and highs of 11 and 12 percent in 1954 and 1958 respectively. Finally, the rate averaged only 4 percent between 1960 and 1965, with a low of 2.4 percent in both 1962 and 1963 and a high of close to 5 percent probably reached again in 1965.

This up-and-down pattern defeats the attempt to show that the Eastern economies suffered from a gradual attrition of inherited resources which they could not replenish. A comparison with West German data shows rather that there was a common underlying trend in both economies to move from maximum recovery rates to more "normal" growth. West German recovery was entirely delayed until 1947, when financial reform and Marshall Plan measures generated a three-year spurt in economic growth at an average rate of about 35 percent. For the following ten years the average dropped to 6.5 percent, with only two great deviations of 11 percent in 1955 and barely 2 percent in 1958. Since 1961, the average has been 3.5 percent, with a low of barely 2 percent in 1963, a high of over 5 percent in 1964, and a renewed tendency towards gradual decline thereafter.[4] In view of this striking similarity of the long-run patterns in both East and West Germany, it is naturally not very convincing to hear one cited as evidence of "bankruptcy," "pervasive internal deterioration," "a travesty of reason," and "a political liability," while the other seems to qualify, in the general Western evaluation, as continued proof of the West German *Wirtschaftswunder*.

Turning to the explanation of the immediate background of the reform move, we read that there was in East Germany "a relative lack of opposition to the new economic model, and hence the rapidity with which the party was able to get the economic reform program underway"; that "Walter Ulbricht's unusual sensitivity . . . made it possible for him to place himself at the head of the bandwagon"; that he "sensed which way the wind was blowing and—seizing the initiative—provided the GDR with an early lead in the economic reform movement."

Now while I am usually inclined to oppose the often crude and overexaggerated criticisms levelled against Mr. Ulbricht, in this case he deserves very little credit. Actually, he was completely unresponsive to the idea of reform when it was strongly pushed by a group of high-ranking East German academic economists as far back as 1956—practically at the same time that Professor Yevsei Liberman made his first try in Russia. The leading members of this group were obliged to confess their "error" and were practically silenced behind the walls of the Academy of Sciences; and Professor Fred Oelssner lost his political post as a member of the Council of Ministers (*Ministerrat*). Furthermore, there is no doubt that East Germany was purposely chosen by Mr. Khrushchev as a laboratory to pave the way for the much larger-scale task of economic reform lying ahead in the Soviet Union. Finally, there is no justification for the authors' assumption that the Comecon dis-

[3] These results are detailed in a forthcoming book, *Wehen und Wunder der Zonenwirtschaft* (Cologne, 1966). I have also dealt with special aspects in "East German Miracle?" and "Income and Distribution in East Germany," *Challenge*, New York, November 1963 and February 1965.

[4] All growth rates have been computed on a "real per capita" basis.

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cussions in the early 1960's "gave an early impetus to the economic reforms now in progress." The initial reform movement, as pointed out above, occurred in 1956 and floundered; and when the recent reform measures were finally introduced, it was for reasons of a very general nature.

The causes of the supposed economic "failure" in the East European countries are explicitly defined as follows by Mrs. Miller and Mr. Trend:

For long periods, these countries followed the policy of underinvesting in agriculture, housing and the consumer economy, permitting these capital-starved sectors to deteriorate. Similarly, they neglected investments in research and development and chose to live on the technological and scientific inheritance of the past. . . . But since all segments of even Communist-run economies are interrelated, the continued decline in productivity of the neglected sectors has acted as a brake on the entire economy, forcing the realization that the high rates of industrial growth in the early years were largely gained at the expense of potentially higher long-range growth.

Here again, the authors are walking on well-trodden but insecure ground. The assumption that the path of events sketched by them "forced the realization" that past policy had been erroneous is sheer imagination, since the old policy of giving priority to basic industrial development still stands unchanged. Moreover, while it is an indisputable fact that "all segments of even Communist-run economies are interrelated," it is also true that in a planned economy these interrelations may be manipulated almost at will, without regard for possibly adverse market reactions. The authors' argument seems to be inspired largely by the practical experience of advanced Western economies in which expanding consumers' demand invites the expansion of basic industries, or else by some highly debatable hypothetical theories of dynamic "balanced growth" as developed in certain models for underdeveloped countries.

The authors themselves seem to challenge their own thesis when they state: "In short, the Communist regimes concentrated their investments in areas with good prospects for success." This is, in fact, the clue to the whole problem, for the statement seems to contain implicit admission of the need to concentrate meager resources on the best targets. This being the case, it is a mystery why and how better results could have been achieved by "wasting" some of these meager resources on seeding less fertile ground.

It is also patently wrong, especially in the case of East Germany, to view the results of nonpreferential treatment of some areas as "deterioration" and "continued decline." In all these sectors, there was some improvement in East Germany almost from the start, and the results since the middle 1950's have been quite remarkable. In spite of all the handicaps, both natural and self-created, the process of agricultural collectivization seems on the verge of showing extraordinary success in the consolidation of the LPG III—the highest-stage form of collective farm. New housing projects of respectable proportions can be seen today practically everywhere in East Germany. Per capita consumption has risen from less than 50 percent of the West German level to roughly 70-75 percent. In fact, the one major exception to the established order of economic priorities has occurred in this sector. In a mood of overoptimism and pressed by the so-called "mass flights" of East German citizens to the better-filled larders of West Germany, Mr. Ulbricht temporarily reversed the order of priorities in 1958 in order to increase the production of important consumer goods and thus "overtake West German living standards by the early 1960's." Most West German experts see this further overextension of an inherently weak economic base as the immediate cause of the downturn in the economy, which in turn signalled the collapse of Mr. Ulbricht's bold attempt.

As to the authors' emphasis on the lack of investment in research and development, I am certain they would not have stressed it had they ever set foot in an average East German plant. *Had they done so, they would probably* have seen a solitary prototype machine of advanced design surrounded by a broad range of older machines, showing that the main bottleneck is a lack of the necessary resources to exploit new technological improvements rather than the lack of technological progress as such.

This lack of resources in East Germany has one quite obvious, yet generally overlooked, explanation to which the authors refer in two brief sentences that are highly perplexing in their neutralizing effect. "Unlike other European countries," it is stated, "the GDR was required to pay heavy reparations to the Soviet Union. Paradoxically, perhaps, this burden stimulated growth rates in the 1950's. . ." Since the authors fail to explain this paradox, and since I cannot possibly imagine how such a miracle could have occurred, I can merely repeat briefly what I have tried to show in great detail in my recent book (see footnote 3): namely, that these reparations practically emptied the investment fund of East Germany for the first seven postwar years and kept drawing upon it less heavily for at least another four years; that this led to considerable "negative" investment until 1950 and, for the following decade, permitted net investment at only half the level required to keep the West German economy in high gear, and at roughly a third of what other Communist-bloc regimes could squeeze from their people by keeping living standards down.

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Space limitations do not permit me to offer any detailed comments on the authors' assessment of the further impact of the East German reforms. I feel compelled, however, to make two general observations. One is that certain of the authors' conclusions for which they claim "increasing evidence"—such as their estimate of the outlook for further "socialization of the only partially socialized sectors"—seem on the contrary to run directly counter to the evidence, which indicates that both the semi-state industrial enterprises as well as the semi-state agricultural collectives of the LPG-III type have been gaining ground continually. Secondly, in their discussion of the "sparation of ownership from management," the authors view this tendency as "similar to that long witnessed in the West," whereas it is actually of an entirely different nature, *i.e.*, a move from centralized to more decentralized management.

It remains only to state briefly my own views as to the reasons for the reforms and their probable results. The reforms, I believe, were not adopted as a response to any particular set of difficulties, but represent rather a general move to replace outdated techniques by new ones better suited to the more complex conditions of economies in near-consolidation on a qualitatively much more integrated level. They seem likely to overcome the main problems, although not without further complications on the technical level. I doubt that the results have yet been reflected to any marked degree in the recent improvement in the East German economy—which, incidentally, I predicted in 1962-63 without counting on the beneficial results of the impending reforms being felt at so early a stage.

Hans Apel

(*Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, Connecticut.*)

A Reply

We welcome the opportunity to comment on Mr. Hans Apel's criticisms.

First of all, without going into a discussion on the specifics of the growth rates, we think that Mr. Apel's data support the theory of a *secular* decline in growth rates. The *cyclical* changes in the GDR's economic growth are not unique. A number of East European economists have even tried to develop a theory of economic cycles and secular decline for planned economies! [1] The existence of declining secular growth rates in capitalist countries does not invalidate the conclusion that this is one reason why the East European regimes wanted to change the system of economic management. References to expressions and discussions in support of this view in almost all the bloc countries are too numerous to cite. In the planned economies the "cure" has taken the form of economic reform, and in the West it is frequently reflected in the adoption of new fiscal and monetary policies.

Under conditions of unbalanced growth, one may experience an "up-and-down pattern" and a "gradual attrition" of resources over a long period of time. The bloc's "unbalanced" growth goes under the guise of various economic "barriers" (*e.g.*, "material," "labor," "power," etc.). One can also have short-run "sprints" in growth rates at the expense of long-term growth rates, and this is no "miracle" when applied to the short-run effects of Soviet reparations. To argue that one concentrates on areas of good prospects for success in the short run does not invalidate the criticism that this may be done at the expense of long-run economic growth. Whether Mr. Apel is willing to admit it or not, there is something to the theory of "balanced growth." Finally, the advantages gained by tapping "successively" declining reserves of uncommitted resources need not be exhausted in a *single economic cycle.*

Mr. Apel's discussion of Ulbricht merely supports our hypothesis that the East German leader is frequently opposed to a specific movement developing in the bloc. When such a program is about to be adopted generally, however, he quickly joins the bandwagon and claims he has been ahead of everybody else all along.

Mr. Apel claims that Khrushchev was using the GDR as a laboratory (similar claims have been made about Bulgaria). But did not Khrushchev carry out limited experiments in the Soviet Union? And would it not have been more advantageous for the Soviet Union to introduce reforms on a broader scale in one of its many republics where they could be tested under peculiar Soviet conditions? Also, is it an accident that recent economic reforms in the various bloc countries show largely identical features, with only a few variations? Following Mr. Apel's reasoning, the very identity of the reforms would make all the East European countries "laboratories" for a forthcoming Soviet economic reform!

The concern of East Europe with evergrowing unsold inventories, the importance of commodity-money relations, and the law of value seems to indicate that East European economists do not agree with Mr. Apel's view that in a planned economy manipulations can be performed "without regard for possible adverse market reactions."

In our article we talked about the importance of the lack of investments in the infra-structure. Mr. Apel seems to confuse this with the consumer sector. Throughout the bloc there have been demands for

[1] *E.g.*, see Josef Goldmann, "The Rate of Growth and the Recurring Fluctuations in the Economy of Some Socialist Countries," and "The Rate of Growth in Some Socialist Countries and the Model of Economic Management," *Planovane Hospodarstvi*, No. 9, September 1964, and No. 11, November 1964, respectively; also Jozef Pajestka, "Stages in Poland's Economic Development," *Zycie Gospodarcze*, Feb. 28, 1965.

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an increase of investment in research and development. The West is always held up as a most acceptable model to emulate. The lack of resources for exploiting technological developments was the choice of the planners when priorities were set. They now have expressed a wish to change the sequence of priorities, raising the level of expenditures on research and development and on the productive implementation of technological advances.

The change of LPG I into "higher forms" and increased participation of the state in semi-state industrial enterprises cannot be considered a retrogression of socialization as Mr. Apel claims.

We think that our discussion of the separation of ownership and control was an "inspired" bit of comparative analysis, and our footnote on this and the new Soviet enterprise statute gives some validity to such a conclusion even at this early date.

Now to turn to Mr. Apel's own explanation of the reasons for the reforms, offered as a substitute for our multiple-causal explanation. He claims that the reforms represented "a general move to replace outdated techniques by new ones better suited to the more complex conditions of economies in near-consolidation on a qualitatively much more integrated level." Are we to believe, then, that the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria have now reached the highly "integrated level" found in East Germany and Czechoslovakia when they first used the directive system of economic management? [2] Or does Mr. Apel propose a separate theory for each of these countries to explain a common phenomenon?

The simultaneous existence of ever-growing unsalable inventories and of growing unsatisfied purchasing power fully deserves to be called a "travesty of reason" and a "political liability." Or would Mr. Apel call this condition an example of economic rationality? If a similar situation occurred in the West and we had the opportunity to comment on it, we would be happy to describe it in the same way, though perhaps omitting the "political liability" charge. However, we were writing about this situation in the GDR. The same may be said about other similar phrases we applied to *specific* situations.

As to the discussion about the relative performances of East and West Germany, it seems to us that Mr. Apel is preparing a defense of his forthcoming book. Since this was beyond the scope of our article, we feel no urge to reply.

Dorothy Miller and
Harry G. Trend

[2] In East Europe a similar explanation for the need of a new system of economic management is given in terms of a change from an "extensive" to an "intensive" economy. For an East European criticism of this explanation, see B. Korda, "Comments on J. Goldmann's Study on the Rate of Growth," *Planovane Hospodarstvi,* No. 2, February 1965.

Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

Developments in Rumania

To the Editors: In your January-February 1965 number, George Gross appraises the interesting fruits of Rumanian autonomy within the Soviet bloc. It is surprising how easily Mr. Gross accepts the new official Rumanian explanation for the growing dissatisfaction and despair of the 1,500,000-strong Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Until very recently those Hungarians who maintained their national identity and adhered to their cultural and linguistic heritage were branded "bourgeois nationalists" and "revisionists" (*i.e.,* Marxist revisionists) by Bucharest; now they are conveniently called "agents of Moscow" by the same politically unscrupulous source. Mr. Gross would be nearer to the truth if he sought the causes of Hungarian discontent in Rumania in the harsh, chauvinistic policies of Bucharest—in the closing down of Hungarian schools, the resettlement of Hungarians to remote areas of Rumania, and the ever-increasing curtailment of Hungarian cultural autonomy in that country. As for his allegation that in 1964 scattered "anti-government demonstrations" took place in Transylvania, this is complete

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news to me, unless Mr. Gross had in mind the Nagyvarad (Oradea) demonstration referred to by Mr. George Bailey in *The Reporter* (of Nov. 19, 1964). This protest broke out when local authorities attempted the demolition of Nagyvarad Cathedral, a greatly cherished historical and religious monument. For such a protest to take place, I believe, "the instigation of Budapest" would be entirely unnecessary.

GEORGE GOMORI
Birmingham, England

TO THE EDITORS: I read with great interest Mr. Gross' erudite and in many respects convincing account of contemporary Rumania. It appears, however, that at least in one instance Mr. Gross is too charitable toward Ceausescu & Co.

In commenting on Rumanian reaction to US involvement in Viet-Nam, Mr. Gross somewhat understates the case. For while it is true that, during the first part of 1965 in Rumania, attacks on the US were less frequent and less vituperative than in any other Communist country (with the possible exception of Yugoslavia), it is also true that after the Ninth Party Congress these anti-US attacks picked up momentum. As a matter of fact, the resolution on Viet-Nam adopted by the party Congress, the second Rumanian government statement (August 13), and, among other items, the numerous reports filed by *Scinteia's* Hanoi correspondent (Alexandru Cimpeanu), were no less vitriolic than Soviet (or Czechoslovakian, or Hungarian, or Polish) comments on Viet-Nam. By the time the NFLSV delegation visited Bucharest (December) and Rumania signed a trade deal with North Viet-Nam (January, 1966), anti-US propaganda in Rumanian media was hardly different from any other anti-US diatribes in the bloc.

In all fairness it must be said that some of these developments occurred after Mr. Gross submitted his article. However, it is more disturbing that Mr. Gross consistently, and apparently deliberately, misspelled the title of the official organ of the RCP.

EMERY S. KOBOR
Arlington, Virginia

MR. GROSS REPLIES: Over the past several years, the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania has generated considerable heat and many exaggerated charges, some of which are to be found, unfortunately, in Mr. Gomori's letter and Mr. Bailey's article [in *The Reporter*]. In my own article, I did not intend to deal with this question as an internal matter, but rather to point out how it had become a factor in Rumania's striving for autonomy. The statements made in this regard are backed up by evidence from a variety of sources.

As for Mr. Kobor, he is correct in pointing out that the Rumanian propaganda line on Viet-Nam hardened in 1965. (Actually this adjustment started in April 1965 and not at the Ninth RCP Congress last July.) However, if all indications of policy are taken into account, it is still correct to say that Rumania's stance on this issue has been marked, as compared to the various other Communist countries, by relative restraint.

As for the misprinting of *Scinteia,* please blame the typographer, not the author.

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